European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET) 2006

Study Center Gerzensee, 3-14 July 2006

The meeting is generously hosted by Studienzentrum Gerzensee.

Programme

Week One

Monday 3 July  

 

08:30 - 10:00 How to Organize Crime

*Mariagiovanna Baccara (Stern School of Business, New York University)
Heski Bar-Isaac (Stern School of Business, New York University)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions

 

20:30 - 21:30 Influencing the Influencers: Optimal Network Strategies

*Andrea Galeotti (University of Essex)
Sanjeev Goyal (Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Essex)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Legislative Bargaining (Over Discrete Bills)

*Rafael Hortalà-Vallvé (Nuffield College, Oxford University)

 

Tuesday 4 July

 

08:30 - 10:00 Trust and Cooperation in Social Networks

*Adam Szeidl (University of California, Berkeley)
Markus Mobius (Harvard University)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:00 - 21:00 Bilateral Commitment

Sophie Bade (Penn State University)
*Guillaume Haeringer (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
Ludovic Renou (University of Adelaide and University of Leicester)

 

20:00 - 21:00 Diversity and Demand Externalities with a Multidimensional Good

Heski Bar-Isaac (Stern School of Business, New York University)
*Guillermo Caruana (CEMFI, Madrid)
Vicente Cuñat (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR)

 

Wednesday 5 July

 

08:30 - 11:30 Focus Session: The Economics of Social Networks

 

Chair: Matthew O. Jackson (Caltech and CASBS Stanford)

 

  Interaction Patterns With Hidden Complementarities

Coralio Ballester (Universidad de Alicante)
*Antoni Calvó-Armengol (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and CEPR)

 

  Delegated Public Good Provision

Francis Bloch (Université de la Méditerranée)
*Garance Genicot (Georgetown University)

 

  Network Games

Andrea Galeotti (University of Essex)
Sanjeev Goyal (Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Essex)
*Matthew O. Jackson (Caltech California Institute of Technology)
Fernando Vega-Redondo (Universidad de Alicante, University of Essex)
Leeat Yariv (Caltech)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:00 - 21:00 Identification of Peer Effects Through Social Networks

*Yann Bramoullé (Université Laval)
Habiba Djebbari (Université Laval)
Bernard Fortin (Université de Laval)

 

20:00 - 21:00 Coordination and Delay in Hierarchies

*Andrea Patacconi (Oxford University)

 

Thursday 6 July

 

08:30 - 10:00 Information Markets: of Efficient Monopolies and Inefficient Chinese Wall

*Antonio Cabrales (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Piero Gottardi (Universita' Ca Foscari Venezia)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Avoiding Bad Companies: the Spread of Misbehavior in Social Networks

George Ehrhardt (ICTP Trieste)
Constanza Fosco (Universidad de Alicante)
Matteo Marsili (ICTP Trieste)
*Fernando Vega-Redondo (Universidad de Alicante, University of Essex)

 

20:30 - 21:30 On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure

*Vasiliki Skreta (University of Pittsburgh)

 

Friday 7 July

 

08:30 - 10:00 Contracts, Hold-Up and Export: Textiles and Opium in Colonial India

*Rachel E. Kranton (University of Maryland)
Anand Swamy (Williams College of Economics)

 

Morning Parallel Sessions:

 

10.30-11.30 Local Network Effects and Complex Network Structure

*Arun Sundararajan (Stern School of Business, Kaufman Management Center, New York University)

 

10.30-11.30 The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony

*Winand Emons (Universität Bern and CEPR)
Claude Fluet (Université du Quebec, Montréal)

 

Monday 10 July Week 2

 

08:30 - 10:00 Money Pumps in the Market

*Ran Spiegler (University College London)
Ariel Rubinstein (NYU and Tel Aviv)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Paternalism in a Behavioral Economy

*Francesco Squintani (University College London, University of Rochester)
Alvaro Sandroni (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)

 

20:30 - 21:30 When Should Leaders Share Information with their Subordinates?

*Jordi Blanes I Vidal (University of Oxford)
*Marc Moller (University Carlos III Madrid)

 

Tuesday 11 July  

 

08:30 - 10:00 A "Super" Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games

Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University)
Dino Gerardi (Yale University)
*Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Why The Ultimatum Game May not Be the Ultimate Experiment

*Yoram Halevy (University of British Columbia)
*Michael Peters (University of British Columbia)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Learning and the Common Prior Assumption

*Nabil al-Najjar (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University)

 

Wednesday 12 July

 

08:30 - 11:30 Focus Session: Boundedly Rational Beliefs in Games

 

Chair: Ran Spiegler (University College London)

 

  "Wishful Thinking in Strategic Environments"

*Muhamet Yildiz (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

 

  "Dynamic Psychological Games"

*Pierpaolo Battigalli (Universita Bocconi)
*Martin Dufwenberg (University of Arizona)

 

  Inferential Naivety in Games

*Erik Eyster (London School Economics)
Matthew Rabin (University of California, Berkeley)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Cooperation and Communication in Front of a Large Audience: Evidence from a TV Game Show

*V. Bhaskar (University College London)

 

20:30 - 21:30 TBA

*Ian Jewitt (Nuffield College, Oxford University)

 

Thursday 13 July

 

08:30 - 10:00 Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product Lines

*Emir Kamenica (Harvard University)

 

Evening Parallel Sessions:

 

20:30 - 21:30 Tournaments with Midterm Reviews

*Alex Gershkov (University of Bonn)
Motty Perry (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

 

20:30 - 21:30 Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence From a Firm-Level Experiment

*Imran Rasul (University College London)

 

Friday 14 July

 

08:30 - 10:00 Aggregation of Information and Beliefs in Prediction Markets

*Marco Ottaviani (London Business School)
*Peter Sorensen (Kobenhavns Uniersitet)

 

Morning Parallel Sessions:

 

10.30-11.30 Learning and Self-Reinforcing Behavior

*Margaret A. Meyer (Nuffield College, Oxford University)

 

10.30-11.30 Learning and Self-Reinforcing Behavior

*Margaret A. Meyer (Nuffield College, Oxford University)

 

Asterisks (*) denote authors who are present at the meetings.

 

Organizers: Antoni Calvó-Armengol (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and CEPR)
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Margaret A Meyer (Nuffield College, Oxford University and CEPR)
Andrea Prat (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and CEPR)
Philippe Bacchetta (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR)
Patrick Legros (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles and CEPR)
Patrick Rey (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR)