

# Demand Estimation for Italian Newspapers: the Impact of Weekly Supplements\*

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## **Abstract**

This paper looks at a form of non-price competition that has taken place in the Italian newspaper market, whereby weekly supplements are sold with the newspaper at a higher price. I estimate the impact of this selling strategy using a logit and a nested logit model of demand on a panel of Italian newspapers. I show that supplements increase the readership both in the weekday of issue and in the average weekday. This suggests that supplements are a way to attract new readers for the newspaper. This promotional effect is due both to business stealing and to market expansion.

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# 1 Introduction

The Italian newspaper market has always been characterized by a low level of price competition, both at the national and at the local level. This is partly due to the fact that until the end of the Eighties prices of newspapers were regulated, and were therefore uniform across newspapers. Even afterwards, however, there did not seem to be a strong competition in prices, since prices have had a quite stable pattern and price increases by the different newspapers have always been quite simultaneous. However, starting from the end of the Eighties, new forms of non-price competition have taken place. In particular, the practice of selling supplements and inserts together with newspapers has become increasingly widespread. The success of this practice is proved by the fact that, according to a recent survey conducted by Censis, 36,5% of the people declare that they buy a newspaper for the supplements it contains.<sup>1</sup> This so-called “war of supplements” has had an important impact on the structure of competitive interactions in this market. In this paper I will test the empirical relevance of this phenomenon by estimating a model of newspapers demand on a panel of national Italian newspapers.

Typically, different types of supplements are packaged with the newspaper in different days of the week. In addition to these weekly supplements, there are other more specific initiatives, such as language courses, encyclopedias released over a number of issues, guides to business and investment, games with prizes (like “lotto”), books, cassettes and so on. These types of supplements and inserts differ not only for their content, but also for the selling strategy adopted: some of them are provided with the newspaper for free, others are sold as a package with the newspaper at a higher price, others can be purchased optionally at an additional fee.

While the promotional feature of free supplements like inserts with specialized information (travels, music, business, etc.), guides and games is evident,<sup>2</sup> it is more of a puzzle to understand the rationale of the pricing strategy used for weekly supplements, which are sold as a package with the newspaper at a higher price.<sup>3</sup> If indeed the introduction of a supplement could attract some readers that would not buy the newspaper otherwise, the fact of bundling it with the newspaper and sell it at a price which is higher than the usual price may discourage part of the established readership.

However I argue that this bundling strategy can be seen as a promotional

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<sup>1</sup>This figure is provided in CENSIS, 2001.

<sup>2</sup>Inserts with specialized information (travels, music, business, etc.) seem to be aimed at integrating and enriching the editorial content of the newspaper, and therefore at making it more valuable to readers. Encyclopedias and guides are probably aimed at inducing individuals that would buy the newspaper only occasionally or never to purchase it regularly during a certain period in order to collect all the installments. Therefore the promotional feature seems to be the prevailing one, given also that these initiatives are largely unrelated with the editorial content of the newspaper. As for games with prizes, they were very successful in increasing sales, and therefore very effective as a promotional device.

<sup>3</sup>The order of magnitude of the price increase of the newspaper in the day of issue of the magazine was of 25% in the first phase, and up to 50% subsequently.

device: people who would not buy the newspaper do indeed purchase it because they are attracted by the supplement. Then, because of the implicit learning costs of reading a newspaper (which might consist in the fact of getting to know where to find the different types of news, of getting used to the format, to the position of the different sections and more generally to the editorial line of a newspaper), the new readers attracted by the supplement might continue to purchase that newspaper afterwards, increasing in this way its readership. Therefore bundling would be a way in which the publishers try to extend the group of readers for the newspaper by providing an almost unrelated product capable of attracting new customers that would not purchase that newspaper otherwise. In the Appendix 3 I provide a numerical example showing how bundling can be used as a promotional device.<sup>4</sup>

In an oligopolistic setting, this idea could be reinterpreted in terms of switching costs: being captured because of the bundling device, consumers become more reluctant to patronize another firm. Therefore, once a publisher has managed to induce new consumers to buy its newspaper, it will enjoy some brand loyalty that will reinforce its market power.

This idea differs from the traditional explanations for commodity bundling that have been provided in the economic literature. The most common explanation for bundling is price discrimination: loosely speaking, selling two products as a package would increase monopoly profits by allowing to implicitly charge different prices for different goods to consumers with different reservation values for the two goods. This idea was first expressed by Stigler (1968), articulated through numerous examples in a widely cited work by Adams and Yellen (1976), and generalized by Schmalensee (1984) and McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989).

My alternative explanation does not rely on the existence of static price discrimination reasons for bundling. More precisely, bundling may be profitable as a promotional device even in the case it was not profitable as a price discrimination device in the short run. The publisher of a newspaper may indeed decide to bundle the newspaper with the supplement in one period instead of pricing them independently (even though the latter strategy would be more profitable in the short run) if it expects to attract new readers for the newspaper and therefore to gain more profits in following periods. Therefore bundling could be seen as an optimal price discrimination device in the long run.

An interesting issue is also why the newspapers prefer to sell the newspaper and the supplement only as a bundle and do not give instead the possibility of buying the newspaper alone, which means that they adopt a pure bundling strategy instead of a mixed bundling strategy. In the above mentioned literature on bundling it is usually argued that mixed bundling is a superior strategy because it is a more flexible tool of price discrimination. However, Anderson and Leruth (1993) show that in an oligopolistic setting mixed bundling may not be optimal because it entails competition on many fronts or products. In the

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<sup>4</sup> Another possible reason behind the introduction of magazines might be advertising revenues. However, this is explanation is not at odds with the one proposed in this paper, as the two could well coexist.

example of Appendix 3 I also provide an example where pure bundling might be more profitable than mixed bundling. This is due to the fact that by allowing also to buy the newspaper alone the newspaper firm would lose profits on the supplement because some readers would not buy the bundle anymore.

The econometric task amounts to understanding the impact of supplements on newspapers' circulation and in particular to testing the hypothesis that bundling may be used as a promotional device. I estimate the impact of supplements using a logit choice model of demand on a panel of the four biggest newspapers in Italy from 1976 to 2000, which is based on a data set that I built at the European University Institute. I compare the result obtained using the multinomial logit model with the one obtained under an alternative specification, namely a nested logit model. The latter assumes that consumers first decide whether to purchase a newspaper or not and then choose among the existing newspapers (which constitute a nest).

