Hidden Hostility: Donor Attention and Political Violence

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Introduction

- Rich country governments give considerable sums of Official Development Assistance
  - 2019: ODA US$ 168 billion,
  - Especially high in Africa as proportion of budget
  - Main donor countries: UK, France, US, Japan, Germany

Donor Influence

- ODA (can) influence recipient governments
  - Pro-development? (Easterly 2003, Sachs 2006)
  - Geo-strategically
  - Domestically
- Indirectly
  - Collier Hoeffler (2002), de Ree Nilleson (2009), Nunn and Qian (2014)
- Donor public opinion could affect recipient government actions (indirectly at least)
  - Civil rights
  - Repression
  - Violence against civilians
  - Army Actions (Durante Zhuravskaya 2018)
- Our focus: where preferences of donor and recipients diverge, recipient actions may depend on donor attention

Distraction: The Super-bowl, Disasters, Elections

- Reasonable conjecture: if donors distracted, recipients are less constrained
- Conjecture supported by Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018) Israel/Palestine
  - News pressure: time devoted to top three stories, not related Israel/Palestine in evening news on NBC, ABC, and CBS
  - Instrument with – Important political/sports events (pre-determined timing) dominating U.S. news
  - More importantly – measure of ex ante expectation for whether U.S. media are likely to cover important events
- Israeli attacks are significantly more likely to occur during these events
  - Israeli attacks not significantly related to news pressure driven by unpredictable onset of natural disasters

Israel an unusual Aid Recipient

- Very high state capacity
- Long-lasting conflict
- Highest aid recipient from US (top two)
- Most of the aid military: 3.8 billion USD (2020)
- Relatively small part of budget $134 billion USD
- A democracy

African Aid

- Aid amounts much higher vis a vis govt. budget
  - Substantial number with ODA 30 to 40% of budget sometimes close to 100%
- Much lower state/military capacity
- Rarely two-player conflict
- Rarely readily identified military targets
- Multiple aid donors
- Polity scores vary widely

Government Acts in Low Capacity Settings

- Conjecture (which we share) is that distraction of large donors frees (pro-)government actors
- But attacks on opposition forces may not be main channel of effect
  - Low military and state capacity
  - Distributed (diffused) nature of opposition
- Instead: Low capacity government choice is reaction to *dissent*:
  - Protests and Civil Disobedience,
  - Riots,
  - Violence
- Choice is degree of *reaction*:
  - Beating up protesters
  - Shooting into crowds
  - Rounding up organizers

Donor Distraction and Actions

- Government can be more reactive to acts of dissent
- Facing a less constrained government opposition should moderate
  - So government repression may decline overall (ambiguous)
  - But anti-government agitation should fall
  - Government repression per agitation should increase
  - Anticipated v. Unanticipated distractions?
- A model of this game

Donor Distractions

- Multiple donors for each African country in sample
- We do not measure media coverage in each donor country
- We do utilize distraction events in each donor country
  - Natural Disasters
  - Elections

Recipient Country Actions

- Acts of government repression
  - Violence Against Opposition
  - Repression
  - Excessive force against protesters
- Acts of opposition dissent
  - Peaceful Protests
  - Riots
  - Violence Against Government Supporters (civilians)

Roadmap

- Description of Data
- Empirical Strategy
- We don't find what we thought we'd find
- Things more complicated (build model)
- Test Predictions of model
- Some Handwaving (more tests)

Data: Disasters

EM-DAT: International Disaster Database

- Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) UCL (Belgium)
- Global database on natural and technological disasters
- Various sources, mainly international agencies (e.g UN, Red Cross, governments, etc)
- More than 21,000 disasters from 1900 to present
- Includes disasters conforming to at least one of the following:
  - (i) 10 or more people dead; (ii) 100 or more people affected; (iii) declaration of state of emergency; and (iv) call for international assistance
- Disasters identified at the **country** and **day** level
- Disaster types: transport accident, flood, storm, earthquake, epidemic, drought, etc
  - we focus on **natural disasters only**
  - top 10%: $>$ **115 deaths**

Data: Donor Recipient Links

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

- Source: OECD International Development Statistics
- ODA: Total Net
- Donor-Recipient-Year flows
- 49 donors, aprox 180 recipients
- Time: 1960-2017

Military Arms Sales: Fearon and Hansen (2018)

- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
- Arms transfers between states since 1950
- Highly concentrated – small number of major suppliers

Data: Violence/Demonstrations

ACLED

- Tracks political violence, demonstrations and select (politically important) non-violent events
- Battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, protests, riots, strategic development Event types
- Actors: state forces, rebels, militias, identity groups, demonstrators, civilians and external forces
- Derived from a wide range of local, regional and national sources
- Collected by trained data experts worldwide
- Geographical (GPS) and time (day) precision
- Africa: 1997-present

Data: Violence/Demonstrations

ACLED: Key outcomes

- Violence against civilians: violent events where an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants (e.g beating, shooting, torture, rape, mutilation, kidnapping)
- Protests: public demonstration in which the participants do not engage in violence, though violence may be used against them
- Riots: violent events where demonstrators or mobs engage in disruptive acts, including but not limited to rock throwing, property destruction, etc.

Data: Violence/Demonstrations

SCAD: Social Conflict Analysis Database

- Information on protests, riots, strikes, and other social disturbances
- Searches of Associated Press and Agence France Presse newswires, as compiled by the Lexis-Nexis news service
- Peaceful demonstrations, violent riots, strikes, repression, anti-gov violence, extra-gov violence and intra-gov violence SCAD
- Geographical (GPS) and time (day) precision
- Africa and Latin America: 1990-2017

Data: Our final version

- Unit of analysis: country (recipient)-day level
- Conflict outcome: dummy indicating whether there was a conflict event on that day (repression, demonstration, etc)
- Donor disaster: variable indicating there was a disaster in a donor country (defined below)
- Donor election
- Robustness: military links (partners)
- Africa
  - for SCAD events: 01 Jan 1990 - 31 Dec 2017
  - for ACLED events: 01 Jan 1997 - 15 Jul 2018

Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Demonstrations	0.0694	0.254	0	1	393,715
Protests	0.0489	0.216	0	1	393,715
Riots	0.0315	0.175	0	1	393,715
Violence Against Civilians	0.0193	0.138	0	1	393,715
State Violence	0.0618	0.241	0	1	393,715
Repression	0.00245	0.0495	0	1	490,896
Disaster (Share within 10 preceding years)	1.74e-05	0.000851	0	0.277	525,017
Election (Share within 10 preceding years)	2.68e-05	0.000950	0	0.227	533,618
Mean monthly temperature	24.47	4.511	6.420	33.97	536,905
Mean monthly log(precipitation + 0.01)	3.265	2.063	-4.605	6.371	536,905
Growing Season	0.615	0.374	0	1	515,721
GDP per capita	4,561	5,190	436.7	41,249	489,789
Bureaucratic quality	1.635	0.894	0	3	275,392
Tax to GDP ratio	14.44	6.398	0.000148	30.89	367,798
Military Expenditure per capita	46.72	97.86	0.500	1,422	415,285
Autocracy	0.180	0.384	0	1	536,905
Anocracy	0.539	0.498	0	1	536,905
Democracy	0.281	0.449	0	1	536,905

