Revolutionary Contagion

Saumitra Jha (Stanford) and Steven Wilkinson (Yale)

JULY 14, 1789 THE STORMING OF THE BASTILLE

The Siege of the Bastille, by Claude Cholat, an eyewitness

JANUARY 6, 2021 THE STORMING OF THE US CAPITOL

Disproportionate number of current and former military personnel arrested in Capitol attack, CNN analysis shows

WHAT ROLE CAN INDIVIDUALS PLAY IN SHAPING HISTORY?

Liberty Leading the People, by Eugene Delacroix

WHEN DOES THIS ENHANCE FREEDOM FOR OTHERS TOO?

WHEN DOES IT LEAD TO REPRESSION AND AUTHORITARIANISM INSTEAD?

WHAT ROLE CAN INDIVIDUALS PLAY IN SHAPING HISTORY?

STRUCTURE   versus   **AGENCY**

"A King is History's Slave"- Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*

Napoleon at Borodino, by Vasily Vereshchagin

Napoleon on his Imperial Throne, by Jacques-Louis David

WE ARGUE: THERE ARE **HIDDEN STRUCTURES TO AGENCY**

WARS AND FREEDOMS

STRUCTURE
- The ability of non-elites to organize and credibly threaten violence has long been seen as an important driver of radical political change, including democratization and revolution (eg Marx, Boix 2003, Acemoglu Robinson 2000, 2006)

TO
- WE ARGUE: A common setting through history where this happens is in times of **war**, when external threats leave elites little choice but mobilize non-elites.

AGENCY
- **War** provides non-elites an opportunity to learn to fight, to organize and build networks as well as to demonstrate `heroism': signal willingness for (extreme) sacrifice for the nation.
- Once non-elite individuals have these skills and heroic credentials, they often play leadership roles when they return home that shape history.

WE EXPLOIT NATURAL EXPERIMENTS DUE TO QUASI-RANDOM DEPLOYMENT TO MEASURE THESE EFFECTS.

WARS AND FREEDOMS

THREE PATHS FROM WARS TO FREEDOMS

1 THE PATH OF LEADERSHIP (LIMITED WARS)
Limited mobilization: few veterans with org skills: conducive to **civil conflict.**
(eg WWII vets and ethnic cleansing in Partition of S. Asia). Yet leaders can effectively spread ideas of liberty if they believe in them (*Elie/La Reynie/Hulin/Marneur, Lafayette, Saint-Simon, Garibaldi, Decembrists, 18-19C*). *Highly contingent.*

2 THE PATH OF REVOLUTION (LARGE DECISIVE WARS)
Mass mobilization: large networks of veterans: conducive to **class conflict.**
Elites may democratize or face revolution (UK after Napoleonic Wars, Russian Rev).
Heroes coordinate/have influence (Italy, Germany, France after WWI, UK after WWI).

3 THE PATH OF STATE-BUILDING (LARGE `FOREVER' WARS)
Mass mobilization but elites **can adapt over time.**
Can build fiscal capacity (France under Colbert/ Louis IV), engage in military reforms (Germany 19-20C), or can share financially and grant incremental political rights (Venice, Dutch Rep., England 17C, Meiji Japan 19C).

LIMITED WAR

"CASTE"

EXISTENTIAL WAR

CLASS

THE DECISIVENESS OF WAR

DECISIVE WAR

'FOREVER' WAR

THE SCALE OF WAR

LIMITED WAR

"CASTE"

EXISTENTIAL WAR

CLASS

DECISIVE WAR

THE DECISIVENESS OF WAR

'FOREVER' WAR

COOPT

THE MILITARY CASTE:

ELITES BUY OFF PRAETORIAN NON-ELITE
GROUPS/ "MARTIAL RACES"

THE CONSTANT THREAT:

"WAR MAKES STATES"

THE SCALE OF WAR

MORE FORMALLY (DESTINED FOR AN APPENDIX / ENDNOTE?)