I show that the supplements have a positive impact not only on circulation on the day of issue, but also on the own average circulation, which means that there has been a promotional effect. I then address the issue of whether this promotional effect comes from market expansion or from business stealing by computing the marginal effect of the introduction of supplements on other newspapers' circulation and on the outside good. The relative magnitude of these two effects depends on the model adopted: in the multinomial logit model the market expansion effect dominates over the business stealing effect, suggesting that the effect of magazine introduction was to attract new readers rather than stealing readers to each other (at least for the newspapers considered). However, in the nested logit specification, which takes into account the fact that a reader of a newspaper is more likely to substitute with another similar newspaper than with the outside good (i.e. buying no newspapers at all), the business stealing effect is more important than in the logit case, and is even bigger in terms of copies than the market expansion effect.

My work is related to the empirical literature on the estimation of demand with differentiated products<sup>5</sup> and in particular to Kaiser (2003), who analyzes the impact of the introduction of websites on German women magazines and to Petrin (2002), who examines the effects of the introduction of new products (with an application to minivans) using a random-coefficients model of demand.

This paper is also related to the recent empirical work on bundling, namely to Crawford (2001) and Gandal et al. (2003). These papers analyse the price discrimination explanation for bundling by estimating the correlation of consumer valuations (which should be negative in order for this explanation to work), whereas I test a different explanation, namely that bundling can be a promotional device (or long-run price discrimination device).

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I describe the data set used and present some descriptive statistics. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the empirical methodology and the related estimation issues respectively. Results are pre-

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<sup>5</sup>For a discussion of the estimation issues of the Logit model and its applications see Werden et al. (1996).

sented in Section 5. In Section 6 I show additional results on the magnitude of the business stealing effect and of the market enlargement effect. Section 7 concludes and discusses directions for future research. The Appendix contains a description of the data set, tables and figures, and a numerical example motivating my theoretical hypothesis.

## 2 Data

I perform the analysis using a data set which is mainly based on the data collected by the Associazione Diffusione Stampa (ADS). The ADS data set covers the majority of Italian newspapers and magazines and provides therefore a quite complete picture of this market in the last 25 years.<sup>6</sup>

I restrict my analysis to the national newspapers of general information. This market seems to be distinguishable both from the market of business newspapers and from that of sport newspapers. Moreover, the national newspapers of general information seem to belong to a different market than local newspapers, which mainly cover local news and are therefore directed to a different kind of readership.<sup>7</sup>

Among the national newspapers of general information, the two leading ones in terms of circulation are *Repubblica* and *Corriere della Sera*, while *La Stampa* has a lower market share and *Il Giornale* is well below *La Stampa*.<sup>8, 9</sup> The series of monthly average daily printed copies for the four newspapers considered are presented in Figure 1 in the Appendix 2. Among these, only *Il Giornale* has never had any weekly magazine. *Corriere della Sera* and *Repubblica* started to introduce regular weekly magazines from 1987, respectively *Sette* on Saturdays from September 1987 (moved to Thursday from November 1992) and *Venerdì* on Fridays from October 1987.<sup>10</sup> In 1996, they both started to issue also a magazine for women (*Corriere della Sera* in March and *Repubblica* in May). *La Stampa* introduced a weekly magazine of general information similar to the one of the two other competitors (*Specchio*) only from January 1996 and, after four years in which it was sold at a charge together with the newspaper, it started to be distributed for free in September 2000. Table 1 below summarizes the

<sup>6</sup>For a complete description of the data available, see the Appendix 1.

<sup>7</sup>These distinctions have been made clear by the Italian competition authority in several occasions (see for example the case 3354/95 *Ballarino vs. Grandi Quotidiani*).

<sup>8</sup>If we consider these four newspapers as belonging to a single market, *Corriere della Sera* would have a market share of 36% in terms of circulation, *Repubblica* 32%, *La Stampa* 20% and *Il Giornale* 12% (as of year 2000).

<sup>9</sup>Other national newspapers which were or are politically-oriented (controlled directly or indirectly by political parties) had in the past periods of very high circulation (e.g. *L'Unità*, the newspaper of the left-wing party). Unfortunately, the political newspapers are not present (at least not continuously) in the ADS database.

<sup>10</sup>There is a number of other magazines and inserts that are distributed with the newspaper for free, many of which are not issued on a continuative basis or are only issued in some areas. Given the huge number and variety of these supplements, it is not possible to account for all of them. Here I only consider the supplements that are sold with the newspaper at an additional price.

dates of first issue of each magazine and the corresponding weekday. Figure 2 in the Appendix 2 shows the series of prices of newspapers with and without the magazines of general information.

Table 1: Dates of first issue of magazines

	<i>Corriere</i>	<i>Repubblica</i>	<i>La Stampa</i>
General magazine	Sat. from 9/87 Thu. from 11/92	Fri. from 10/87	Sat. from 1/96
Women magazine	Sat. from 3/96	Tue. from 5/96	—

A preliminary descriptive analysis on the data series of monthly average printed copies in the weekday of issue of the respective magazines for *Repubblica*, *Corriere della Sera* and *La Stampa* (the newspapers which introduced a weekly supplement) seems to suggest that at least for the first two newspapers the supplements were very successful, meaning that in the weekday of issue the sales have increased (of course the effect varies over time). Figure 3 shows the daily average number of copies printed on Fridays in each month for the whole period. The blue line represents the Fridays in the absence of the magazine, whereas the other line is the number of printed copies of the magazine sold together with the newspaper.<sup>11</sup> The graph seems to suggest that the introduction of *Venerdì* had a relevant and positive impact on the number of printed copies of *Repubblica* on Fridays.

Figures 4 and 5 show the series for average printed copies on Saturday and on Thursday for *Corriere della Sera*. As to the period in which *Sette* was issued on Saturday, it seems to have increased the printed copies both with respect to the previous period and with respect to the times in which the newspaper was sold alone. Moreover, its impact seems greater when it was sold on Thursday (see Figure 5). One possible explanation for this is that, given that this supplement is very similar in contents and format to *Venerdì* (and they both provide a weekly guide to TV programs and to the main events of the following week), the fact of issuing one day before the other gives a competitive advantage that is reflected in a higher number of copies sold. As far as the women magazine is concerned, this magazine, after a peak in the first months, does not seem to have affected the trend of *Corriere della Sera* in a very strong way.

Figure 6 shows the average printed copies on Saturday for *La Stampa* before and after the introduction of the magazine *Specchio*. After a huge peak in the first few months, circulation does not seem to have significantly increased after the introduction of the magazine.