Empirical Strategy

Links:

$$Link_{rdy} = \frac{\sum_{\tau=y-10}^{\tau-y} ODA_{rd\tau}}{\sum_{d} \sum_{\tau=y-10}^{\tau-y} ODA_{rd\tau}}, \tag{1}$$

Donor Disaster at day t:

$$DonorDisaster_{r,y,t-1} = \sum_{d} Disaster_{dt-1} \times Link_{rdy} \times \text{ODA/GNI}_{ry}, \tag{2}$$

Robustness. *alternative bilateral links: major donor, military transactions data instead of development assistance data, different time frames, receiving any donation at all during entire period under consideration, different moving average computations such as the average over the past 20 or 30 years.*

Empirical Strategy

Main specifications:

$$Y_{r,y,t} = \beta DonorDisaster_{r,y,t-1} + \gamma_{ry} + \alpha_m + \epsilon_{r,y,t}, \tag{3}$$

- $Y_{r,y,t}$: Event – Repression, Demonstrations, Riots, Violence etc. in country r, year y and day t
- γ_{ry} are country-year fixed effects
- α_m are month fixed effects
- Standard errors clustered at the country level

What would we expect if government initiates aggression (analog of IDF)?

When donor distracted:

- Increased frequency of state forces (ACLED: military, police and other security agents, pro-gov militia)
- Increased military actions against rebel actors, unidentified armed groups, political militias, vigilante militias, communal militias
- Increased frequency of such forces targeting civilians (or civilian fatalities)
- Increased frequency of repression by state forces (SCAD)

Figure 1: Impact of Disasters and Elections on State Violence and Repression (S)



No sign that recipient governments are opportunistically exploiting distraction to initiate conflict

- What would we expect to see if opposition initiates dissent and government is a 'reactor'?

Model: Actors

- **The Government** – mechanical actor, exogenous reactivity level
- **The Opposition** – Chooses whether to 'agitate' ($A = 1$) against Government or not ($A = 0$)
  - Once started, $A = 1$ lasts over multiple days,
- **Individuals** – members of opposition, get 'agitated' by opposition incitement.
  - Chooses whether to participate in dissent
  - Type of dissent to express

Model: Individual Decisions

Individual benefits of Dissent

- $V^i(\theta)$ denotes the value of performing action i as experienced by agent of type θ
- Individuals vary by type, θ, the degree to which they 'enjoy' dissenting act, $V^i_\theta > 0$.
- $i = p$ (protests), or $i = r$ (riots), or $i = v$ (violence against civilians)
- Assume:

$$V^v_\theta > V^r_\theta > V^p_\theta \tag{4}$$

  i.e.: More extreme actions are relatively more enjoyed by higher θ types

Model: Individual Types

Individual costs of Dissent

- Cost of action i denoted $C^i(S)$
  - Costs: effort, opp cost, etc., **AND probability of encountering security forces, AND severity of punishment if encountered**
- Costs independent of θ but increasing in government repression $S = L$ or H
  - $C^i_S \geq 0$:
  - $S = L$ normal state of repression by government policy/security forces/army
  - $S = H$ increased repression:

    Beating/arresting/detaining protesters

    Firing into crowds

    Arming/unrestraining militia

    etc.
- C increasing in severity of action: $C^v(S) \geq C^r(S) \geq C^p(S)$.

Key Assumptions

Assumption 1: When donors are distracted, $S = H$. Otherwise $S = L$.

Assumption 2: $C_S^i > 0$ for $i = p, r$. But $C_S^v = 0$.

- Clearly for $i = p, r$
  - Greater security forces response to protests, more violence if caught
  - Government embarrassed to be heavy handed with dissent in front of donors
- For v – punishment for violence targeted at private citizens – (govt. supporters in particular) donor distraction does not matter
  - Recipient government acts towards those targeting violence at civilians unaffected by donor distraction
  - Chances of detecting violence towards civilians unaffected

Mechanism

- Donor country governments worry about funding recipient governments that are violent
- Recipient country governments know that when donor country media is distracted, donor country governments pay less attention to, and have less concern about, recipient government heavy-handedness
  - When donor country media distracted, recipient government relatively unconstrained (high repression state)
- Anti-government forces know when recipient country governments are in a state of high repression

Opposition Choice

- Each t, probability ρ opportunity to foment dissent avails itself: period t costs of dissent drawn, k_t.
- If dissent ($D_t = 1$) opposition utility is: $B_t \equiv \sum_{\tau=t}^{\tau=t+n} B(M_\tau)$.
  - M_τ: total mass of individuals partaking in period τ
- Dissent will necessarily last for n periods once started.
- Cutoff: All individuals for whom $\theta \geq \theta_t$ participate, and $\theta < \theta_t$ stay home.
  - Clearly, B monotonically decreasing in θ_t.

Decision rule:

$$D_t = 1 \text{ iff } B_t \equiv \sum_{\tau=t}^{\tau=t+n} B(\theta_\tau) \geq k_t. \tag{5}$$

Back to Individuals




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
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
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Protests
Riots
Violence against Civilians


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Protests
Riots
Violence against Civilians

Under Assumption 2



Anticipated v Unanticipated Shocks

- In the Israel (IDF) case (Durante/Zuravskaya), since the Military initiates action, and military operations require planning, it was predicted that anticipated shocks (the super-bowl, elections etc.) would trigger attacks from the IDF
  - They did
- However, unanticipated shocks, natural disasters, were run as a placebo, since they provide no time for planning, it was posited these wouldn't trigger IDF attacks
  - They didn't
- In the present model, actions are Opposition initiated, government is reactive
- This generates different predictions regarding anticipated v unanticipated shocks

Distinct Case Predictions

- Unanticipated Shocks (Natural Disasters)
- Unanticipated Shocks Conditional upon an Agitation
- Anticipated Shocks (Elections)
- Anticipated Shocks Conditional upon an Agitation

Unanticipated shocks: Disasters

Each check mark represents a day



Disaster at t

$$R = H$$



Disaster/Agitation: Possibility 1




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Protests
Riots
Violence against Civilians

Disaster/Agitation: Agitation Canceled




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
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Results: Disasters

Proposition: (Unconditionally) (i) Disasters lower the frequency of demonstrations. (ii) Disasters lower the frequency of at least one of protests and riots. (iii) Disasters have no clear effect on Violence Against Civilians.

Figure 2: Impact of disasters in donor countries (unconditional)



Notes: Confidence interval bars are depicted for the 95% level.

