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How to Target the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia

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I. Introduction

Kompas
Jakarta Post

Jakarta Post
Jakarta Post

II. Experimental Design and Data

II.A. Setting

Bantuan Langsung Tunai

BLT

Biro Pusat Statistik

BPS

Raskin

(Operasi Pasar Khusus

Askeskin/Jamkesmas

Kompas

Kompas

II.B. Sample

dusun

Rukun Tetangga (RT)

Kompas
Kompas

II.C. Experimental Design

Basic setup

the set of

Main Treatment 1: PMT

Main Treatment 2: Community Targeting

paling mampu

paling miskin

Main Treatment 3: Hybrid

Community Sub-Treatments

Randomization Design

kecamatan

kabupaten

kecamatan

Timing

III. Data

III.A. Baseline Data

III.B. Data on treatment results

III.C. Data on community meetings


III.D. Data on community satisfaction

III.E. Summary statistics

III.F. Randomization Balance Check

IV. Main Results: Targeting Performance and Satisfaction

IV.A. Targeting performance



very

IV.B. Satisfaction

$$\sum_i u_c - c_i(e) X_i$$

$$i \ u_c$$

$$c_i(e)$$

$$e \qquad X_i$$

$$i \qquad u_g \qquad pmti$$

elite capture

$$i$$

$$e$$

$$u$$

$$i$$

V. Elite Capture

$$\lambda \neq \lambda$$

$$\lambda$$

λ ivk

l

ivk

2

 ivk

3

ivk

4

5

ivk

6

 ivk

ivk

 β

ivk

 ivk k ivk

ivk

VI. Community effort

tokoh

n

n

VII. Does the Community Have a Different Maximand?

$$u \neq u$$

VII.A. *Alternative welfare metrics*

u

r

r

r_e

r

r_i

r_g

r_c

r_e

νkw

l

$\nu k \quad 2$

νk

k

νkw

νkw

w

ν

k

r

r

u

r

VI.B. Broadly shared preferences?

VII.C. What is the community maximizing?

$$r \neq r$$

$$\lambda \neq \lambda$$


$$r$$

$$r$$

$$u$$

$$\lambda$$

VII.D. Information



VIII. Conclusion

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Table 1: Randomization Design

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Panel A: Consumption from baseline survey

Panel B: Mis-targeting variables:

Panel C: Rank correlations between treatment results and...

Table 4: Results of Different Targeting Methods on Mis-targeting Rate

Table 5: Satisfaction

<i>Panel A: Household Endline Survey</i>
<i>Panel B: Sub-village Head Endline Survey</i>
<i>Panel C: Comment forms and fund disbursement results</i>

Table 8: Effort

Table 9: Rank correlation matrix of alternative welfare metrics

$$\mathcal{U}_{\underline{s}}$$

Table 12: What is the community maximizing?

u_c u_e u_s

Table 13: Information

Figure 1: PDF of log per-capita consumption of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, by treatment status




Figure 2: Effect of order in ranking meeting on mis-target rate