The data provided by these tables suggest that some of the magazines might have been successful in terms of increased circulation at least in the day of issue. We now have to turn to an econometric analysis in order to correctly identify

<sup>11</sup>From October 1987, that is from the introduction of *Venerdì*, the Friday issue of the newspaper started to be filed separately by ADS, because it contained also the magazine. It was filed together with the other days of the week only when, for some reason (holidays, strikes) the newspaper was issued without the magazine.

and measure the effects of interest controlling for other factors that may affect newspaper circulation.

### 3 Empirical framework

In order to determine whether the magazine affected the circulation of the newspaper in the other days of the week and the circulation of the competing newspapers, I consider a framework that takes into account the determinants of the demand for newspapers.<sup>12</sup> Therefore I estimate a differentiated product model of demand using the panel data on the average daily number of copies printed in each weekday of each month for *Repubblica*, *Il Corriere della Sera*, *La Stampa*, and *Il Giornale*.<sup>13</sup> Under this approach, the magazine is considered as a quality characteristic of the newspaper, and its impact on demand is estimated using a multinomial logit model of product differentiation.

The utility of consumer  $i$  from purchasing product  $j$  at time  $t$  is a function of observed and unobserved characteristics ( $\mathbf{x}_{jt}$  and  $\xi_{jt}$  respectively), price ( $p_{jt}$ ), and unknown parameters. The following functional form is assumed:

$$u_{ijt} = \mathbf{x}_{jt}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_{jt} + \xi_{jt} + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

where  $\epsilon_{ijt}$  is an i.i.d. extreme-value distributed error term.

Notice that in this specification the vector of taste parameters  $\boldsymbol{\beta}$  and the price coefficient  $\alpha$  are assumed to be constant across consumers. This assumption of the logit model has strong implications on the pattern of substitution among products. In particular, it implies that consumers substitute away in proportion to market shares regardless of the characteristics of the products. The full random coefficients model, recently developed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and following literature, overcomes this problem by treating the taste parameters as consumer-specific, allowing therefore for a more flexible pattern of substitution. However, given that for the present analysis own- and cross-price elasticities are not of primary interest, I use the (fixed-coefficient) logit model, whose estimation algorithm is computationally much easier to implement. Moreover the logit model allows to better exploit the panel structure of the data, which is very important in my data set.<sup>14</sup>

Given the panel structure of data, the unobservable component  $\xi_{jt}$  can be decomposed as

$$\xi_{jt} = \gamma_j + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad (2)$$

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<sup>12</sup>This framework could also be used for other types of analyses, like measurement of market power and merger analysis.

<sup>13</sup>The data for the monthly average of daily copies by weekdays (e.g. the average number of copies of Mondays in March 1988) is available in this dataset only for the printed copies, and not for sales. I also replicated the analysis with the data on sales, and the results were similar. However, since these data do not contain information on weekdays, they do not allow to distinguish the impact of the supplement on the day of issue from the impact on other days and other newspapers.

<sup>14</sup>For computational reasons, in random coefficients models different years are treated as different markets (see for example Nevo, 2000), which makes it impossible to use standard panel data techniques.

where  $\gamma_j$  is a product-specific component and  $\varepsilon_{jt}$  is an i.i.d. error term varying across products and time. The product-specific component  $\gamma_j$  is assumed to be an unknown parameter specific to each product, which leads to a fixed-effect model.

Consumers are assumed to purchase one unit of the good that gives them the highest utility.<sup>15</sup> Consumer mean utility  $\delta_{jt}$  from consumption of good  $j$  at time  $t$  is

$$\delta_{jt} = \mathbf{x}_{jt}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_{jt} + \xi_{jt} \quad (3)$$

The logit model leads to the following form of market share for product  $j$  at time  $t$  (choice probability):

$$s_{jt}(\delta_{jt}) = \frac{\exp(\delta_{jt})}{1 + \sum_{k \neq 0} \exp(\delta_{kt})} \quad (4)$$

where  $s_{jt}$  is the number of copies printed by newspaper  $j$  at time  $t$  relative to the total market size. Market size is defined as the total population in Italy older than 14 years at time  $t$ .

The specification of the demand system is completed with the introduction of an outside good, whose utility is generally normalized to zero, so that the market share for the outside good is

$$s_{0t}(\delta_{jt}) = \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{k \neq 0} \exp(\delta_{kt})} \quad (5)$$

The estimation equation for the market share of product  $j$  at time  $t$  is obtained by taking logarithms and subtracting the log of the market share of the outside good from the log of the market share of each product, i.e.:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(s_{jt}) - \ln(s_{0t}) &\equiv \ln\left(\frac{\exp(\delta_{jt})}{1 + \sum_{k \neq 0} \exp(\delta_{kt})}\right) - \ln\left(\frac{1}{1 + \sum_{k \neq 0} \exp(\delta_{kt})}\right) \quad (6) \\ &= \delta_{jt} = \mathbf{x}_{jt}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_{jt} + \xi_{jt} \end{aligned}$$

The dependent variable is therefore the (log) market share of newspaper  $j$  at time  $t$  relative to the market share of the outside good, which is calculated as  $s_{0t} = 1 - \sum_j s_{jt}$ .

The logit model illustrated above implicitly assumes that the substitution pattern across products and with the outside good is driven by market shares only. This means that, for given market shares, consumers are equally likely to substitute toward other similar newspapers than toward the outside good (buying nothing). In reality, however, it seems plausible to assume that the

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<sup>15</sup>The implicit assumption, common to most empirical studies on differentiated product markets, is that consumers purchase at most one product. This assumption seems reasonable in the case of newspapers, where multiple purchases are likely to be negligible, especially if the unit of analysis is the individual and not the household, as it is the case here. Moreover, subscriptions and corporate buys of newspapers, which are typically multiple purchases, are very low in Italy.



reader's choice is twofold: first, she chooses whether to buy a newspaper at all, then which one to buy among those available on the market. This implies that, for given market shares, consumers substitute more toward other similar newspapers than toward the outside good.

The idea that consumer tastes might be correlated across products is captured by the nested logit model of demand, which groups products according to some observable characteristics which are expected to make them closer substitutes for consumers. I therefore assume that the outside good is the only member of the first nest, whereas the four newspapers considered all belong to the other nest.