Consider a country with economy size Π_t and three groups:

- ▶ (V)anguard non-elite group: endowed with traits α making them good recruits, $\alpha \geq 1$, 1 unit of labor. Earn
  $IR_V : w_v \geq \alpha R$ in peace time,
    R: reservation; $\underline{R}$: subsist/ revolt payoff.
- ▶ Other (N)on-elites: 1 unit of labor.
  $IR_N : w_N \geq R$ in peace-time
- ▶ (E)lites: residual claimants, will receive (per capita) share
  $\frac{\Pi_t-((\alpha V+N)R)}{E}$ during peace-time.

where $E << V << N$

Total non-elite mobilization costs $M((\alpha V + N)w_N, K_M)$
    where K_M: Military Capital (fixed in short-term);
Elite controlled *State* Budget $B_t = B_t(K_A, \Pi_t)$
    where K_A: Administrative Capacity (fixed in short-term);

Existential Threat: $\frac{B_t(K_A,\Pi_t)}{M((\alpha V+N)\underline{R},K_M)} \simeq 1$
(indifference between service and revolt)

WHO HAS AGENCY?

LIMITED WAR

$$\frac{B_t(K_A,\Pi_t)}{\underline{M}((\alpha V+N)\underline{R},K_M)} \gg 1$$

"CASTE"

EXISTENTIAL WAR

$$\frac{B_t(K_A,\Pi_t)}{\underline{M}((\alpha V+N)\underline{R},K_M)} \simeq 1$$

CLASS

↑ (THE DECISIVENESS OF WAR)

DECISIVE WAR

CRISIS

LEADERS ORGANIZE:

THE PEOPLE MOBILIZE:

FEW **(NON-ELITE) VETERANS**

MANY **NON-ELITE VETERANS + HEROES**

CONDUCIVE TO **CIVIL** CONFLICT

CONDUCIVE TO **CLASS** CONFLICT

Elie/Marneur etc (French Rev), Garibaldi, GK Singh (Partition)

Petain+(win), Mussolini +, Hindenberg (loss) / Russian Rev

Itote/ "General China"(Mau Mau/UK col after WWII)

LESSENING EXISTING ELITE CONTROL

'FOREVER'

COOPT

EXISTING ELITES

TECHNOCRATIC REFORMERS

Relax Vanguard Non-Elite IR

↑ K_A: Fiscal Reforms (Colbert/ Neckar)

(French Colonial Armies after WWII:

↑ K_M: Military / Coercive Reforms (if substitutes)

Harkis -`bulwarks of empire'

↓ $\underline{R}$: Relax Non-Elite IR: Participation / Financial

Martial races- UK col. armies before WWII)

Reforms. (Hamilton, Matsukata)

THE SCALE OF WAR $\frac{B_t}{\underline{M}}$

WARS AND FREEDOMS?

LIMITED WAR

EXISTENTIAL WAR

CASTE

CLASS

THE DECISIVENESS OF WAR (↑)

DECISIVE WAR — **CRISIS**

THE PATH OF LEADERSHIP:

CONTINGENT ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES OF NON-ELITE LEADERS THEMSELVES.

WAVE DURING ENLIGHTENMENT.

THE PATH OF REVOLUTION:

RELIES ON MASS MOBILIZATION, MOST PRONE TO RADICAL (& POTENTIALLY DESTRUCTIVE) CHANGE. **CAN BE SHAPED BY HEROES.**

'FOREVER' WAR — **COOPT**

THE PATH CLOSED

ENTRENCH A MILITARIZED SUBGROUP

THE PATH OF STATEBUILDING:

CONTINGENT ON TECH/ IDEAS OF REFORMERS:

WITH FORESIGHT: ADOPT REPRESENTATION/ FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION REFORMS WITHOUT NEED FOR EXTERNAL THREAT.

THE SCALE OF WAR $\frac{B_t}{\underline{M}}$ (→)

EVIDENCE?

	LIMITED WAR	EXISTENTIAL WAR

CASTE   **CLASS**

DECISIVE WAR   **CRISIS**

THE PATH OF LEADERSHIP:

FEW NON-ELITES GAIN THE CAPACITY TO ORGANIZE.
BUT THIS ORG. CAPACITY PROVIDES THESE LEADERS CHOICE

SOUTH ASIAN VETERANS IN PARTITION OF S. ASIA (Jha & Wilkinson *American Pol. Sci Rev.* 2012)

FRENCH VETERANS OF AMERICAN REV IN FRENCH REVOLUTION

(Jha & Wilkinson "Revolutionary Contagion" WP 2023)

THE PATH OF REVOLUTION:

MANY GAIN THE CAPACITY TO ORGANIZE.
AGENCY COMES FROM COORDINATION OF THESE GROUPS, INCLUDING THROUGH HEROISM.