Magnitudes

Coefficient is effect of disaster on hypothetical donor who contributes ODA that is 100% of GNI and contributes 100% of all donations

- Average donor: 7.1% of all donations to an average African country (P25: 3.4%) (median: 3.8%) (P75: 5%).
- Major donor: 30% of all donations to an African country (P25: 16%) (median: 24%) (P75: 39%) (P90: 53%).
- ODA per GNI: Average 10% (P25: 2.48%) (P50: 7.5%) (P75: 13.5%) (P90: 23%)

Coefficient -0.5 on Demonstrations (mean 7%) implies (-0.5*0.3*0.1) = 1.5% decline in Demonstrations

Table: Effects on Repression/Demonstration ratio

VARIABLES	(1) $log(\frac{\text{VAC by State forces}}{\text{Demonstrations}})$	(2) $log(\frac{\text{VAC by State forces}}{\text{Protests}})$	(3) $log(\frac{\text{VAC by State forces}}{\text{Riots}})$
Donor Disaster (previous day)	0.105**	0.0678	0.0686**
	(0.0444)	(0.0440)	(0.0269)
Observations	375,180	375,180	375,180
R-squared	0.253	0.202	0.166

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country-level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Disasters Conditional Upon an Agitation

Disaster at t

$$R = H$$



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


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θ
Protests
Riots
Violence against Civilians

Results: Disasters, Conditional on Agitation

Proposition: Conditional upon an agitation already occurring: (i) Disasters lower the frequency of demonstrations. (ii) Disasters lower the frequency of at least one of protests and riots. (iii) Disasters increase the frequency of Violence Against Civilians.

Results: Disasters, Conditional on Agitation

Report: Conditional upon Riot in $t-1$ to $t-7$

Robustness:

- Any Event
- Demonstration
- Previous two weeks

Figure 3: Impact of disasters in donor countries (conditional)



Notes:

Confidence interval bars are depicted for the 95% level.

Table: Mobile Phone Interactions Per Capita, ACLED

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Protests	(3) Riots	(4) VAC by Rebel
Donor Disaster (previous day)	1.238	0.886	0.667**	1.886*
	(1.169)	(1.091)	(0.302)	(1.024)
Donor Disaster (previous day) x mobile	-7.028*	-6.237*	-3.020***	-0.615
	(3.653)	(3.472)	(1.020)	(2.285)
Observations	60,997	60,997	60,997	60,997
R-squared	0.249	0.237	0.173	0.229

Mobile Cellular Subscriptions, 2000-2019, (per 100 people) International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Event Study

Figure 4: Dynamic Effects of Donor Natural Disasters (Unconditional)



Event Study

Figure 5: Dynamic Effects of Donor Natural Disasters (Conditional on Previous Riots)



Anticipated Shocks: Elections

- A natural disaster can surprise opposition leaders when an agitation is already under way
- In contrast, donor country elections are predetermined and known in advance
- Consequently the dissent suppressing effect of elections should be greater than that of natural disasters.

Election at t



Election/Agitation: Agitation Moved/Canceled




$V^v(\theta) - C^v(S)$
$V^r(\theta) - C^r(S)$
$V^p(\theta) - C^p(S)$
θ
Protests
Riots
Violence against Civilians


θ
$V^v(\theta) - C^v(S)$
$V^r(\theta) - C^r(S)$
$V^p(\theta) - C^p(S)$

Results: Elections

Prediction: (Unconditionally) Elections: (i) lower the overall frequency of demonstrations; (ii) lower the frequency of at least one of protests and riots, and (iii) have ambiguous effects on violence against civilians. (iv) The coefficient on violence against civilians should be more negative than for natural disasters.

Figure 6: Impact of elections in donor countries (unconditional)



Notes:

Confidence interval bars are depicted for the 95% level.

Results: Elections

Prediction: Conditional upon an agitation already being underway, elections: (a) lower the overall frequency of demonstrations; (b) lower the frequency of at least one of protests and riots; and (c) increase violence against civilians.

Caveat: the frequency of agitations already underway when donor elections occur should be lower due to the dissent suppressing effect of anticipated elections.

Figure 7: Impact of elections in donor countries (conditional)



Notes:

Confidence interval bars are depicted for the 95% level.

Heterogeneity Analysis

- Democratic v Non-Democratic Donors
- Right Wing v Left Wing Donors
- State Capacity of Recipients
- Autocracy v Anocracy v Democracy Recipients

Democratic Donors Polity IV ≥ 5

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Democratic Donors								
	Unconditional				Conditional			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-0.382**	-0.193	-0.249**	0.066	-4.947***	-3.956***	-2.137	6.971**
	(0.180)	(0.211)	(0.099)	(0.206)	(1.320)	(0.820)	(1.518)	(3.227)
Observations	381828	381828	381828	381828	42489	42489	42489	42489

Non-Democratic Donors Polity IV < 5

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel B. Non-Democratic Donors								
	Unconditional				Conditional			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	0.812	-0.661	1.717	-1.185	-1.8e+03	-784.835	-775.419	-545.613
	(2.905)	(1.381)	(3.316)	(0.972)	(1984.061)	(1783.340)	(1432.168)	(728.852)
Observations	373977	373977	373977	373977	42477	42477	42477	42477

China (AidData)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel C. China								
	Unconditional				Conditional			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	0.039	-0.054	0.130	-0.071	6.021	2.601	4.042	-0.490
	(0.108)	(0.073)	(0.120)	(0.084)	(6.794)	(3.739)	(6.750)	(1.761)
Observations	373274	373274	373274	373274	39965	39965	39965	39965

Right-Wing Donors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Right-Wing Donors								
	Unconditional				Conditional			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-0.233	-0.151	-0.122	-0.215	-5.097	2.565	-11.37	-0.616
	(0.214)	(0.185)	(0.111)	(0.247)	(17.42)	(14.17)	(7.691)	(7.068)
Observations	381,874	381,874	381,874	381,874	42,499	42,499	42,499	42,499

Left-Wing Donors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel B. Left-Wing Donors								
	Unconditional				Conditional			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-0.820*	-0.478	-0.468*	0.848**	-4.674***	-4.015***	-1.435	7.642**
	(0.429)	(0.428)	(0.240)	(0.363)	(1.365)	(0.920)	(1.132)	(3.563)
Observations	381,874	381,874	381,874	381,874	42,499	42,499	42,499	42,499

State Capacity (Bureaucratic Q) - Unconditional

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel B. Heterogeneity by Bureaucracy quality (ICRG)								
	Low				High			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-0.851*	-0.253	-0.666**	-0.499**	1.638	1.672	-0.260	1.203
	(0.434)	(0.328)	(0.226)	(0.209)	(2.467)	(2.393)	(0.705)	(1.428)
Observations	109,941	109,941	109,941	109,941	94,236	94,236	94,236	94,236
R-squared	0.149	0.153	0.051	0.161	0.364	0.308	0.265	0.174

State Capacity (Tax/GDP) - Unconditional

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel C. Heterogeneity by Tax to GDP ratio								
	Low				High			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-0.431*	-0.305	-0.168***	0.160	0.290	0.743	-0.702*	0.815
	(0.206)	(0.198)	(0.0530)	(0.154)	(1.782)	(1.843)	(0.389)	(1.105)
Observations	141,352	141,352	141,352	141,352	125,648	125,648	125,648	125,648
R-squared	0.154	0.131	0.067	0.214	0.327	0.275	0.261	0.075