Under this assumption, consumer utility is:

$$u_{ijt} = \mathbf{x}_{jt}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_{jt} + \xi_{jt} + \zeta_{igt} + (1 - \sigma)\epsilon_{ijt} \quad (7)$$

which is the same as (1) except for the term  $\zeta_{igt}$ , which represents consumer utility common to all products of group  $g$ , and  $\sigma \in [0, 1]$  is a parameter that measures the correlation of utility within each group (if  $\sigma \rightarrow 1$  products within a group are perfect substitutes, whereas if  $\sigma = 0$  they are independent and we are in the logit case).

The demand equation for the nested logit model is: <sup>16</sup>

$$\ln(s_{jt}) - \ln(s_{0t}) \equiv \mathbf{x}_{jt}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_{jt} + \xi_{jt} + \sigma \ln(s_{jt|g}) \quad (8)$$

where  $s_{jt|g}$  is the share of good  $j$  within group  $g$ . Since the last term is endogenous, it needs to be instrumented, an issue that I will discuss in the next section.

## 4 Empirical specification

In order to estimate the market share equations (6) and (8), I append the data on the average daily number of copies printed in each weekday of each month (for instance on the Mondays of July of 1989) from 1976 to 2000 included for the four newspapers mentioned above. This allows to use information on price variability across newspapers within the week,<sup>17</sup> and also to distinguish the impact of the supplement on the day of issue from the impact on other days.

The presence of weekly magazines is considered as a product characteristic, and is therefore included in the vector of product characteristics  $\mathbf{x}_{jt}$ . I distinguish between magazines of general information and women magazines. The vector of product characteristics  $\mathbf{x}_{jt}$  includes therefore:

- dummies for the weekdays in which the own magazine is issued: this variables represent the impact of the magazine on the day of issue, which tells us whether the magazine is a successful one or not;

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<sup>16</sup>For a treatment of the nested logit model see Berry (1994), and for applications Ivaldi and Verboven (2003) and Verboven e Brenkers (2002).

<sup>17</sup>I included in the dataset the time series of prices in different days of the week, which were different from each other just because of the supplements.

- a dummy for the introduction of the weekly magazine of general information;
- a dummy for the introduction of the women magazine.

The last two variables are meant to capture the effect of the introduction of the magazine on the overall circulation of the newspaper, and measure therefore the “promotional effect”.

For each newspaper, I also add a dummy for the launch of the website, a dummy for the games with prizes, the number of local sections, the changes of editors, the issue of the Monday page, and dummies for other events like elections, sport events, and months in order to deseasonalise the data. I also add a time trend in order to control for a possible trend of growth of the whole market, or a general shift in consumer tastes.

Given that the residuals in both models seem to be serially correlated, I estimate a fixed effect logit model with Newey-West standard errors. Therefore the error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic and possibly autocorrelated up to 12 lags (12 months).<sup>18</sup>

Given that the data are monthly average printed copies by weekday for each newspaper, the fixed effect should be a newspaper-weekday fixed effect rather than a newspaper fixed effect. This allows for a different ranking of newspapers across weekdays, which is very convenient when considering the impact of magazines that are issued in different days of the week by different newspapers.<sup>19</sup>

Notice that price endogeneity is not a big concern in this framework because prices were regulated until the end of the Eighties and even afterwards there was not much price variability across newspapers.

A problem of identification arises instead in the nested logit model, since the within market shares  $s_{jt|g}$  are endogenous. As commonly done in the literature,<sup>20</sup> I instrument them with the characteristics of the other products belonging to the same product group (launch of websites, of supplements, and games).

## 5 Results

The framework adopted allows to disentangle several effects of the introduction of supplements. The estimation results for the logit and the nested logit model are presented in Table 2 in Appendix 2.

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<sup>18</sup>Results of estimates obtained under the assumption of autocorrelation of order one (AR(1) fixed effects) are very similar to the ones shown below and are available upon request. I opted for the current specification because it does not require autocorrelation to be of order one, but allows instead for a more flexible correlation pattern.

<sup>19</sup>Notice that the vector of fixed effects  $\xi$  is identified separately from the coefficients on characteristics because in my framework the latter are time-variant (see Berry, 1994 p. 256 and Kaiser, 2003).

<sup>20</sup>See for example Berry (1994), Ivaldi and Verboven (2000), and Kaiser (2003).

First of all, for both types of supplements it is possible to see whether they lead to an increase in the circulation on the weekday in which they are issued. This is the first step of the analysis, because the promotional impact of magazines can only arise if they are actually successful, that is if on the day the newspaper comes out with the magazine the number of copies increases. If this is the case, then one can look at whether this increase of sales arises to the other weekdays as well, which is the effect of interest.

Under both the specifications presented in Table 4 the coefficient for the day of issue of the magazine of general information is positive and strongly significant. This suggests that the introduction of this type of supplement has been a successful practice in terms of circulation, at least in the weekday in which it is issued.

But these results tell us even more. Specifically, the fact that the coefficient of the dummy for the introduction of the magazine of general information is positive and significant in both regressions suggests that the supplements had an impact not only on the day of the week in which they are issued, but also on the other days, which is the promotional effect we were looking for. Therefore this kind of supplement seems to have had a positive impact on average circulation for the newspapers considered. This finding seems to confirm the hypothesis that in this case bundling might have been used as a promotional device, namely to gain a new group of readers that are first attracted by the bundled magazine but may continue to purchase the newspaper alone afterwards. Notice that this explanation does not exclude other additional motivations for bundling: selling the magazines with the newspapers might also have increased advertising revenues (because of increased advertising space on high-quality color paper), but my results show that for sure there was a positive impact on circulation.

Whether this increased circulation comes from people who were not used to buying a newspaper or from readers of competing newspapers is an issue that will be discussed in the next Section.

The results for women magazines do not suggest such a strong positive effect. The coefficient corresponding to the weekday of issue is positive in both models, but not very significant in the nested logit specification. Moreover there does not seem to be a significant effect on all weekdays, suggesting that women supplements does not have a significant promotional effect. Therefore the reason behind the introduction of women supplements may be other than an attempt to attract new readers, and is probably more linked with advertising revenues, which are likely to be very important for this kind of magazines.<sup>21</sup>

The other coefficients have the expected sign and are very precisely estimated. The price coefficient is negative: estimated own elasticities are around 0.37 in the logit model and 0.26 in the nested logit model. Cross elasticities are estimated in a range from 0.008 (*Corriere della Sera*) to 0.002 (*Il Giornale*) in the nested logit, and are a bit smaller in the logit model. These estimates

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<sup>21</sup>Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible to obtain data on advertising revenues and volumes. This would allow to investigate other possible reasons to explain the profitability of supplements, especially for the women magazines whose content is advertising in a big proportion.

of elasticities are consistent with previous studies: for example, Bucklin, Caves and Lo (1989) estimate own elasticities which range from 0.26 to 0.55, whereas Dertouzos and Trautman (1990)'s estimates are around 0.44.

