European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET)

Studienzentrum Gerzensee, 4-15 July 2005

The meeting is generously hosted by Studienzentrum Gerzensee.

Organizers: Patrick Rey (University of Toulouse and CEPR) and Xavier Vives (INSEAD, ICREA-UPF and CEPR)

Programme

Monday 4 July

 

08:30 - 09:30 The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing

Patrick Bolton (Princeton University and CEPR)
* Christopher J Harris (University of Cambridge)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions

 

20:30 - 21:30 Recursive Global Games

Chryssi Giannitsarou (University of Cambridge)
*Flavio Toxvaerd (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms

*Guido Friebel (IDEI, Toulouse and CEPR)
Sergei Guriev (CEFIR, Moscow, New Economic School, Moscow and CEPR)

 

Tuesday 5 July

 

08:30 - 11:30 Focus Session: Organizations

 

Session Organizer: Wouter Dessein (University of Chicago and CEPR)

 

  Organizing for Synergies

*Wouter Dessein (University of Chicago and CEPR)
Luis Garicano (University of Chicago and CEPR)
Rob Gertner (University of Chicago)

TBC

 

  Too Motivated?

*Eric Van den Steen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

 

  Optimal Delegation

Ricardo Alonso (Northwestern University) *Niko Matouschek (Northwestern University and CEPR)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Downsizing, Job Insecurity, and Firm Reputation

*Doh Shin Jeon (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Joel Shapiro (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

TBC

 

20:30 - 21:30 Slotting Allowances and Conditional Payments

*Patrick Rey (University of Toulouse and CEPR)
Jeanine Thal (University of Toulouse)
Thibaud Vergé (University of Southampton)

 

Wednesday 6 July

 

08:30 - 09:30 Reputations in the Marketplace: Career Tournaments and Criticism

*Pablo Casas-Arce (University of Oxford)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 The Wisdom of the Minority

Steven Callander (Northwestern University) *Johannes Hörner (HEC School of Management, Northwestern University and CEPR)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Estimating Market Power in a Two-sided Market: the Case of Newspapers

*Elena Argentesi (European University Institute, Florence and IDEI, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse)
Lapo Filistrucchi (European University Institute, Florence and University of Siena)

 

Thursday 7 July

 

08:30 - 11:30 Focus Session: Two-Sided Markets

 

Session Chair: Bruno Jullien (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR)

 

  Platform Ownership

Volker Nocke (University of Oxford and University of Pennsylvania)
Martin Peitz (Universidad de Alicante)
*Konrad Stahl (Universität Mannheim and CEPR)

 

  Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts Part 1, Part 2

*Mark Armstrong (University College London and CEPR)

 

  Customer or Complementor? Intercarrier Compensation with Endogenous Network Architecture

*Ben Hermalin (University of California, Berkeley)
Michael Katz (University of California, Berkeley)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Advertising, Competition and Media Diversity

Claude Crampes (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse)
Carole Haritchabalet (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse)
Bruno Jullien (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Reputation and Collusion

Giacomo Calzolari (University of Bologna)
*Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics and CEPR)

 

Friday 8 July

 

08:30 - 09:30 Content and Advertising in the Media: Pay-TV versus Free-to-Air

*Martin Peitz (Universidad de Alicante)
Tommaso Valletti (Imperial College London and CEPR)

 

Parallel Sessions

 

10:00 - 11:00 Capital and Crises in Banking

*Lucy White (Harvard Business School and CEPR)

 

10:00 - 11:00 Platform Competition and Welfare: Media Markets Reconsidered

Attila Ambrus (Harvard University)
*Markus Reisinger (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich)

 

Monday 11 July Week 2

 

08:30 - 09:30 The Timing of Bets and the Favorite-Longshot Bias
Part 1, Part 2

Marco Ottaviani (London Business School and CEPR)
*Peter Norman Sorensen (University of Copenhagen)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects

Paul Heidhues (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) and CEPR)
*Nicolas Melissas (University of Leicester)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Non-Cooperative Foundations of Hedonic Equilibrium

*Michael Peters (University of British Columbia)

 

Tuesday 12 July  

 

08:30 - 11:30 Focus Session: Complementarities and Games

 

Session Organizer: Xavier Vives (INSEAD, ICREA-UPF and CEPR)

 

  New Developments

*Xavier Vives (INSEAD, ICREA-UPF and CEPR)

 

  Strategic Complementarities: Some Macro Perspectives

*Kiminori Matsuyama (Northwestern University)

 

  Testing Models with Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods

*Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology)
Ivana Komunjer (California Institute of Technology)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Discounted Supermodular Stochastic Games

*Rabah Amir (University of Arizona)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Efficient Compromising

*Tilman Börgers (Univresity College London)

 

Wednesday 13 July

 

08:30 - 9:30 Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change

George-Marios Angeletos (Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER)
*Christian Hellwig (University of California, Los Angeles)
Alessanfro Pavan (Northwestern University)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 The Comparative Statics of Constrained Optimization Problems

*John Quah (University of Oxford)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Merger failures

*Albert Banal - Estañol (University of Western Ontario)
Jo Seldeslachts (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB))

 

Thursday 14 July

 

08:30 - 11:30 Focus Session: The Empirics of Complementarities

 

Session Organizer: Xavier Vives (INSEAD, ICREA-UPF and CEPR)

 

  Inference Strategies in Discrete Games

*Elie Tamer (Northwestern University)

 

  Innovation, Complementarity and Scale of Production Pernías

*Eugenio Miravete (University of Pennsylvania and CEPR)

 

  Coordination Games, Multiple Equilibria and the Timing of Radio Commercials

*Andrew Sweeting (Northwestern University)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Dominance-Solvable Lattice Games with Monotonic Best Response Functions

*Alexander Zimper (Universität Mannheim)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

*Frank Heinemann (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
Rosemarie Nagel (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Peter Ockenfels (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main)

 

Friday 15 July

 

08:30 - 09:30 Generic Uniqueness and Continuity of Rationalizable Strategies

*Muhamet Yildiz (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

 

Parallel Sessions:

 

10:00 - 11:00 On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions

* Juan José Ganuza Fernandez (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
José Penalva Zuasti (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

 

10:00 - 11:00 Dynamic Choice under Ambiguity

Marciano Siniscalchi (Northwestern University)

 

* denotes speaker