State Capacity (Military/Capita) - Unconditional

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel D. Heterogeneity by Military Expenditure per capita								
	Low				High			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-0.480**	-0.227*	-0.336	-0.424	0.322	0.610	-0.536	0.486
	(0.229)	(0.120)	(0.211)	(0.445)	(1.095)	(1.145)	(0.360)	(0.702)
Observations	152,680	152,680	152,680	152,680	152,315	152,315	152,315	152,315
R-squared	0.220	0.196	0.123	0.189	0.315	0.272	0.238	0.116

State Capacity (GDP/Capita) - Unconditional

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Heterogeneity by GDP per capita								
	Low				High			
Dep Var	Demostrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demostrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-0.400	-0.0116	-0.478***	-0.392	1.984	1.151	0.413	0.537
	(0.394)	(0.311)	(0.162)	(0.417)	(2.204)	(2.141)	(1.044)	(1.406)
Observations	176,965	176,965	176,965	176,965	176,602	176,602	176,602	176,602
R-squared	0.121	0.092	0.069	0.176	0.331	0.283	0.240	0.142

State Capacity (Bureaucratic Q) -Conditional

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel B. Heterogeneity by Bureaucracy quality								
	Low				High			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-16.22**	-9.588**	-10.26**	-4.549*	-1.352	-0.0187	-7.117	30.37**
	(6.111)	(3.223)	(4.368)	(2.468)	(5.183)	(6.918)	(6.702)	(11.50)
Observations	10,705	10,705	10,705	10,705	19,862	19,862	19,862	19,862
R-squared	0.139	0.169	0.063	0.156	0.301	0.262	0.213	0.198

State Capacity (Tax/GDP) - Conditional

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel C. Heterogeneity by Tax to GDP ratio								
	Low				High			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-4.673***	-3.880***	-1.235	8.763***	3.837	-3.272	2.230	24.79*
	(1.298)	(0.623)	(1.175)	(1.190)	(10.10)	(7.118)	(13.01)	(12.17)
Observations	12,108	12,108	12,108	12,108	18,995	18,995	18,995	18,995
R-squared	0.139	0.149	0.067	0.296	0.296	0.265	0.228	0.066

State Capacity (Military/Capita) - Conditional

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel D. Heterogeneity by Military Expenditure per capita								
	Low				High			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-8.921*	-4.047	-6.926**	-4.942***	-2.587	-6.979	-1.583	18.82
	(4.429)	(2.820)	(3.220)	(0.869)	(8.946)	(7.319)	(9.585)	(12.99)
Observations	15,386	15,386	15,386	15,386	22,190	22,190	22,190	22,190
R-squared	0.257	0.261	0.125	0.206	0.276	0.256	0.216	0.098

State Capacity (GDP/Capita) -Conditional

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Heterogeneity by GDP per capita								
	Low				High			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-10.26**	-5.342*	-7.526**	-4.882***	1.367	-6.014	2.178	23.06*
	(4.384)	(2.829)	(3.279)	(1.092)	(10.64)	(8.831)	(12.86)	(13.23)
Observations	14,674	14,674	14,674	14,674	25,679	25,679	25,679	25,679
R-squared	0.140	0.144	0.078	0.177	0.284	0.257	0.206	0.173

Autocratic Recipient (< -5)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Autocracy								
	Unconditional				Conditional			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-0.178	-0.151	-0.0305	-0.135	-34.97	-28.33	-4.370	-16.18
	(0.197)	(0.166)	(0.0455)	(0.287)	(20.71)	(25.09)	(6.755)	(14.68)
Observations	47,113	47,113	47,113	47,113	1,012	1,012	1,012	1,012
R-squared	0.027	0.020	0.017	0.096	0.112	0.103	0.086	0.105

Anocratic Recipient [-5,5)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel B. Anocracy								
	Unconditional				Conditional			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-0.352**	-0.175	-0.233*	-0.197	-11.23**	-7.223*	-7.241**	-5.596***
	(0.172)	(0.179)	(0.135)	(0.162)	(5.021)	(4.084)	(3.227)	(1.453)
Observations	223,901	223,901	223,901	223,901	24,547	24,547	24,547	24,547
R-squared	0.206	0.189	0.100	0.203	0.185	0.209	0.092	0.248

Democratic Recipient ≥ 5

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel C. Democracy								
	Unconditional				Conditional			
Dep Var	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC	Demonstrations	Protests	Riots	VAC
Disaster (previous day)	-0.562	-0.407	-0.270	1.176	-3.026***	-3.046***	-0.521	11.25***
	(0.702)	(0.654)	(0.210)	(1.133)	(0.891)	(0.573)	(0.855)	(1.645)
Observations	110,860	110,860	110,860	110,860	16,940	16,940	16,940	16,940
R-squared	0.369	0.309	0.282	0.138	0.324	0.278	0.236	0.196

Conclusion

- When donor countries experience natural disasters, or elections, there is less public, civil unrest in African recipient countries
- There is proportionately more government reaction to dissent
- Conditional on dissent just before a disaster there is more VAC by rebels
- This is consistent with the instigating actor being the opposition
  - Does not seem consistent with opportunistic instigation on the part of recipient governments (low state capacity)
- Welfare? ..... Bad:
  - Increased fear of repression leads to more 'apathy'. Fewer people willing to express dissent publicly
  - And increased targeted private violence on the part of opposition groups

Table 4: Types of Protests, ACLED HYPERLINK

VARIABLES	(1) Peaceful protest	(2) Peaceful protest	(3) Excess force agnst protest	(4) Excess force agnst protest
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.0643		0.00907	
	(0.0431)		(0.0137)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.0756*		0.00514
		(0.0438)		(0.0142)
Observations	375,180	375,184	375,180	375,184
R-squared	0.242	0.242	0.049	0.049
Mean of Dev Var	0.0409	0.0409	0.00316	0.00316

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 5: Types of Riots, ACLED HYPERLINK

VARIABLES	(1) Violent demonstration	(2) Violent demonstration	(3) Mob violence	(4) Mob violence
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.0502***		-0.0236	
	(0.0185)		(0.0151)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.0509***		-0.0290*
		(0.0168)		(0.0145)
Observations	375,180	375,184	375,180	375,184
R-squared	0.155	0.155	0.098	0.098
Mean of Dep Var	0.0215	0.0215	0.0122	0.0122

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

- Growing season compiled at the grid level by PRIO-GRID, MIRCA2000 dataset v.1.1.
- Provides the starting (and final) month of the growing season for the cell's main crop, values 1-12, based on the Cropping Periods
- From this data, we construct for each country-month the share of the country territory in the growing season

Back

Table 6: Interactions Hyperlink

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Rioters alone	Rioters alone	Rioters - State forces	Rioters - State forces	Rioters - Rioters	Rioters - Rioters
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.0154		-0.0406**		-0.0161**	
	(0.0164)		(0.0200)		(0.00779)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.0241		-0.0351**		-0.0169**
		(0.0167)		(0.0173)		(0.00745)
Observations	375,180	375,184	375,180	375,184	375,180	375,184
R-squared	0.131	0.131	0.095	0.095	0.052	0.052

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 1tp: controls (temperature, precipitation)

