

WEDNESDAY 4 JULY

Morning Sessions

08.30 - 09.45 | **Inequality and Risk-Taking Behaviour**
Ed Hopkins (University of Edinburgh)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30 | **Reciprocal Contracting**
Michael Peters (University of British Columbia)

Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets
*Marek Pycia (Université de Toulouse I)
Qingmin Liu (University of Pennsylvania)

THURSDAY 5 JULY

Focus Session on Matching

Chair: | *Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)*

08.30 - 09.45 | **Matching with Incomplete Information**
*Qingmin Liu (University of Pennsylvania)
George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)
Larry Samuelson (Yale University)

10.15- 11.30 | **Stable Marriage and Search Frictions**
Stefan Lauermaun (University of Michigan)
Georg Nöldeke (Universität Bonn and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30 | **The Supermodular Stochastic Ordering: Applications**
*Margaret Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR)
Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)

Do Smarter Consumers Get Better Advice? An Analytical Framework and Evidence from German Private Pensions
Tabea Bucher-Koenen (Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, Munich)
*Johannes Koenen (Universität Bonn)

FRIDAY 6 JULY

Morning Sessions

08.30 – 09:30 | **Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching**
*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University College London and CEPR)
Ed Hopkins (University of Edinburgh)

Morning Parallel Sessions

10:00 – 11:00 | **Pay-for-luck in CEO compensation: matching and efficient contracting**
Pierre Chaigneau (HEC Montréal)
*Nicolas Sahuguet (Ecole des HEC)

Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
*Renato Gomes (Toulouse School of Economics)
Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)

WEEK 2

MONDAY 9 JULY

Morning Sessions

08.30 – 09:45	Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters Heski Bar-Isaac (New York University) *Joyee Deb (New York University)
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Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Rational Inattention and Organizational Focus *Wouter Dessein (Columbia University Business School and CEPR) Andrea Galeotti (University of Essex) Tano Santos (Columbia University and CEPR)	Optimal Certification Design Sergey Kovbasyuk (EIEF)
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TUESDAY 10 JULY

Focus Session on Communication and Information

Chair:	Marco Ottaviani (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University and CEPR)	
08.30 - 09.45	A Conversational War of Attrition Katalin Bognar (University of California, Los Angeles) *Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (University of California, Los Angeles) Lones Smith (University of Wisconsin)	
10.15 - 11.30	Uncertain Reaction Lag and Cooperation in Continuous Prisoners' Dilemma In-Uck Park (University of Bristol)	

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Manipulative Disclosure Claudio Mezzetti (University of Warwick)	Targeted Communication, Selective Disclosure, and Privacy Florian Hoffmann (Goethe University Frankfurt) Roman Inderst (Goethe University Frankfurt and CEPR) Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR)
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WEDNESDAY 11 JULY

Morning Sessions

08.30 - 09.45	A Large-Market Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model Xavier Vives (IESE, Barcelona-Madrid and CEPR)
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Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Cheap Talk With Two-Sided Private Information Inés Moreno de Barreda	Uniqueness and Comparative Statics in the Strategic Information Transmission Game Dezső Szalay (Universität Bonn)
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THURSDAY 12 JULY

Focus Session on Communication and Information

Chair:	<i>Dezső Szalay (Universität Bonn)</i>
08.30 - 09.45	Selling Information *Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR) Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford University)
10.15 - 11.30	Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market *William Fuchs (University of California Berkeley) Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford University)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Optimal Delay in Committees Ettore Damiano (University of Toronto) *Hao Li (University of British Columbia) Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong)	A Folk Theorem with Mediated Communication David Rahman (University of Minnesota)
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FRIDAY 13 JULY

Morning Sessions

08.30 - 09.30	Queues and Experiments Martin Cripps (University College London) *Caroline Thomas (University of Texas, Austin)
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Morning Parallel Sessions

10.00- 11.00	Buybacks and opportunism in vertical contracting João Montez (London Business School)	Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case *Tymofiy Mylovanov (Penn State University) Thomas Tröger (Universität Mannheim)
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* Indicates the presenter.

Organisers:

Jan Eeckhout (University College London and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR)
Dezső Szalay (University of Bonn)

Organising Committee:

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Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Christian Hellwig (University of California, Los Angeles and CEPR)
Matthew O. Jackson (Stanford University)
Margaret Meyer (Oxford University and CEPR)
Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR)
Andrea Prat (London School of Economics and CEPR)
Sven Rady (Universität München and CEPR)
Patrick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR)
Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University)
Dezső Szalay (University of Bonn)
Juuso Välimäki (Helsinki School of Economics and CEPR)
Timothy Van Zandt (INSEAD and CEPR)
Xavier Vives (IESE Business School, Barcelona-Madrid and CEPR)
Lucy White (Harvard Business School and CEPR)