The coefficient relative to the number of local sections is positive, indicating that adding local sections is a successful strategy. This can help explain the increasing trend towards expansion in local markets by big national newspapers, made both via launch of new local sections and via bundling with existing local newspapers. Also the games like "Lotto" that were introduced by some newspapers in the Nineties seem to have been very successful. Another interesting result concerns the launch of websites, which seems to have a negative impact on printed newspapers.<sup>22</sup> This result contrasts with those of Kaiser (2003), who finds that there is no significant crowding out by the online version in the German market for women magazines. This difference can partly be explained with the fact that in Italy the online version was very similar to the printed one, which was not the case for German women magazines. And my findings can also explain the fact that, after a period where the online version was free-of-charge, some newspapers (namely those whose websites were more successful) started to charge readers for online access to full content.

Finally, notice that the correlation coefficient in the nested logit model is 0.63, indicating that there is a quite high degree of substitution between the newspapers considered, and therefore the nested specification is appropriate.

## 6 Market enlargement or business stealing?

The results discussed in the previous Section show that the magazines of general information increased the readership of the newspapers which introduced them. This promotional effect might be due both to the fact that magazines attract readers of rival newspapers (business stealing effect), and to the fact that new readers start to buy a newspaper instead of not buying any newspaper at all (market enlargement effect). In order to disentangle these two effects one should look at the marginal effect of supplement introduction on other newspapers and on the outside good. The estimates of these effects are recovered from the estimates of the parameters shown in Table 2. I compare the marginal effects obtained under the logit specification with those obtained under the nested logit specification. As I will show, the nested model produces a smaller estimate of the marginal effect on the outside good (market expansion) with respect to the logit model, because of the closer substitution between newspapers belonging to the same group. Given that the promotional effect seems to arise mainly for magazines of general information, I only consider this kind of supplements and disregard women magazines in what follows.

For a generic characteristic  $x_{1j}$ , the own marginal effect is given by the first derivative of the market share of newspaper  $j$  with respect to this characteristic.

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<sup>22</sup>Filistrucchi (2003) analyses the impact of website provision on printed newspapers on the same dataset that I use.

For the logit model the own marginal effect is:<sup>23</sup>

$$\frac{\partial s_j}{\partial x_{1j}} = \beta_1(1 - s_j)s_j$$

where  $\beta_1$  is the parameter associated to characteristic  $x_{1j}$ .

The cross marginal effect, that is the effect of characteristic  $x_{1j}$  on another newspaper  $l$  is instead

$$\frac{\partial s_l}{\partial x_{1j}} = -\beta_1 s_l s_j$$

whereas the effect on the outside good is

$$\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial x_{1j}} = -\beta_1 s_0 s_j$$

Given that the characteristic of interest is a dummy (having or not a weekly magazine), the marginal effect must be computed in discrete terms, by taking the difference between the predicted market share when the dummy is one and the predicted market share when the dummy is zero. The own marginal effects is in this case:<sup>24</sup>

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Delta s_j}{\Delta x_{1j}} &= \frac{\exp(\beta_1 + \mathbf{x}_j \boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_j + \xi_j)}{1 + \exp(\beta_1 + \mathbf{x}_j \boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_j + \xi_j) + \sum_{k \neq 0,j} \exp(\delta_k)} + \\ &\quad - \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}_j \boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_j + \xi_j)}{1 + \exp(\mathbf{x}_j \boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_j + \xi_j) + \sum_{k \neq 0,j} \exp(\delta_k)} \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

where  $\mathbf{x}_j$  is the vector of all observed characteristics of newspaper  $j$  but  $x_{1j}$ .

The cross marginal effect of the dummy  $x_{1j}$  of newspaper  $j$  on newspaper  $l$ 's market shares is instead

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Delta s_l}{\Delta x_{1j}} &= \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}_l \boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_l + \xi_l)}{1 + \exp(\beta_1 + \mathbf{x}_j \boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_j + \xi_j) + \sum_{k \neq 0,j} \exp(\delta_k)} + \\ &\quad - \frac{\exp(\mathbf{x}_l \boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_l + \xi_l)}{1 + \exp(\mathbf{x}_j \boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha p_j + \xi_j) + \sum_{k \neq 0,j} \exp(\delta_k)} \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

The computation of the own marginal effect of supplements and of cross marginal effects on other newspapers and on the outside good allows therefore to disentangle the overall promotional effect in a business stealing effect, measured by the cross effects on other newspapers, and a market enlargement effect, measured by the cross effect on the outside good.

Before commenting on the results of the different marginal effects, two observations are required. As discussed above, one of the disadvantages of the

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<sup>23</sup>The formula of the market shares is given by eq. (4) for the newspapers and eq. (5) for the outside good.

<sup>24</sup>I omit the  $t$  subscript for simplicity.

logit model is that it places restrictive assumptions on the substitution pattern of consumers. In particular, consumers are assumed to substitute products only according to market shares. If two newspapers had the same market share, equation (9) implies that the own marginal effect of characteristic  $x_{1j}$  would be the same on both newspaper. Moreover, the cross marginal effect with respect to any third newspaper would be the same, as can be seen in equation (10).<sup>25</sup>

Another remark should be made about the marginal effect of supplements on the market share of the outside good. Given that we use as the potential market size the number of individuals above 14 in Italy, and given that substitution is driven by market shares, the marginal effect on the outside good is by far the largest compared to the effect on rival newspapers. I therefore compute also the marginal effect relative to the number of printed copies of each newspaper.

Table 3 in Appendix 2 shows the marginal effect of the introduction of supplements of general information in their weekday of issue in terms of printed copies gained or lost and in terms of relative printed copies. The impact of magazines in the day of issue is very strong for all the newspapers considered, ranging between 50% of printed copies for Repubblica to 54% for Corriere della Sera. This exercise allows to disentangle the market enlargement effect, that is the effect on the outside good, from the business stealing effect, that is the effect on other newspapers. Although the former is much bigger than the latter in terms of printed copies, they are very similar in relative terms. It should be noticed that the business stealing effect from *Il Giornale*, the only newspaper which does not have any supplement, is generally bigger than from the others. Moreover, the magazine of *La Stampa* had a weaker impact on competitors in terms of relative copies.

