European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET)

Studienzentrum Gerzensee

5/16 July 2004

 

The meeting is generously hosted by Studienzentrum Gerzensee.

Travel costs are sponsored by the Economic Journal

 

Programme

Monday 5 July Week 1

 

08:30 - 09:30 The Impact of Leniency Programs on Cartels

Cecile Aubert (Univ. Paris IX Dauphine)
William Kovacic (George Washington University)
*Patrick Rey (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR)

 

09:50 - 10:50 Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

*Volker Nocke (University of Pennsylvania)
Lucy White (Harvard Business School)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions

John Asker (Harvard University)
*Estelle Cantillon (Harvard Business School and CEPR)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Competitive Experimentation with Private Information

Guiseppe Moscarini (Yale University) *Francesco Squintani (University College London)

 

Tuesday 6 July

 

08:30 - 11:30 Focus Session: Law and Economics

 

Session Organizer: Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

 

  The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives

*Steven Shavell (Harvard University)

 

  Legal Applications of Contract Theory

*Alan Schwartz (Yale University)

 

  Courts and Contracts

Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University)
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)
*Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Design and Enforcement of Legal Standards

*Giovanni Immordino (Universita di Salerno)
Marco Pagano (Universita di Salerno)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Contracting in the Shadow of the Law

*Nicola Gennaioli (Harvard University)

 

Wednesday 7 July

 

08:30 - 09:30 Firm-Specific Training

Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
*Christopher Harris (King's College, Cambridge)

 

09:50 - 10:50 Employer Learning and General Human Capital

*Jan Eeckhout (University of Pennsylvania)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Flexible Contracts

Paolo Ghirardato (University of Turin)
*Piero Gottardi (University of Venice)
Jean-Marc Tallon (Universite Paris I)

 

20:30 - 21:30 A Smooth Model of Decision Making Under Ambiguity

Peter Klibanoff (Nothwestern University)
Massimo Marinacci (University of Turin)
*Sujoy Mukerji (University of Oxford)

 

Thursday 8 July

 

08:30 - 11:30 Focus Session: Allocation Mechanisms without Prices

 

Session Organizer: Michele Piccione (London School of Economics)

 

  Social Assets

*George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

 

  Better Mechanism Design and Implementation

*Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Columbia University)

 

  Equilibria in the Jungle

*Michele Piccione (London School of Economics)
Ariel Rubinstein (Tel-Aviv University and New York University)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Qualitative Voting

*Rafael Hortala-Vallve (London School of Economics)

 

20:30 - 21:30 A Model of the Origins of Basic Property Rights

*Abhinay Muthoo (University of Essex)

 

Friday 9 July

 

08:30 - 09:30 Multidimensional Cheap Talk

*Gilat Levy (London School of Economics and CEPR) *Ronny Razin (New York University and CEPR)

 

09:50 - 10:50 Competition over Non-Bayesian Agents

*Ran Spiegler (Tel-Aviv University)

 

Parallel Session:

 

11.10 - 12.10 Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders

*Winand Emons (Universität Bern and CEPR)

 

11.10 - 12.10 Discretion and Partisans

*Elisabetta Iossa (Brunel University)
Giuliana Palumbo (Bank of Italy)

 

Week 2

 

Monday 12 July

 

8:30 - 09:30 Building Rational Cooperation

James Andreoni (University of Wisconsin)
*Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)

 

9:50 - 10:50 Media as Watchdogs: The Role of News Media in Electoral Competition

*Jimmy Chan (John Hopkins University)
Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability

Jeffrey Ely (Boston University)
Marcin Peski (Northwestern University)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University of Essex)
George J Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Stephen Morris (Yale University)

 

Tuesday 13 July

 

08:30 - 11:30 Focus Session: Models of Reputation

 

Session Organizer: Jeffrey Ely (Boston University)

 

  Reputational Cheap Talk

*Marco Ottaviani (London Business School and CEPR)
*Peter Sorensen (Kobenhavns Uniersitet)

 

  Career Concerns in Financial Markets

Amil Dasgupta (London School of Economics)
*Andrea Prat (London School of Economics and CEPR)

 

  Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

*Martin Cripps (Washington University, St. Louis)
*George J Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Static Efficiency and Dynamic Incentives

*Heski Bar-Isaac (New York University)
Juanjo Ganuza (U. Pompeu Fabra)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations

Philippe Jehiel (CERAS-ENPC, University College London and CEPR)
*Frederic Koessler (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

 

Wednesday 14 July

 

08:30 - 9:30 Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Auctions

*Ian Jewitt (Nuffield College, Oxford and CEPR)

 

09:50 - 10:50 Towards a Theory of Deception

*David Ettinger (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)
Philippe Jehiel (CERAS-ENPC and University College London)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Principal and Expert Agent

*James Malcomson (University of Oxford)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Dynamic Aspects of Unstructured Bargaining

*Christopher Tyson (Nuffield College, Oxford)

 

Thursday 15 July

 

08:30 - 11:30 Focus Session: Strategic Behavior and Educational Outcomes

 

Session Organizer: Christopher Avery (Harvard University)

 

  School Choice : An Experimental Study

Yan Chen (University of Michigan)
*Tayfun Sonmez (Koç Universi

 

  Games of School Choice under the Boston Mechanism

Haluk Ergin (MIT)
*Tayfun Sonmez (Koç University)

 

  Categorical Redistribution in Winner-Take-All Markets

*Roland Fryer (Harvard University)
Glenn Loury (Boston University)

 

  Equilibrium Information Disclosure: Grade Inflation and Unraveling

Michael Ostrovsky (Harvard University)
*Michael Schwarz (Harvard University)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Contracts with Endogenous Information

*Dezso Szalay (Université de Lausanne)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Party Governance and Political Competition

Micael Castanheira (Universite Libre de Bruxelles)
Benoit Crutzen (Universite Libre de Bruxelles)
*Nicolas Sahuguet (Universite Libre de Bruxelles)

 

Friday 16 July

 

08:30 - 09:30 Post-Schooling Wage Growth: Investment, Search, and Learning

*Yona Rubinstein (Tel-Aviv University)
Yoram Weiss (Tel-Aviv University)

 

9:50 - 10:50 Reverse Discrimination and Efficiency in Education

*Gianni de Fraja (University of York and CEPR

 

* denotes speaker