The following papers will be presented at this symposium. Please see the Programme for further details.

A Large-Market Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model

Xavier Vives (IESE, Barcelona-Madrid and CEPR)

A Conversational War of Attrition

Katalin Bognar (University of California, Los Angeles) *Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn (University of California, Los Angeles) Lones Smith (University of Wisconsin)

Adverse Selection and Matching

Heski Bar Isaac (New York University) *Ian Jewitt (University of Oxford and CEPR) Clare Leaver (University of Oxford and CEPR)

A Folk Theorem with Mediated Communication

David Rahman (University of Minnesota)

Buybacks and opportunism in vertical contracting

João Montez (London Business School)

Child Adoption Matching: Preferences for Gender and Race

*Maria Giovanna Baccara (Washington University, St Louis) Allan Collard-Wexler (New York University) Leonardo Felli (London School of Economics and CEPR) Leeat Yariv (California Institute of Technology)

Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market

*William Fuchs (University of California Berkeley) Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford University)

Decision-Making and Implementation in Teams

*Marc Möller (Universität Bern) Jordi Blanes-i-Vidal (London School of Economics)

Do Smarter Consumers Get Better Advice? An Analytical Framework and Evidence from German Private Pensions

Tabea Bucher-Koenen (Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, Munich) *Johannes Koenen (Universität Bonn)

Inequality and Risk-Taking Behaviour

Ed Hopkins (University of Edinburgh)

Manipulative Disclosure

Claudio Mezzetti (University of Warwick)

Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching

*Venkataraman Bhaskar (University College London and CEPR) Ed Hopkins (University of Edinburgh)

Matching Information

*Hector Chade (Arizona State University) Jan Eeckhout (University of Pennsylvania and CEPR)

Matching with Incomplete Information

Qingmin Liu (University of Pennsylvania) George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania) Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania) Larry Samuelson (Yale University)

Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case

Tymofiy Mylovanov (Penn State University) Thomas Tröger (Universität Mannheim)

Mismatch, Rematch and Investment

Thomas Gall (University of Bonn) Patrick Legros (ECARES) Andrew Newman (Boston University)

Optimal Certification Design

Sergey Kovbasyuk (EIEF)

Optimal Delay in Committees

Ettore Damiano (University of Toronto) *Hao Li (University of British Columbia) Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong)

Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets

Marek Pycia (Université de Toulouse I) Qingmin Liu (University of Pennsylvania)

Pay-for-luck in CEO compensation: matching and efficient contracting

Pierre Chaigneau (HEC Montréal) *Nicolas Sahuguet (Ecole des HEC)

Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets

*Renato Gomes (Toulouse School of Economics) Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)

Queues and Experiments

Martin Cripps (University College London) Caroline Thomas (University of Texas, Austin)

Rational Inattention and Organizational Focus

*Wouter Dessein (Columbia University Business School and CEPR) Andrea Galeotti (University of Essex) Tano Santos(Columbia University and CEPR)

Reciprocal Contracting

Michael Peters (University of British Columbia)

Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters

Heski Bar-Isaac (New York University) *Joyee Deb (New York University)

Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules

*Tilman Börgers (University of Michigan) Doug Smith (Federal Trade Commission)

Selling Information

Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR)

Stable Marriage and Search Frictions

Georg Nöldeke (Universität Bonn and CEPR)

Targeted Communication, Selective Disclosure, and Privacy

Marco Ottaviani (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University and CEPR)

Transparency and Commitment

Vasiliki Skreta (New York University)

The Supermodular Stochastic Ordering: Applications

*Margaret Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR) Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)

Uncertain Reaction lag and Cooperation in Continuous Prisoners' Dilemma

In-Uck Park (University of Bristol)

Uniqueness and Comparative Statics in the Strategic Information Transmission Game

Dezsö Szalay (Universität Bonn)