Similar remarks hold for the effect of supplements on weekdays other than the weekday of issue of the magazine, which is precisely the promotional effect discussed above (see Table 4 in Appendix 2). This effect is of course smaller than the effect on the weekday of issue, but it is still of a considerable amount, around 35%. Here as well in terms of printed copies the effect on the outside good looks much bigger than the effect on rivals, suggesting that the market enlargement effect is stronger than the business stealing effect. Also on other weekdays than the weekday of issue, the relative business stealing from *Il Giornale* is bigger than from other newspapers.

Results for the marginal effect of supplements in the nested logit model are shown in Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix 2. These results should partly correct for the large effect on the outside good observed in the logit model, because here the four newspapers are considered as belonging to a group and therefore the results allow for a bigger substitutability between them. Table 5 shows

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<sup>25</sup>This problem can be overcome by considering supplements not as the same characteristic for all newspapers, but as a different characteristic for each. In other words, the characteristic would not be “having a supplement of general information” (as it is the case in this first part of the analysis), but instead “having a supplement of general information like *Sette di Corriere della Sera*”, or “having a supplement of general information like *Venerdì di Repubblica*”, or “having a supplement of general information like *La Stampa*”.

the marginal effect of the introduction of supplements of general information in their weekday of issue in terms of printed copies gained or lost and in terms of relative printed copies. As in the logit case, the own effect of magazines on printed copies is around 50%, but here the business stealing effect is bigger than in the logit case, around 10-15%. Notice again that business stealing is larger from *Il Giornale*, the only newspaper which does not have a weekly magazine.

As to the effect of magazines in other weekdays, also in the nested logit case the own effect is more than 30%, and the business stealing effect is around 9%. Here as well the magazine of *La Stampa* has a weaker impact on competitors both in the weekday of issue than in other weekdays.

Therefore both a market enlargement effect and a business stealing effect are present, and they jointly determine the positive effect of magazines on newspapers. In the logit model, the former effect largely dominates over the latter in absolute terms. This is not the case in the nested logit model, which allows a higher substitutability between the newspapers considered in contrast with the outside good which is assumed to belong to a different group. Overall, weekly magazines seem to have been beneficial for the newspapers which decided to launch them because, not only some business stealing took place, but there was also an important enlargement of the readership of newspapers. Indeed, there has been a negative impact on *Il Giornale*, the only national newspaper which never introduced such magazines, and possibly on other minor or local newspaper that I have not considered in the present analysis.

## 7 Conclusion

I study the impact of the strategy of bundling a supplement together with the newspaper at an additional fee. Estimating a differentiated product demand model on a panel of the four biggest Italian newspapers both with a logit and with a nested logit specification, I show that the magazines of general information are generally successful in terms of increased readership both in the weekday of issue and in the average weekday. Therefore the introduction of magazines seems to have had a long-run impact on overall sales, indicating that these magazines are seen by consumers as valuable quality characteristic and that their introduction positively affects the performance of a newspaper in terms of copies sold. This seems to confirm the hypothesis that in this case bundling was used as a promotional device, namely to capture people who would not buy the newspaper but start to purchase it because they are attracted by the supplement.

In order to determine to what extent the impact of magazines is due to business stealing and to what extent it is instead due to market expansion, I compute the marginal effect of each supplement both on rival newspapers and on the outside good. The results show that both a business stealing effect and a market enlargement effect are present. The relative magnitude of these two effects depends on the model adopted: in the multinomial logit model the market expansion effect dominates over the business stealing effect, suggesting

that the effect of magazine introduction was to attract new readers rather than stealing readers to each other (at least for the newspapers considered). However, in the nested logit specification, which takes into account the fact that a reader of a newspaper is more likely to substitute with another similar newspaper than with the outside good (i.e. buying no newspapers at all), the business stealing effect is more important than in the logit case, and is even bigger in terms of copies than the market expansion effect. Therefore the overall effect of this kind of supplements seems to be partly due to an enlargement of the readership to a new target of readers, who started to buy a newspaper attracted by the magazine, and then kept on purchasing it afterwards. However, there appears to be also a business stealing from other newspapers, and in particular from other national newspapers which did not introduce any supplement, and which experienced a significant drop in circulation. In the present analysis I show the negative impact on *Il Giornale*, but it would be interesting to consider also the impact of supplements on minor national newspapers and on local newspapers, which also probably suffered a loss from that.<sup>26</sup>

A feature that is not yet embodied in my model is the dynamics of newspaper demand. A further step will therefore be to account for consumer habits by adopting a dynamic panel framework,<sup>27</sup> which would allow to model issues of learning and switching costs that seem very important in the market for newspapers and particularly when looking at promotional effects.

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<sup>26</sup> In 1995 a complaint was brought to the Italian antitrust authority against *Repubblica* and *Il Corriere della Sera* for the practice of selling supplements with newspapers. The authority concluded that this practice did not constitute an abuse of dominant position neither in the market of national newspapers nor in the market of local newspapers (see case n. 3354/95 *Ballarino vs. Grandi Quotidiani*).

<sup>27</sup> Kaiser (2003), for example, estimates a simplified model of consumer demand by putting lagged endogenous variables as additional regressors.



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## Appendix 1: The data

The data set is mainly based on the data collected by the Associazione Diffusione Stampa (ADS). The ADS database contains information on more than 40 newspapers, most of which are local, entirely on paper from 1976. I have so far transformed these data on an electronic format only for the seven major national newspapers, namely *Repubblica*, *Corriere della Sera*, *La Stampa*, *Il Giornale*, *Il Sole-24Ore*, *Il Corriere dello Sport* and *La Gazzetta dello Sport*.

The information available for each newspaper includes data on:<sup>28</sup>

a) Printed copies

- Average daily number of copies printed
  - in each year
  - in each month (for instance in July 1989)
  - in each different weekday of each year (for instance in all the Mondays of 1989)
  - in each different weekday of each month (for instance in all the Mondays of July of 1989)

b) Circulation (copies distributed or sold)

- average daily number of copies distributed or sold either in Italy or abroad
  - in each year
  - in each month
- average daily number of copies sold (by newspaper agents) in Italy<sup>29</sup>
  - in each year
  - in each month
- average daily number of subscriptions in Italy<sup>30</sup>
  - in each year
  - in each month
- average daily number of free copies in Italy
  - in each year
  - in each month

c) Number of issues printed in each month (only from 1987 onwards)

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<sup>28</sup>In addition to the information on copies sold and printed at a national aggregate level, there are also more disaggregated data on local circulation, divided by regions and provinces.

