



EUROPEAN SUMMER SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY Generously hosted by Study Center Gerzensee

PROGRAMME WEEK 1 July 4th – 8th 2022

Monday, 4 July

Focus Session on Credible Mechanisms

08.30 - 09.30	Credible Auctions *Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University) with Shengwu Li (Harvard University)
09.30 – 10.30	Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment *Laura Doval (Columbia Business School and CEPR) with Vasiliki Skreta (UT Austin, UCL and CEPR)
10:30 -11:00	Coffee break
11:00 - 12:00	On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Auction *Songzi Du (UC San Diego) with Ben Brooks (University of Chicago)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Keeping Agents in the Dark: Private	Gradual Learning from
	Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms	Incremental Actions
	*Andrea Attar (TSE) with Eloisa Campioni	*Julia Salmi (University of
	(Universitá degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata)	Copenhagen) with Tuomas Laiho
	Thomas Mariotti (TSE and CEPR) and	(Finnish Ministry of Finance) and
	Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University and CEPR)	Pauli Murto (Aalto University)

<u>Tuesday, 5 July</u>

Focus Session on Credible Mechanisms 08.30 – 09.30 Taxing Externalities with Unequal Incon

09.30 Taxing Externalities with Unequal Incomes *Mallesh Pai (Rice University and CEPR) with Philipp Strack (Yale University and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Should the Timing of Inspections be	Network Formation and
	Predictable?	Heterogeneous Risks
	*Jan Knopfle (Aalto University) with Ian	*Antonio Cabrales (Universidad Carlos
	Ball (MIT)	III de Madrid and CEPR) with Piero
		Gottardi (University of Essex and CEPR)



Wednesday, 6 July

Focus Session on	Credible Mechanisms
08.30 - 09.30	Auctions for homogeneous goods: a case for pay-as-bid
	*Marek Pycia (University of Zurich and CEPR) with Kyle Woodward (University of
	North Carolina)
9.30 - 10.30	
	Timing decisions under model uncertainty
	*Sarah Auster (University of Bonn and CEPR) with Christian Kellner (University of
	Southampton)
10.30 - 11.00	Coffee break
11:00 - 12:00	Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated?"
	*Jiangtao Li (Singapore Management University) with Piotr Dworciak (Northwestern University)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Fighting for Lemons: The Encouragement	False Narratives and Political
	Effect in Dynamic Competition with	Mobilization
	Private Information	*Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University and
	*Marc Möller (University of Bern) with	CEPR) with Simone Galperti (UC San
	Juan Beccuti (University of Bern)	Diego) and Kfir Eliaz (Tel Aviv
		University and CEPR)

Thursday, 7 July

Focus Session on Credible Mechanisms	
08.30 - 09.30	Dominance and Optimality
	*Tilman Börgers (University of Michigan)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Communication in the shadow of catastrophe	Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents
	*Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR) and Inga Deimen (University of	*Denis Kattwinkel (UCL) with Axel Niemeyer (BGSE, University of Bonn),
	Arizona and CEPR)	Justus Preusser (BGSE, University of Bonn) Bonn) and Alexander Winter (BGSE,
		University of Bonn)

<u>Friday, 8 July</u> Morning Session	
08.30 - 09.30	Investment incentives in near-optimal mecha
	*Shengwu Li (Harvard University) with Moham
	University) Scott Duke Keminers (Hervard Univ

anisms

nmad Akbarpour (Stanford University), Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University) and Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)

Morning Parallel Session

10.00 - 11.00	A Welfare Analysis of a Steady-State
	Model of Observational Learning
	*Meg Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR) with Eszter Kabos (University of Oxford)

Privacy-Preserving Auctions

*Ran Eilat (Ben-Gurion University) with Kfir Eliaz (Tel Aviv University and University of Utah) and Xiaosheng Mu (Princeton University)

* Indicates the presenter







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PROGRAMME WEEK 2 July 11th – 15th 2022

Monday, 11 July

Focus Session on Value and Cost of Information Gathering and Processing 08.30 – 09.30 Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture *Palée Country (USE) with Allia Countraction Learning (USE) and Themas Proved

*Balázs Szentes (LSE) with Alkis Georgiadis-Harris (LSE) and Thomas Brzustowski (LSE)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information	Information Payoffs: An Interim
	Acquisition	Perspective
	*Ludmila Matyskova (University of Bonn) with	*Alex Smolin (TSE and CEPR) with
	Alfonso Montes (École Polytechnique)	Laura Doval (Columbia Business
		School and CEPR)

