

European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory Gerzensee, 29 June/10 July 1998

Final Programme

Monday 29 June

- 08.30 - 09.45 **Prices and the Winner's Curse**
Jeremy Bulow (Graduate School of Business, Stanford)
Paul Klemperer (Nuffield College, Oxford, and CEPR)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **Optimal Trade Policy in the Presence of DFI and Internal
Tax Competition**
Laurel Adams (Northwestern University)
Pierre Regibeau (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona,
and CEPR)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **Does Asymmetry Help Firms to Collude?**
Massimo Motta (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, and CEPR)

Tuesday 30 June INTERNATIONAL TRADE

- Workshop leaders: Kyle Bagwell (Columbia University)
Joseph Francois (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and CEPR)
(presentations to last about 45 minutes each)
- 08.30 **GATT-Think**
Kyle Bagwell (Columbia University)
Robert Staiger (University of Wisconsin)
- Competition and Trade Policy**
Joseph Francois (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and CEPR)
Henrik Horn (World Trade Organization, Geneva, and CEPR)
- Global Income Divergence, Trade and Industrialization:
The Geography of Growth Take-Offs**
Richard Baldwin (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva,
and CEPR)
Philippe Martin (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva,
and CEPR)
Gianmarco Ottaviano (Università di Bologna, Università Bocconi,
Milano, and CEPR)
- Why are Preferential Trade Agreements Regional?**
Rodney D Ludema (Georgetown University)
Ian Wooton (University of Glasgow and CEPR)

Wednesday 1 July

- 08.30 - 09.45 **Incomplete Social Contracts**
Philippe Aghion (University College London, EBRD and CEPR)
Patrick Bolton (Princeton University and CEPR)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **Information Aggregation, Strategic Behavior, and Efficiency**
Xavier Vives (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona, and CEPR)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **The Search for Fit: Learning from Others and Organizational Design**
Kai-Uwe Kühn (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona, and CEPR)
Peter Zemsky (INSEAD, Fontainebleau)

Thursday 2 July **COMPETITION POLICY**

Workshop leaders: Richard Gilbert (University of California, Berkeley)
Patrick Rey (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR)
(presentations to last about 45 minutes each)

- 08.30 **Anti-Trust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual Property**
Richard Gilbert (University of California, Berkeley)
Carl Shapiro (University of California, Berkeley)
- Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion**
Olivier Compte (CERAS, Paris)
Frédéric Jenny (Conseil de la Concurrence, Ministère des Finances, and ESSEC, Paris)
Patrick Rey (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR)
- Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy**
Patrick Bolton (Princeton University and CEPR)
Joseph Brodley (Boston University)
Michael Riordan (Boston University)
- R&D Competition with Network Externalities**
Joseph Farrell (University of California, Berkeley)
Michael Katz (Haas School of Business, University of California)
- 20.30 **Roundtable**
Chair: Richard Gilbert (University of California, Berkeley)
Frédéric Jenny (Conseil de la Concurrence and ESSEC, Paris)
Joseph Farrell (University of California, Berkeley)
Damien Neven (Université de Lausanne and CEPR)
David Newbery (Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge, and CEPR)
Xavier Vives (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona, and CEPR)

Friday 3 July

- 08.30 - 09.45 **Competition, Contracts and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market**
David M Newbery (Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge, and CEPR)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **Capacity Investment and Competition in Decentralised Electricity Markets**
Nils-Hendrik von der Fehr (Universitetet i Oslo)
David Cameron Harbord (David Harbord and Associates, Oxford)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **Team-Play and the War of Attrition**
David Myatt (Nuffield College, Oxford)

Monday 6 July

- 08.30 - 09.45 **The Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem: Second-Best Contracts**
Patrick Bolton (Princeton University and CEPR)
Christopher Harris (University of Cambridge)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions**
Olivier Compte (CERAS, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Paris)
Philippe Jéhiel (CERAS, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Paris, University College London and CEPR)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **Allocation of Effort in Government Bureaucracies**
Maija Halonen (University of Bristol)
Carol Propper (University of Bristol)

Tuesday 7 July

- 08.30 - 09.45 **Narrative Evidence on the Dynamics of Collusion: The Sugar Institute Case**
David Genesove (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Wallace Mullin (Michigan State University)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **Estimating Demand for Local Telephone Service with Asymmetric Information and Optional Calling Plans**
Eugenio J Miravete (INSEAD, Fontainebleau, and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona)
- 20.30 - 21.30 **Horizontal Mergers: A Free-Entry Equilibrium Analysis**
Luís M B Cabral (London Business School, Universidade Nova de Lisboa and CEPR)

Wednesday 8 July REGULATION

Workshop leader: Michael Riordan (Boston University)

8.30

Regulating Telecommunications: Issues for Future Policy

Michael Riordan (Boston University)

The Transition to Competition in Telecommunications

Gary Biglaiser (University of North Carolina)

Michael Riordan (Boston University)

The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transactions Costs

David Martimort (INRA/IDEI, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, and CEPR)

20.30 - 21.30

The Design of Markets and the Solution to Hold-Up Problems

Hans Gersbach (Alfred-Weber-Institut, Universität Heidelberg)

20.30 - 21.30

Internal Efficiency and Competition

Jörgen W Weibull (Stockholm School of Economics)

Thursday 9 July

08.30 - 09.45

The Sale of Intellectual Property: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Incomplete Contracts

James J Anton (Fuqua School, Duke University)

Dennis A Yao (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

20.30 - 21.30

A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transactions Costs

Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics and CEPR)

Jean-Jacques Laffont (IDEI and GREMAQ, Toulouse)

David Martimort (INRA/IDEI, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, and CEPR)

20.30 - 21.30

Market Experimentation in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly

Godfrey Keller (London School of Economics)

Sven Rady (Graduate School of Business, Stanford)

Friday 10 July

8.30 - 9.45

Sequential Investments and Options to Own

Georg Nöldeke (Universität Basel)

Klaus M Schmidt (Universität München and CEPR)