<sup>29</sup>From 1987 onwards, information is available also on the average daily number of copies sold directly by the newspaper in Italy in each month and in each year.

<sup>30</sup>From 1991 onwards, a distinction was introduced between paid subscriptions, free subscriptions, and enrollment fee subscriptions.

In the days where the supplement is issued together with the newspaper, it is filed on a separate sheet, and I had therefore to include this information for each of the supplements. Therefore, in order to aggregate all the information on every day of the week, I had to reconstruct all the averages by using also the information on the monthly number of issues both for the newspaper and for the supplement. Fortunately, this information on the number of issues started to be included in the data set in 1987, which is exactly the year where the first supplements appeared.

The database has been completed with other information on the dates of the first issues of all the regular supplements, the list of all promotions with the corresponding periods, the series of prices from 1976, the dates in which the local chronicles were added to some of the national newspapers, the dates in which the editors of each newspaper have changed, and the dates of periodic events that may influence the circulation of newspapers such as elections, football cups, Olympic games etc.

## Appendix 2: Figures and tables





Figure 1: Monthly averages of daily printed copies








Figure 6: Monthly average printed copies of La Stampa on Saturday with and without the magazine “Specchio”.

Table 2: Estimation results

	Logit fixed effects	Nested Logit fixed effects
Own supplement (day)	0.320*** (0.046)	0.124*** (0.027)
Own supplement	0.424*** (0.041)	0.170*** (0.030)
Own women supplement (day)	0.191*** (0.044)	0.051* (0.026)
Own women supplement	0.031 (0.025)	- 0.005 (0.023)
Real price	- 0.030*** (0.004)	- 0.009*** (0.002)
Number of local sections	0.043*** (0.006)	0.016*** (0.004)
Games with prizes	0.215*** (0.032)	0.132*** (0.019)
Website	- 0.083*** (0.026)	- 0.054*** (0.015)
Time trend	Yes	Yes
Constant	- 4.748	-3.961
Correlation coefficient $\sigma$		0.633
N. of obs.	8088	8088
N. of groups	28	28

Note: The dependent variable is log market shares (see equations (6) and (8)). Standard errors are in parentheses. Other control variables are included in the regression, such as dummies for sport events, elections, change of editors etc.

Table 3: Logit model: Impact of supplements in the weekday of issue (printed copies and relative printed copies)

		<i>Corriere</i>	<i>Repubblica</i>	<i>Stampa</i>	<i>Giornale</i>	Outside
<i>Corriere</i> magazine	copies	499359	-8062	-5780	-3302	-482215
	relative	0.5452	-0.0103	-0.0106	-0.0115	-0.0106
<i>Repubblica</i> magazine	copies	-8740	489421	-5582	-3158	-471941
	relative	-0.0104	0.5027	-0.0103	-0.0112	-0.0104
<i>Stampa</i> magazine	copies	-5188	-4713	310184	-2169	-298114
	relative	-0.0066	-0.0065	0.5261	-0.0061	-0.0064

Table 4: Logit model: Impact of supplements in weekdays other than the weekday of issue (printed copies and relative printed copies)

		<i>Corriere</i>	<i>Repubblica</i>	<i>Stampa</i>	<i>Giornale</i>	Outside
<i>Corriere</i> magazine	copies	287870	-4821	-3378	-1862	-278184
	relative	0.3482	-0.0059	-0.0061	-0.0065	-0.0060
<i>Repubblica</i> magazine	copies	-4761	263721	-3098	-1712	-254150
	relative	-0.0057	0.3359	-0.0056	-0.0060	-0.0056
<i>Stampa</i> magazine	copies	-3344	-3021	185962	-1285	-178312
	relative	-0.0038	-0.0038	0.3553	-0.0038	-0.0038

Table 5: Nested Logit model: Impact of supplements in the weekday of issue (printed copies and relative printed copies)

		<i>Corriere</i>	<i>Repubblica</i>	<i>Stampa</i>	<i>Giornale</i>	Outside
<i>Corriere</i> magazine	copies	465504	-122457	-89197	-50763	-203087
	relative	0.5077	-0.1559	-0.1644	-0.1752	-0.0044
<i>Repubblica</i> magazine	copies	-128946	446651	-81437	-45551	-190717
	relative	-0.1532	0.4593	-0.1496	-0.1585	-0.0042
<i>Stampa</i> magazine	copies	-82252	-73333	320059	-36155	-128020
	relative	-0.1059	-0.1011	0.5450	-0.1013	-0.0027

Table 6: Nested Logit model: Impact of supplements in weekdays other than the weekday of issue (printed copies and relative printed copies)

		<i>Corriere</i>	<i>Repubblica</i>	<i>Stampa</i>	<i>Giornale</i>	Outside
<i>Corriere</i> magazine	copies	262150	-71930	-52800	-28451	-114853
	relative	0.3176	-0.0882	-0.0954	-0.0998	-0.0024
<i>Repubblica</i> magazine	copies	-70706	245035	-45640	-24921	-103768
	relative	-0.0850	0.3129	-0.0822	-0.0858	-0.0022
<i>Stampa</i> magazine	copies	-47390	-42649	179583	-18560	-70984
	relative	-0.0545	-0.0544	0.3433	-0.0543	-0.0015



## 8 Appendix 3: A numerical example of bundling as a promotional device

The idea that the introduction of a supplement sold together with the newspaper could be a profitable way to attract readers for the newspaper itself can be illustrated by an example with a discrete distribution of consumer types. Let us first consider a situation where a monopolist sells a newspaper at time  $t_0$  and at time  $t_1$  introduces a supplement sold with the newspaper as a bundle in order to attract new readers. Under the assumption that reading a newspaper makes readers used to it, consumers who have bought the newspaper in  $t_1$  will have a higher willingness to pay in a following period  $t_2$ . This can be seen as a sort of learning cost for the reader of a newspaper. Therefore the supplement attracts new readers that will become repeat-purchasers of the newspaper afterwards.

Let us examine an example that shows why bundling can be profitable as a promotional device.

Suppose that in period  $t_1$  the monopolist produces good  $N$  (newspaper) and a supplement  $S$ . There are five types of consumers, whose reservation values for the good are:

	N	S
A	110	92
B	90	5
C	30	10
D	50	100
E	4	146

It is easy to show that here bundling is not profitable as a price discrimination device in a single period. In  $t_1$  the optimal price with bundling would still be  $p_1^{N+S} = 150$  and profits 450, whereas with independent pricing prices would now be  $p_1^N = 90$  and  $p_1^S = 92$ , and total profits are 456 ( $\Pi_1^N = 180$  and  $\Pi_1^S = 276$ ).<sup>31</sup>

After having shown that in this example bundling is less profitable than independent pricing from a static point of view, we now show that bundling may be more profitable in a dynamic sense, namely as a promotional device.

We then have to show that:

1. Bundling is better than independent pricing in a two-period setting. In the absence of static price discrimination motivations for bundling, this implies that the only reason that makes bundling profitable is its promotional effect, namely the fact that it allows to attract readers in the second period;
2. Bundling is the best promotional device: show that bundling is more profitable than a price cut.

**Bundling vs. independent pricing** As explained above, in a one-period setting profits with bundling are 450 and with independent pricing they are 456.

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<sup>31</sup>I assume zero cost of production.

I assume that if a consumer buys good  $N$  in period  $t_1$ , his willingness to pay for that good in period  $t_2$  is increased by 40. The maximization problem of the newspaper firm is solved by determining first the optimal (two-period) pricing strategy with bundling and with independent pricing, and then comparing the corresponding outcomes.

- BUNDLING

In a two-period setting, the best bundling strategy entails selling the bundle at price 150 in  $t_1$ , and good  $N$  alone in  $t_2$ . With this pricing strategy, only consumers A, D, and E buy the bundle in  $t_1$ , and consumers reservation values in  $t_2$  are therefore:

	$N$
A	150
B	90
C	30
D	90
E	44

Therefore the optimal price in period  $t_2$  is  $p_2^N = 90$  and profits are 270. Overall profits in the two periods are 720.

- INDEPENDENT PRICING

In a two-period setting, the best strategy with independent pricing entails selling good  $N$  at price 90 to consumers A and B in  $t_1$ . Consumers reservation values in  $t_2$  are:

	$N$
A	150
B	130
C	30
D	50
E	4

Therefore the optimal price is  $p_2^N = 130$  and profits are 260. Notice that with independent pricing consumers A and B are the only ones who purchase good  $N$ , because there is no market enlargement. Overall profits with independent pricing are 716.

Therefore in this two-period setting, bundling is more profitable because the overall revenue the firm gets if it decides to bundle in period  $t_1$  is 720, whereas it is 716 if it chooses to sell the two goods independently. This is due to the fact that bundling allows to attract a new consumer in the last period (consumer D), and this effect more than compensates the lower profits obtained in the short run.

There are therefore five types of consumers in this example. Type A consumers are "captive", in the sense that their willingness to pay for the newspaper is very high and they buy it with or without the supplement. Type B has instead a very low valuation for the supplement and is not willing to pay a higher

price for the bundle, therefore he does not buy the newspaper if sold together with the magazine. Consumer C does not buy the newspaper anyway, whereas consumers D and E buy it only if bundled with the supplement, because they have a very high valuation for the latter. The difference between D and E is that the former has a high enough valuation for  $N$  and once it learns to read it he keeps on buying it in following periods; this consumer represents the market enlargement or business stealing effect.<sup>32</sup> Consumer E is instead a one-shot buyer, attracted only by the supplement.

The crucial question is now whether bundling is the best promotional device: would not it be more profitable to lower the price of  $N$  in  $t_1$  instead of bundling? In the next section we show that in this example bundling is more profitable than price cutting as a way to attract new readers.

**Bundling vs. price cutting** In order to show that bundling is the best promotional device, we now compare it with a price cutting in period  $t_1$ .

Solving the problem backwards, it is easy to see that the firm obtains the highest profit in  $t_2$  when consumer D has bought in  $t_1$ , because in this case it can price at 90 and get profits of 270, selling to A, B, and D. Therefore in  $t_1$  the firm wants to attract consumer D, and it can do it by either a strategy of bundling or a price cut.

In period  $t_1$ , profits with bundling are 450, as explained above. If instead the firm wants to attract type D consumers with a price cut, it has to lower the price of  $N$  to 50 and earn  $\Pi_1^N = 150$ . The price of  $S$  is instead  $p_1^S = 92$  and the corresponding profits are  $\Pi_1^S = 276$ . Overall profits in  $t_1$  with a price cut are 426. Therefore bundling is more profitable than price cutting as a way to attract new readers.

**Pure bundling or mixed bundling?** One could argue that pure bundling is not the most profitable bundling strategy, because the firm could get higher profits in  $t_1$  by adopting a mixed bundling strategy, i.e. selling both the bundle and good  $N$  alone. By doing so, in our example the firm could sell the bundle to A, D, and E, getting a profit of 450, but could also sell good  $N$  alone to consumer B (who did not purchase with pure bundling), getting an additional profit of 90.

We can modify the example to show that pure bundling may indeed be the most profitable strategy. The intuition is that by giving the opportunity of selling good  $N$  alone you also lose some consumers that would purchase the bundle otherwise, and the result is that total profits are lower.

In order to show this, I modify the example in the following way:<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>In order to disentangle these two effects we should adopt a duopolistic setting. This would also allow to consider the possibility that the firm who introduces the supplement loses forever those readers who are not willing to buy the bundle (type B in the example). This may happen if these readers are captured by a rival newspaper in period  $t_1$ , and their willingness to pay for this newspaper increases so that they stick to it in period  $t_2$ .

<sup>33</sup>In this second example there is scope for price discrimination with bundling even in the short run, because first-period profits with bundling are 555 whereas with independent pricing

	N	S
A	110	92
B	90	5
C	30	10
D	50	135
E	4	181

The optimal  $t_2$  profits are the same as in the previous case, so with bundling in  $t_1$  the firm wants to price so as to attract consumer D. The strategy of selling the two goods independently with a price cut on  $N$  gives the same results as in the previous case (optimal prices and profits are the same).

I now have to compare the profits of a pure bundling strategy with those of a mixed bundling strategy. With pure bundling, the optimal bundle price is 185, and consumers A, D, and E buy giving profits of 555. With mixed bundling, the firm could sell the bundle at 185 and good  $N$  at 90. Therefore D and E buy the bundle and A and B buy good  $N$  alone (because A gets a higher surplus by purchasing A alone at the price of 90 than by purchasing the bundle at 185). This would give the firm profits of 550, lower than the profits it would get with pure bundling.

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they are 476. However, short-run price discrimination is not the only driving force of the dominance of bundling in the two-period setting, as there is an additional gain from bundling in the second period (second period profits are 270 with bundling and 260 with independent pricing) due to the fact that this strategy allows to attract new readers.