Tuesday, 12 July

Focus Session on Value and Cost of Information Gathering and Processing
Modeling Machine Learning
*Andrew Caplin (NYU) with Daniel Martin (Northwestern University) and Philip Marx
(Louisiana State University)09.30 - 10.30Inattentive Economies
George-Marios Angeletos (MIT) and *Karthik Sastry (MIT)10:30 - 11:00Coffee break11:00 - 12:00Information Acquisition, Efficiency, and Non-Fundamental Volatility
*Ben Hébert (Stanford University) with Jennifer La'O (Columbia University and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Information Choice in Auctions	Persu
	* Nina Bobkova (Rice University and CEPR)	*Anto
		Schoo

Persuasion as Matching *Anton Kolotolin (UNSW Business School) with Alex Wolitsky (MIT)

Wednesday, 13 July

Focus Session on Value and Cost of Information Gathering and Processing

08.30 - 09.30

Applications of Power Diagrams to Mechanism and Information Design *Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn and CEPR) with Andreas Kleiner (Arizona State University) and Philipp Strack (Yale University and CEPR) and Mark Withmeyer (Arizona State University)



Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	Persuasion Duality
	*Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern
	University) with Anton Kolotolin (UNSW
	Business School)

Consumer Search and Choice Overload *Volker Nocke (University of Mannheim and CEPR) with Patrick Rey (TSE and CEPR)

Thursday, 14 July

Focus Session on Value and Cost of Information Gathering and Processing 08.30 - 09.30 Protracted Learning and Preemptive Stopping: the Wald Problem with Ambiguity *Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University) with Sarah Auster (University of Bonn and CEPR) and Konrad Mierendorff (UCL) 9.30 - 10.30 **The Indirect Cost of Information** *Weijie Zhong (Stanford Graduate School of Business) with Alex Bloedel (Caltech) 10.30 - 11.00**Coffee break** 11:00 - 12:00 Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness *Anne-Katrin Roesler (University of Toronto) with Rahul Deb (University of Toronto and CEPR)

Evening Parallel Sessions

20.30 - 21.30	(In)efficiency in Information Acquisition and Aggregation Through Prices	Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring
	*Xavier Vives (IESE Business School and	*Ming Yang (UCL) with Liang Dai
	CEPR) with Alessandro Pavan	(Shanghai Jiao Tong University) and Yenan
	(Northwestern University and CEPR)	Wang (University of Amsterdam)

Friday, 15 July

Morning Session		
08.30 - 09.30	The Optimality of Coarse Menus	
	*Dirk Bergemann (Yale University and CEPR) with Tibor Heumann (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile) and Stephen Morris (MIT and CEPR)	

Morning Parallel Session

10.00 - 11.00	Consumer Theory in the Dark	Principled Mechanism Design with
	*Jakub Steiner (University of Edinburgh	Evidence
	and CEPR) with Colin Stewart (University	*Roland Strausz (Humboldt-Universität zu
	of Toronto) and Pavel Kocourek (CERGE-	Berlin and CEPR) with Sebastian
	EI)	Schweighofer-Kodritsch (Humboldt-
		Universität zu Berlin)
* Indicates the prese	nter	

indicates the presenter



ESSET 2022 Organisers:

Scientific coordinators: Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania and CEPR) and Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR) Chair of the Organising Committee: Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR)

Week 1: Vasiliki Skreta (UT Austin, UCL and CEPR) and Joel Sobel (UC San Diego) **Week 2:** Emir Kamenica (Chicago Booth) Stephen Morris (MIT and CEPR)

Organising Committee:

Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania and CEPR) Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University and CEPR) Johannes Hörner (Yale University and CEPR) Emir Kamenica (University of Chicago and CEPR) Margaret Meyer (University of Oxford and CEPR) Stephen Morris (MIT and CEPR) Dirk Niepelt (Study Center Gerzensee and CEPR) Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University) Marco Ottaviani (Bocconi University and CEPR) Andrea Prat (Columbia University and CEPR) Joel Sobel (UC San Diego) Dezsö Szalay (University of Bonn and CEPR) Xavier Vives (IESE Business School, Barcelona and CEPR) Lucy White (Boston University and CEPR)