VARIABLES	(1) ACLED: Demostrations	(2) ACLED: Demostrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.101**		-0.0758*		-0.0642**		0.159	
	(0.0497)		(0.0442)		(0.0263)		(0.192)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.113**		-0.0851*		-0.0694***		0.152
		(0.0536)		(0.0471)		(0.0252)		(0.175)
mean monthly temperature	-0.00129**	-0.00129**	-0.00142***	-0.00142***	-0.000496	-0.000496	0.000108	0.000108
	(0.000533)	(0.000532)	(0.000464)	(0.000464)	(0.000344)	(0.000344)	(9.88e-05)	(9.88e-05)
log(precipitation + 0.01)	-0.000133	-0.000130	0.000327	0.000329	-0.000144	-0.000143	-0.000437	-0.000437
	(0.000573)	(0.000573)	(0.000491)	(0.000491)	(0.000338)	(0.000338)	(0.000316)	(0.000316)
Observations	375,180	375,184	375,180	375,184	375,180	375,184	375,180	375,184
R-squared	0.275	0.275	0.240	0.240	0.188	0.187	0.191	0.191

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country-level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 1lt:(within-year) country-specific cubic time trend + country-year FE

VARIABLES	(1) ACLED: Demostrations	(2) ACLED: Demostrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Disaster (previous 5 days)	-0.105***		-0.0829**		-0.0517**		0.140	
	(0.0303)		(0.0341)		(0.0236)		(0.165)	
Donor Disaster (previous 7 days)		-0.100***		-0.0741**		-0.0522*		0.165
		(0.0322)		(0.0359)		(0.0297)		(0.152)
Observations	375,188	375,192	375,188	375,192	375,188	375,192	375,188	375,192
R-squared	0.277	0.277	0.242	0.242	0.190	0.190	0.193	0.193

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country-level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 12: Donor - specific shocks (top 10% per country)

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
FRA Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.243		-0.272		-0.126*		1.085**	
	(0.227)		(0.193)		(0.0709)		(0.491)	
USA Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.0975*		-0.0234		-0.0911*		-0.0140	
	(0.0545)		(0.0433)		(0.0503)		(0.0735)	
GER Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.800***		-0.514***		-0.321***		-1.320	
	(0.221)		(0.143)		(0.113)		(0.894)	
JPN Donor Disaster (previous day)	5.436		9.133		-4.713**		-7.853	
	(14.21)		(15.81)		(2.325)		(5.736)	
FRA Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.251		-0.264		-0.137**		1.006**
		(0.185)		(0.166)		(0.0575)		(0.455)
USA Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.0414		0.0336		-0.0964*		-0.0160
		(0.102)		(0.0733)		(0.0526)		(0.0641)
GER Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		0.378		0.665		-0.323***		-1.207
		(1.040)		(1.067)		(0.114)		(0.903)
JPN Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.980		3.633		-5.637**		-3.613
		(4.829)		(5.808)		(2.122)		(6.899)
Observations	381,008	381,012	381,008	381,012	381,008	381,012	381,008	381,012
R-squared	0.276	0.276	0.240	0.240	0.189	0.189	0.194	0.194

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 1tpC: controls (temperature, precipitation)

VARIABLES	(1) ACLED: Demostrations	(2) ACLED: Demostrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.958**		-1.074**		-0.303		1.699***	
	(0.428)		(0.418)		(0.217)		(0.576)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-1.170**		-1.199**		-0.421*		1.416**
		(0.511)		(0.481)		(0.230)		(0.648)
mean monthly temperature	-0.00482***	-0.00483***	-0.00529***	-0.00529***	-0.00252**	-0.00252**	0.000121	0.000117
	(0.00144)	(0.00144)	(0.00132)	(0.00131)	(0.00117)	(0.00117)	(0.000222)	(0.000222)
log(precipitation + 0.01)	-0.00197	-0.00196	-0.000186	-0.000173	-0.000621	-0.000612	-0.000841	-0.000832
	(0.00225)	(0.00224)	(0.00205)	(0.00204)	(0.00182)	(0.00182)	(0.000776)	(0.000777)
Observations	64,648	64,650	64,648	64,650	64,648	64,650	64,648	64,650
R-squared	0.252	0.252	0.241	0.241	0.173	0.173	0.230	0.230

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country-level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 1tC: (within-year) country-specific cubic time trend + country-year FE

VARIABLES	(1) ACLED: Demostrations	(2) ACLED: Demostrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.560		-0.914**		0.0281		1.832***	
	(0.490)		(0.441)		(0.306)		(0.662)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.779		-1.046**		-0.0960		1.540**
		(0.591)		(0.520)		(0.325)		(0.741)
Observations	64,648	64,650	64,648	64,650	64,648	64,650	64,648	64,650
R-squared	0.257	0.257	0.245	0.245	0.179	0.179	0.233	0.232

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country-level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 16: Types of protests

VARIABLES	(1) Peaceful protest	(2) Peaceful protest	(3) Excess force agnst protest	(4) Excess force agnst protest
Donor Election day	-0.00240		-0.0375**	
	(0.216)		(0.0170)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.000316		-0.0268**
		(0.131)		(0.0109)
Observations	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126
R-squared	0.243	0.243	0.039	0.039
Mean of Dev Var	0.0409	0.0409	0.00316	0.00316

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 17: Types of Riots

VARIABLES	(1) Violent demonstration	(2) Violent demonstration	(3) Mob violence	(4) Mob violence
Donor Election day	-0.123		-0.151**	
	(0.0871)		(0.0692)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.0445		-0.109**
		(0.0769)		(0.0522)
Observations	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126
R-squared	0.156	0.156	0.097	0.097
Mean of Dep Var	0.0215	0.0215	0.0122	0.0122

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 18: Interactions

VARIABLES	(1) Rioters alone	(2) Rioters alone	(3) Rioters - State forces	(4) Rioters - State forces	(5) Rioters - Rioters	(6) Rioters - Rioters	(7) Rioters - civilians	(8) Rioters - civilians
Donor Election day	-0.122**		-0.104*		-0.0410*		-0.0877**	
	(0.0505)		(0.0567)		(0.0216)		(0.0351)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.0756*		0.0147		-0.0471**		-0.0649*
		(0.0396)		(0.0404)		(0.0206)		(0.0325)
Observations	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126
R-squared	0.131	0.131	0.095	0.095	0.050	0.050	0.087	0.087

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 22: Donor-specific election

VARIABLES	(1) ACLED: Demonstrations	(2) ACLED: Demonstrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
FRA Donor Election day	-0.458		-0.00900		-0.513***		0.197	
	(0.402)		(0.442)		(0.131)		(0.544)	
USA Donor Election day	-0.328		-0.275		-0.0957		-0.325	
	(0.241)		(0.197)		(0.115)		(0.304)	
GER Donor Election day	-0.646		-0.252		-0.596*		1.404	
	(0.694)		(0.709)		(0.340)		(1.019)	
UK Donor Election day	0.878		1.205		-0.346		1.030	
	(1.345)		(1.488)		(0.372)		(0.758)	
JPN Donor Election day	2.119		1.008		-0.140		-0.689	
	(4.091)		(3.560)		(2.028)		(2.896)	
FRA Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.182		0.0447		-0.240**		-0.218
		(0.336)		(0.374)		(0.108)		(0.153)
USA Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.276		-0.217		-0.0788		-0.212
		(0.219)		(0.173)		(0.0902)		(0.184)
GER Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		0.199		0.350		0.116		0.227
		(0.497)		(0.387)		(0.446)		(0.344)
UK Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.494		0.0704		-0.575***		0.118
		(0.530)		(0.561)		(0.137)		(0.118)
JPN Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		1.519		1.156		-0.216		-1.577
		(2.527)		(1.864)		(1.406)		(1.381)
Observations	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126
R-squared	0.276	0.276	0.241	0.241	0.188	0.188	0.195	0.194

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 15tp: controls (temperature, precipitation)

VARIABLES	(1) ACLED: Demostrations	(2) ACLED: Demostrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Election day	-0.269		-0.0433		-0.291**		0.116	
	(0.196)		(0.211)		(0.126)		(0.223)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.177		-0.0216		-0.141		-0.155*
		(0.155)		(0.140)		(0.103)		(0.0894)
mean monthly temperature	-0.00152**	-0.00152**	-0.00167***	-0.00167***	-0.000594	-0.000594	7.82e-05	7.89e-05
	(0.000570)	(0.000570)	(0.000495)	(0.000495)	(0.000384)	(0.000384)	(9.74e-05)	(9.75e-05)
log(precipitation + 0.01)	-0.000186	-0.000186	0.000341	0.000341	-0.000180	-0.000180	-0.000507	-0.000506
	(0.000625)	(0.000625)	(0.000540)	(0.000540)	(0.000361)	(0.000361)	(0.000303)	(0.000303)
Observations	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126
R-squared	0.277	0.277	0.241	0.241	0.188	0.189	0.195	0.195

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country-level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 15t: (within-year) country-specific cubic time trend + country-year FE

VARIABLES	(1) ACLED: Demostrations	(2) ACLED: Demostrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Election day	-0.334		-0.0919		-0.315**		0.106	
	(0.199)		(0.213)		(0.129)		(0.217)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.243		-0.0711		-0.165		-0.165*
		(0.153)		(0.140)		(0.101)		(0.0978)
Observations	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126
R-squared	0.279	0.279	0.243	0.243	0.191	0.191	0.196	0.196

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country-level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 24: Military link, ACLED

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) Protests	(4) Protests	(5) Riots	(6) Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel	(8) VAC by Rebel
Partner Election day	-0.0443		0.000980		-0.0489***		-0.0266	
	(0.0361)		(0.0371)		(0.0141)		(0.0180)	
Partner Election (t-1, t, t+1)		0.00311		0.0170		-0.00403		-0.0224*
		(0.0192)		(0.0215)		(0.00859)		(0.0123)
Observations	369,610	369,610	369,610	369,610	369,610	369,610	369,610	369,610
R-squared	0.278	0.278	0.242	0.242	0.191	0.191	0.197	0.197
Mean of Dep Var	0.0681	0.0681	0.0479	0.0479	0.031	0.031	0.0191	0.0191

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 22C: Donor Specific Election

VARIABLES	(1) ACLED: Demonstrations	(2) ACLED: Demonstrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
FRA Donor Election day	-0.824		1.129		-2.201*		-1.045***	
	(1.067)		(1.670)		(1.217)		(0.366)	
USA Donor Election day	-3.949***		-2.112**		-2.375***		-3.817***	
	(0.537)		(0.964)		(0.664)		(0.603)	
GER Donor Election day	-0.223		0.621		-1.616		5.201	
	(4.149)		(4.069)		(1.585)		(4.015)	
UK Donor Election day	3.557**		4.886***		-1.242***		-0.0923	
	(1.426)		(1.432)		(0.457)		(0.159)	
JPN Donor Election day	2.557		2.406		-5.284		-2.037	
	(15.18)		(12.86)		(7.898)		(5.611)	
FRA Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.0856		0.619		-0.714		-1.178***
		(0.724)		(1.183)		(0.679)		(0.303)
USA Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-3.573***		-2.200**		-1.551***		-2.490***
		(0.757)		(0.822)		(0.391)		(0.702)
GER Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		1.218		2.307		0.408		1.238
		(2.035)		(2.056)		(1.584)		(1.052)
UK Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.262		1.321		-1.802***		-0.0489
		(1.086)		(0.949)		(0.523)		(0.129)
JPN Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		9.129		6.511		0.900		-5.183*
		(9.445)		(7.907)		(4.879)		(3.078)
Observations	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726
R-squared	0.250	0.250	0.238	0.238	0.172	0.172	0.231	0.231

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 15tpC: controls (temperature, precipitation)

VARIABLES	(1) ACLED: Demostrations	(2) ACLED: Demostrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Election day	-0.544		1.079		-2.004***		-0.633*	
	(1.025)		(1.135)		(0.574)		(0.320)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.564		0.429		-0.903*		-1.004***
		(0.569)		(0.681)		(0.522)		(0.324)
mean monthly temperature	-0.00519***	-0.00519***	-0.00566***	-0.00566***	-0.00285**	-0.00285**	-3.32e-05	-3.29e-05
	(0.00153)	(0.00153)	(0.00140)	(0.00140)	(0.00124)	(0.00124)	(0.000218)	(0.000218)
log(precipitation + 0.01)	-0.00136	-0.00135	0.000182	0.000181	-0.000305	-0.000301	-0.00123	-0.00122
	(0.00237)	(0.00237)	(0.00214)	(0.00214)	(0.00184)	(0.00184)	(0.000745)	(0.000744)
Observations	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726
R-squared	0.251	0.251	0.240	0.240	0.172	0.172	0.231	0.231

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country-level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 15tC: (within-year) country-specific cubic time trend + country-year FE

VARIABLES	(1) ACLED: Demostrations	(2) ACLED: Demostrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Election day	-0.688		1.032		-2.081***		-0.654*	
	(1.099)		(1.182)		(0.617)		(0.359)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.698		0.365		-0.946*		-1.028***
		(0.621)		(0.720)		(0.554)		(0.346)
Observations	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726	67,726
R-squared	0.256	0.256	0.245	0.245	0.178	0.178	0.234	0.234

Notes: Standard errors clustered at country-level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 12C: Major Donors

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel groups	(8) VAC by Rebel groups
FRA Donor Disaster (previous day)	-1.136*		-1.250**		-0.426		2.237***	
	(0.657)		(0.614)		(0.388)		(0.275)	
USA Donor Disaster (previous day)	0.0298		0.432		-0.243		0.558	
	(0.335)		(0.357)		(0.240)		(0.365)	
JPN Donor Disaster (previous day)	64.19		77.28		-19.89**		-35.99**	
	(49.09)		(52.06)		(7.940)		(14.21)	
FRA Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-1.221*		-1.234**		-0.521		2.047***
		(0.633)		(0.576)		(0.402)		(0.262)
USA Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.321		0.0922		-0.319		0.403
		(0.360)		(0.384)		(0.195)		(0.272)
JPN Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		1.150		20.45		-26.32***		-38.82***
		(15.89)		(15.47)		(6.407)		(13.35)
Observations	66,788	66,790	66,788	66,790	66,788	66,790	66,788	66,790
R-squared	0.250	0.250	0.238	0.238	0.173	0.173	0.231	0.231

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back

Table 13: Share of Donations, ACLED

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) Protests	(4) Protests	(5) Riots	(6) Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel	(8) VAC by Rebel
Donor Election day	-0.292		-0.0645		-0.301**		0.114	
	(0.200)		(0.212)		(0.128)		(0.222)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.200		-0.0434		-0.151		-0.157*
		(0.157)		(0.141)		(0.104)		(0.0907)
Observations	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126	383,124	383,126
R-squared	0.276	0.276	0.241	0.241	0.188	0.188	0.194	0.194
Mean of Dep Var	0.0681	0.0681	0.0479	0.0479	0.031	0.031	0.0191	0.0191

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back Types of Protests Types of Riots Interactions

Table 15: Interaction with mobile phone subscriptions, ACLED

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) Protests	(4) Protests	(5) Riots	(6) Riots	(7) VAC by Rebel	(8) VAC by Rebel
Donor Election day	0.0405		0.0112		-0.0186		0.177	
	(0.288)		(0.272)		(0.130)		(0.251)	
Donor Election day	-1.293		-0.284		-1.114***		-0.338	
mobile	(1.289)		(1.306)		(0.319)		(0.478)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		0.0210		0.0495		-0.0940		-0.113
		(0.228)		(0.209)		(0.108)		(0.112)
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.841		-0.342		-0.211		-0.122
mobile		(0.657)		(0.583)		(0.359)		(0.355)
Observations	328,374	328,376	328,374	328,376	328,374	328,376	328,374	328,376
R-squared	0.280	0.280	0.244	0.244	0.192	0.192	0.199	0.199
Mean of Dep Var	0.0681	0.0681	0.0479	0.0479	0.031	0.031	0.0191	0.0191

Mobile Cellular Subscriptions, 2000-2019, (per 100 people) International Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Back | Donor Specific Elections | Military Link | Temperature Precipitation | Cubic Time Trend

Disasters

Heterogeneity: Autocracies versus Anocracies versus Democracies

Table 45: Heterogeneity by polity2

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.0555		-0.0373		-0.0575**	
	(0.0482)		(0.0371)		(0.0229)	
Donor Disaster (previous day) x	-0.0239*		-0.0117		-0.00862	
polity2	(0.0140)		(0.0161)		(0.0111)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.0666		-0.0485		-0.0602***
		(0.0458)		(0.0387)		(0.0217)
Donor Disaster (previous day) x		-0.0208		-0.00827		-0.00911
polity2		(0.0143)		(0.0139)		(0.0113)
Observations	372,427	372,431	372,427	372,431	372,427	372,431
R-squared	0.277	0.276	0.242	0.242	0.190	0.190

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 46: Autocracies (polity2 < -5)

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.165		-0.139		-0.0709	
	(0.331)		(0.286)		(0.110)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.178		-0.150		-0.0716
		(0.320)		(0.276)		(0.106)
Observations	45,312	45,314	45,312	45,314	45,312	45,314
R-squared	0.027	0.027	0.019	0.019	0.017	0.017

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 47: Anocracies (-5 $\leq$ polity2 $\leq$ 5)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Demonstrations	Demonstrations	ACLED: Protests	ACLED: Protests	ACLED: Riots	ACLED: Riots
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.0449		0.000989		-0.0740***	
	(0.0443)		(0.0347)		(0.0258)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.0565		-0.00704		-0.0820***
		(0.0507)		(0.0441)		(0.0250)
Observations	223,874	223,876	223,874	223,876	223,874	223,876
R-squared	0.206	0.206	0.189	0.189	0.100	0.100

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 48: Democracies (polity2 $>$ 5)

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.319*		-0.323**		-0.0557	
	(0.163)		(0.144)		(0.0910)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.294**		-0.309**		-0.0401
		(0.139)		(0.129)		(0.0773)
Observations	103,241	103,241	103,241	103,241	103,241	103,241
R-squared	0.380	0.380	0.320	0.320	0.290	0.290

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 49: Autocracies (polity2 < -5)

VARIABLES	(1) Unconditional ACLED: Riots	(2) Unconditional ACLED: Riots	(3) Unconditional VAC by Rebel groups	(4) Unconditional VAC by Rebel groups	(5) Conditional on previous riot ACLED: Riots	(6) Conditional on previous riot ACLED: Riots	(7) Conditional on previous riot VAC by Rebel groups	(8) Conditional on previous riot VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.0709		0.200		-0.445		-1.828	
	(0.110)		(0.247)		(2.846)		(1.690)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.0716		0.179		-0.445		-1.829
		(0.106)		(0.227)		(2.846)		(1.691)
Observations	45,312	45,314	45,312	45,314	970	970	970	970
R-squared	0.017	0.017	0.095	0.095	0.025	0.025	0.253	0.253

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 50: Anocracies (-5 $\leq$ polity2 $\leq$ 5)

VARIABLES	(1) Unconditional ACLED: Riots	(2) Unconditional ACLED: Riots	(3) Unconditional VAC by Rebel groups	(4) Unconditional VAC by Rebel groups	(5) Conditional on previous riot ACLED: Riots	(6) Conditional on previous riot ACLED: Riots	(7) Conditional on previous riot VAC by Rebel groups	(8) Conditional on previous riot VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.0740***		0.157		-0.449		1.817***	
	(0.0258)		(0.235)		(0.290)		(0.163)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.0820***		0.153		-0.596*		1.264***
		(0.0250)		(0.214)		(0.312)		(0.370)
Observations	223,874	223,876	223,874	223,876	24,564	24,564	24,564	24,564
R-squared	0.100	0.100	0.204	0.204	0.107	0.107	0.251	0.251

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 51: Democracies (polity2 $>$ 5)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Unconditional	Unconditional	Unconditional	Unconditional	Conditional on previous riot	Conditional on previous riot	Conditional on previous riot	Conditional on previous riot
VARIABLES	ACLED: Riots	ACLED: Riots	VAC by Rebel groups	VAC by Rebel groups	ACLED: Riots	ACLED: Riots	VAC by Rebel groups	VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Disaster (previous day)	-0.0557		0.0869		-0.778		-0.240	
	(0.0910)		(0.143)		(0.718)		(0.199)	
Donor Disaster (previous 3 days)		-0.0401		0.0911		-0.484		-0.185
		(0.0773)		(0.149)		(0.579)		(0.158)
Observations	103,241	103,241	103,241	103,241	16,089	16,089	16,089	16,089
R-squared	0.290	0.290	0.149	0.149	0.257	0.257	0.197	0.197

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Elections

Heterogeneity: Autocracies versus Anocracies versus Democracies

Table 52: Heterogeneity by polity2

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots
Donor Election day	-0.315		-0.176		-0.208	
	(0.271)		(0.235)		(0.145)	
Donor Election day x	0.00543		0.0284		-0.0237	
polity2	(0.0538)		(0.0569)		(0.0296)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.241		-0.122		-0.128
		(0.174)		(0.128)		(0.103)
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1) x		0.00966		0.0194		-0.00640
polity2		(0.0296)		(0.0333)		(0.0205)
Observations	380,202	380,204	380,202	380,204	380,202	380,204
R-squared	0.278	0.278	0.243	0.243	0.191	0.191

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 53: Autocracies (polity2 < -5)

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots
Donor Election day	-0.347		-0.193		-0.178	
	(0.214)		(0.163)		(0.104)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.311		-0.174		-0.160*
		(0.197)		(0.186)		(0.0909)
Observations	45,651	45,652	45,651	45,652	45,651	45,652
R-squared	0.027	0.027	0.019	0.019	0.017	0.017

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 54: Anocracies (-5 $\leq$ polity2 $\leq$ 5)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Demonstrations	Demonstrations	ACLED: Protests	ACLED: Protests	ACLED: Riots	ACLED: Riots
Donor Election day	-0.378		-0.211		-0.265	
	(0.261)		(0.193)		(0.204)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.322		-0.228		-0.140
		(0.220)		(0.138)		(0.151)
Observations	228,268	228,269	228,268	228,269	228,268	228,269
R-squared	0.207	0.207	0.190	0.190	0.099	0.099

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 55: Democracies (polity2 > 5)

VARIABLES	(1) Demonstrations	(2) Demonstrations	(3) ACLED: Protests	(4) ACLED: Protests	(5) ACLED: Riots	(6) ACLED: Riots
Donor Election day	-0.228		0.0478		-0.330*	
	(0.268)		(0.345)		(0.171)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.110		0.0934		-0.161
		(0.176)		(0.217)		(0.144)
Observations	106,283	106,283	106,283	106,283	106,283	106,283
R-squared	0.380	0.380	0.320	0.320	0.289	0.289

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 56: Autocracies (polity2 < -5)

VARIABLES	(1) Unconditional ACLED: Riots	(2) Unconditional ACLED: Riots	(3) Unconditional VAC by Rebel groups	(4) Unconditional VAC by Rebel groups	(5) Conditional on previous riot ACLED: Riots	(6) Conditional on previous riot ACLED: Riots	(7) Conditional on previous riot VAC by Rebel groups	(8) Conditional on previous riot VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Election day	-0.178		-0.114		-0.590		0	
	(0.104)		(0.146)		(0.882)		(0)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.160*		0.464		-0.706		-0.987
		(0.0909)		(0.669)		(0.920)		(1.467)
Observations	45,651	45,652	45,651	45,652	976	976	976	976
R-squared	0.017	0.017	0.095	0.095	0.025	0.025	0.253	0.253

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 57: Anocracies (-5 $\leq$ polity2 $\leq$ 5)

VARIABLES	(1) Unconditional ACLED: Riots	(2) Unconditional ACLED: Riots	(3) Unconditional VAC by Rebel groups	(4) Unconditional VAC by Rebel groups	(5) Conditional on previous riot ACLED: Riots	(6) Conditional on previous riot ACLED: Riots	(7) Conditional on previous riot VAC by Rebel groups	(8) Conditional on previous riot VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Election day	-0.265		-0.432**		-2.686***		-0.678*	
	(0.204)		(0.204)		(0.790)		(0.362)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.140		-0.523***		-0.831		-2.497***
		(0.151)		(0.159)		(1.490)		(0.524)
Observations	228,268	228,269	228,268	228,269	25,630	25,630	25,630	25,630
R-squared	0.099	0.099	0.207	0.207	0.103	0.103	0.253	0.253

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 58: Democracies (polity2 $>$ 5)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Unconditional	Unconditional	Unconditional	Unconditional	Conditional on previous riot	Conditional on previous riot	Conditional on previous riot	Conditional on previous riot
VARIABLES	ACLED: Riots	ACLED: Riots	VAC by Rebel groups	VAC by Rebel groups	ACLED: Riots	ACLED: Riots	VAC by Rebel groups	VAC by Rebel groups
Donor Election day	-0.330*		0.537		-1.434*		-0.416	
	(0.171)		(0.529)		(0.776)		(0.420)	
Donor Election (t-1, t, t+1)		-0.161		0.0977		-0.477		-0.650
		(0.144)		(0.0853)		(0.683)		(0.400)
Observations	106,283	106,283	106,283	106,283	17,154	17,154	17,154	17,154
R-squared	0.289	0.289	0.149	0.149	0.254	0.254	0.192	0.192

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

ACLED

General	Event Type	Sub-Event Type
Violent events	**Battles**	*Armed clash*
		Government regains territory
		Non-state actor overtakes territory
	Explosions/Remote violence	*Chemical weapon*
		Air/drone strike
		Suicide bomb
		Shelling/artillery/missile attack
		Remote explosive/landmine/IED
		Grenade
	Violence against civilians	*Sexual violence*
		Attack
		Abduction/forced disappearance
Demonstrations	**Protests**	*Peaceful protest*
		Protest with intervention
		Excessive force against protesters
	Riots	*Violent demonstration*
		Mob violence
Non-violent actions	**Strategic developments**	*Agreement*
		Arrests
		Change to group/activity
		Disrupted weapons use
		Headquarters or base established
		Looting/property destruction
		Non-violent transfer of territory
		Other

back

SCAD: Event types

1 = **Organized Demonstration.** Distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) can be identified.

2 = **Spontaneous Demonstration.** Distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. In this event, clear leadership or organization cannot be identified.

3 = **Organized Violent Riot.** Distinct, continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property damage. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) can be identified.

4 = **Spontaneous Violent Riot.** Distinct, continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct "other" group or government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property damage. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) cannot be identified.

5 = **General Strike.** Members of an organization or union engage in a total abandonment of workplaces and public facilities.

6 = **Limited Strike.** Members of an organization or union engage in the abandonment of workplaces in limited sectors or industries.

7 = **Pro-Government Violence (Repression)**: Distinct violent event waged primarily by government authorities, or by groups acting in explicit support of government authority, targeting individual, or "collective individual," members of an alleged opposition group or movement. Note that this event is initiated by the government or pro-government actors. See code for repression, below.

8 = **Anti-Government Violence**: Distinct violent event waged primarily by a non-state group against government authorities or symbols of government authorities (e.g., transportation or other infrastructures). As distinguished from riots, the anti-government actor must have a semi-permanent or permanent militant wing or organization.

9 = **Extra-government Violence**: Distinct violent event waged primarily by a non-state group targeting individual, or "collective individual," members of an alleged oppositional group or movement. As distinguished from riots, at least one actor must have a semi-permanent or permanent militant wing or organization. Government authorities are not listed as actors or targets.

10 = **Intra-government Violence:** Distinct violent event between two armed factions associated with different elements within the government. These include violence between two legally constituted armed units (e.g. clashes between police and military) or between unofficial militias associated with particular governmental leaders. This code includes events such as military coups.

Back