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European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory

A CEPR Symposium,

            Gerzensee, 3/14 July 2000

Monday 3 July  


08.30 - 10.00 Strategic Experimentation with Public or Private Information

Martin Cripps (University of Warwick)
Godfrey Keller (London School of Economics)*
Sven Rady (
Universität München, Stanford University, and CEPR)


20.30 - 21.30 Entry Deterrence in Durable Goods Monopoly

Heidrun Hoppe (Universität Hamburg)
In Ho Lee (University of Southampton)*


20.30 - 21.30 Modelling Financial Fragility in Emerging and Transition Economies

Jeffrey H Nilsen (Studienzentrum Gerzensee and Copenhagen Business School)
Riccardo Rovelli (Università di Bologna)*

Tuesday 4 July


08.30 - 12.15 Focus Session: Microeconomic Models of Financial Crises


  Optimal Currency Crises

Franklin Allen (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)  
Douglas Gale (New York University)


  Demand Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs

Itay Goldstein (Bank of Israel and Tel Aviv University)
Ady Pauzner (Tel Aviv University)


20.30 - 21.30 Dollarization, Bailouts and the Stability of the Banking System

Figures from this paper are available as a separate file.

Douglas Gale (New York University)
Xavier Vives (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona, and CEPR)*


20.30 - 21.30 Delegated Portfolio Management, No Churning, and Relative Performance-Based Incentive/Sorting Schemes

Sudipto Bhattacharya (London School of Economics and CEPR)


Wednesday 5 July


08.30 - 10.00 Professional Advice

A second paper that relates to this presentation is also available

Marco Ottaviani (University College London)
Peter Sørensen (University of Copenhagen)*


20.30 - 21.30 Robustness of Adaptive Expectations as an Equilibrium Selection Device

Martin Lettau (Federal Reserve Bank of New York and CEPR)
Timothy Van Zandt (INSEAD, Fontainebleau)*


20.30 - 21.30 Speculative Attacks: Unique Sunspot Equilibrium and Transparency  

Frank Heinemann (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt-am-Main)*
Gerhard Illing (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt-am-Main)


Thursday 6 July


08.30 - 12.15 Focus Session: Macroeconomic Models of Financial Crises


  Nominal Debt and the Dynamics of Currency Crises (survey)

Giancarlo Corsetti (Yale University and CEPR)
Bartosz Maćkoswiak (Yale University)


  Third Generation Models of Currency Crises (survey)

Philippe Bacchetta (Studienzentrum Gerzensee, Université de Lausanne and CEPR)


  Financial Crises as Herds

V V Chari (University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)
Patrick Kehoe (University of Pennsylvania and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)*


Friday 7 July  


08.30 - 10.00 Why are Housing Prices so Volatile?
Income Shocks in a Stochastic Model with Heterogeneous Agents

François Ortalo-Magné (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Sven Rady (Universität München, Stanford University, and CEPR)*


Monday 10 July


08.30 - 09.45 The Employment Relation and the Theory of the Firm: Arm’s Length Contracting versus Authority

Patrick Bolton (Princeton University and CEPR)*
Ashvin Rajan (Princeton University)


10.15 - 11.30 Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory

Paul Klemperer (Nuffield College, Oxford, and CEPR)


10.15 - 11.30 Performance Incentives with Award Constraints

Pascal Courty (London Business School and CEPR)*
Gerald Marschke (State University of New York, Albany)


20.30 - 21.30 The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments

Anke Kessler (Universität Bonn and CEPR)*
Christoph Lülfesmann (Universität Bonn)

20.30 - 21.30  The Power of a Strategic Buyer with Perfect and Imperfect Monitoring

V Bhaskar (University of Essex)


Tuesday 11 July


08.30 - 12.15 Focus Session on: Personnel Economics

  The Future of Personnel Economics

Edward P Lazear (Hoover Institute, Stanford University)


  Ownership and Incentives

George Baker (Harvard University)


  Top Management Compensation and Incentives: Executive Compensation

Kevin J Murphy (University of Southern California)


20.30 - 21.30 Competing for Ownership

Patrick Legros (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Université de Liège
and CEPR)
Andrew Newman (University College London)


20.30 - 21.30 Capacity Constrained Firms in (Labor) Markets with Adverse Selection

A second paper that relates to this presentation is also available

Roman Inderst (Universität Mannheim)
Achim Wambach (Universität München and CEPR)*  


Wednesday 12 July


08.30 - 12.15 Focus Session: Multiparty Contracting


  Overview of Multiparty Contracting

Ilya Segal (Stanford University)
Michael Whinston (University of Chicago)

  Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

The figures for this paper are available as a separate file

Ilya Segal (Stanford University)
Michael Whinston (University of Chicago)

  Games Played Through Agents

Andrea Prat (STICERD, London School of Economics and CEPR)
Aldo Rustichini (Boston University)*


20.30 - 21.30 Central Governance or Subsidiarity: A Property-Rights Approach to Federalism

Christoph Lülfesmann (Universität Bonn)


20.30 - 21.30 Increasing Lock-in to Facilitate Decision-Making: A Property Rights Theory of the Firm with Private Information

Niko Matouschek (CEP, London School of Economics)


Thursday 13 July


08.30 - 09.45 When are Economies with Asymmetric Information Walrasian ?

Alberto Bisin (New York University)*  
Piero Gottardi (University of Venice)
Danilo Guaitilo
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR)


10.15 - 11.30 Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting with Unobservable Cash Flows

Peter DeMarzo (University of California, Berkeley)*
Mike Fishman (Northwestern University)


10.15 - 11.30 Market Size and Firm Turnover (Part 1: Theory)

Marcus Asplund (Stockhom School of Economics)
Volker Nocke (Nuffield College, Oxford)*


20.30 - 21.30 Project Bundling, Liquidity Spillovers, and Capital Market Discipline

Roman Inderst (Universität Mannheim)
Holger M Müller (Universität Mannheim)*


10.15 - 11.30 The Incentive Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations

Alessandro Lizzeri (Princeton University)
Margaret A Meyer (Nuffield College, Oxford, and CEPR)*
Nicola Persico (University of Pennsylvania)


Friday 14 July

08.30 - 09.45 Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?

Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics)*
Kevin J Roberts (Nuffield College, Oxford)


The views expressed in these papers are those of the author(s) and not those of the funding organization(s), nor of CEPR which takes no institutional policy positions.