UK NAPOLEONIC WAR VETERANS IN PUSHING FOR SUFFRAGE RIGHTS

FRENCH VETERANS OF VERDUN UNDER PETAIN IN SPREADING HIS AUTOCRATIC VALUES. (Cage, Dagorret, Grosjean & Jha

American Econ. Rev. 2023).

'FOREVER' WAR   **COOPT**

THE PATH CLOSED

ELITES CAN ENTRENCH A MILITARIZED SUBGROUP

THE PATH OF STATEBUILDING:

WITH FORESIGHT: ADOPT REPRESENTATION/ FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION REFORMS WITHOUT NEED FOR EXTERNAL THREAT.

"SWORDS INTO BANK SHARES": 17C UK, 18C US, 19C JAPAN, ISRAEL

(Jha *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 2015, Jha WP, Jha, Mitchener & Takashima, WP,

Jha & Shayo *Econometrica* 2019)

EVIDENCE?

LIMITED WAR

EXISTENTIAL WAR

CASTE

CLASS

DECISIVE WAR CRISIS

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American Econ. Rev. accepted subject to data rep.).

'FOREVER' WAR COOPT

THE PATH CLOSED

ELITES CAN ENTRENCH A
MILITARIZED SUBGROUP

THE PATH OF STATEBUILDING:

WITH FORESIGHT: ADOPT REPRESENTATION/ FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION REFORMS WITHOUT NEED FOR EXTERNAL THREAT.

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(Jha *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 2015, Jha WP, Jha, Mitchener & Takashima, WP,

Jha & Shayo *Econometrica* 2019)

NATURAL EXPERIMENT 1: THE PATH OF LEADERSHIP AND "CASTE" CONFLICT: VETERANS IN THE PARTITION OF SOUTH ASIA

1. 14.5 million displaced between June 1947- 1948: one of the largest forced migrations in world history.

2. Estimated 100,000 - 1 million killed in Partition violence

3. But 3.4 million target minorities ``missing''- unaccounted for by 1951 census (Bharadwaj, Khwaja and Mian 2008).

4. Policymakers did not anticipate the scale of the catastrophe (Copland 2002, Talbot and Singh 2009)

Jha and Wilkinson "Does Combat Experience Foster Organizational Skill? Evidence from the Partition of South Asia" *American Political Science Review* 2012

PRE-DEMOBILIZATION HINDU-MUSLIM RIOTS AND PARTITION-ERA ETHNIC CLEANSING (MINORITIES FORCED TO CONVERT, MIGRATE OR KILLED).


``The principal danger areas are likely to lie in the United Provinces, Bihar and Bengal''
- FM Claude Auchinleck: C-in-C Indian Army, Nov 1945.

PRIVATE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS

Legend

Native States

% Minority outflow per 1951 pop (deciles)

-6.96 - -0.51 -0.50 - -0.17 -0.16 - 0.00 0.01 - 0.24 0.25 - 0.53 0.54 - 1.62 1.63 - 2.59 2.60 - 5.96 5.97 - 16.40 16.41 - 93.01

- Horowitz (2001):``Ordinarily, clear and consistent disapproval of violence deters ethnic riots''

- But in 1947:

" members of the Punjab Boundary Force found a countryside not easily intimidated even by seasoned and heavily armed troops like themselves…

What seems to have been happening was that the army was being challenged by experts, by people who had formerly served within its ranks… the massacres of Punjab, in all their gruesome efficiency, bore the imprint of military training and organization."

- Kamtekar (1988) citing Maj-Gen. Rees' Report, Punjab Boundary Force..

COULD VETERANS HAVE BEEN THAT IMPORTANT?

4th Indian Div. with a captured Nazi battle flag at Sidi Omar, Libya, 1941

- South Asia in WWII recruited the largest volunteer army in world history, with 2,286,000 serving in army at war's end.

- 3% of the adult male population of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh

- However, recruitment explicitly focused on *martial races*. Reasons: 1857, phrenology, vegetarianism (Streets 2004).

- In some districts officers favored only minority ``races'', whereas others recruited from majority. *Pre-determined.*

A NATURAL EXPERIMENT:

"Nothing in war ever goes right, except by accident."- Winston Churchill.

4th Indian Div. with a captured Nazi battle flag at Sidi Omar, Libya, 1941

- Transfer and substitution patterns of infantry battalions to combat brigades/ divisions without regard to ethnicity of unit, often improvised in response to local logistic exigencies/ enemy initiatives. Common military practice.

- Special emphasis that units be `interchangeable' (1921 Reorganisation Report, marked ``Confidential").

- All infantry battalions receive same weapons.

- In internal army correspondence, no evidence for WWII service outside India of specific requests for units based on their ethnicity (with 2 exceptions- Gurkhas)

A NATURAL EXPERIMENT:
THE EXPERIENCE OF BATTALIONS WITHIN THE 1ST PUNJAB REGIMENT

4th Indian Div. with a captured Nazi battle flag at Sidi Omar, Libya, 1941

Battalion	Regiment	First Campaign	Second Campaign	Third Campaign	Fourth Campaign	Months at the frontline
1	1 Punjab	Burma March 1944-July 1945				8
2	1 Punjab	The Arakan Operations 1942-1945	Burma March 1944-July 1945			8
3	1 Punjab	September 1940 - May 1941 East African Campaign	North Africa 1941	Italy 1943	Italy 1944	21
4	1 Punjab					0
5	1 Punjab	The Retreat from Burma 1941-1942	The Arakan Operations 1942-1945	Burma May 1945	Japan July 1945-November 1947	8
6	1 Punjab	South-east Asia				1

COMBAT MONTHS (1939-1945) AND ETHNIC CLEANSING in 1947-50

Combat Mths (Deciles)
0.0 - 0.3 | 0.4 - 0.7 | 0.8 - 1.0 | 1.1 - 1.2 | 1.3 - 1.4 | 1.5 - 1.7 | 1.8 - 2.2 | 2.3 - 2.9 | 3.0 - 4.2 | 4.3 - 11.0

Legend
Native States

% Minority outflow per 1951 pop (deciles)
-6.96 - -0.51 | -0.50 - -0.17 | -0.16 - 0.00 | 0.01 - 0.24 | 0.25 - 0.53 | 0.54 - 1.62 | 1.63 - 2.59 | 2.60 - 5.96 | 5.97 - 16.40 | 16.41 - 93.01

BUT EFFECTS DEPEND ON WHO GETS THE EXPERIENCE:
AN EXAMPLE: LYALLPUR, PRE-BOUNDARY

Legend
% Muslim 1942
0% -20% 21%-40% 41%-60% 61%-80% 81%-100%

Lyallpur

- 62.9% Muslim, but minority (Sikh) recruits favored in district. In WWII, troops happened to be assigned to 4.14 months in war combat (90th percentile).

- ``Important Akali (Sikh) leaders have recently been touring to ensure all preparations possible are complete for the waging of defensive warfare... [GK] Singh..has been touring villages by car in the Lyallpur area ...To comply with his instructions, each village must have a *Jathabandi* [local militia group]. *Jathas* must be reinforced by mounted men and ex-military ..." *Police Intel. Abstract, May 1947*

- But no disturbances, unlike neighboring districts.

ASYMMETRY: AN EXAMPLE: LYALLPUR, POST-BOUNDARY

- "The Sikhs moved in blocks of 40,000 to 60,000 and cover about 20 miles a day… The organization is mainly entrusted to ex-servicemen and soldiers on leave who have been caught by the disturbances. Men on horseback, armed with spears or swords, provide guards in front, behind, and on the flanks. There is a regular system of bugle calls. At night a halt is called near some village where water is available, watch fires are lit, and pickets are posted."

  - Ian Morrison, *The London Times*, August 1947.

- Leader- GK Singh, becomes minister, orchestrates division of Punjab.

VETERANS PROTECT OWN GROUP.

Legend
% Muslim 1942
0%-20% 21%-40% 41%-60% 61%-80% 81%-100%

Lyallpur

- "The Sikhs moved in blocks of 40,000 to 60,000 and cover about 20 miles a day… The organization is mainly entrusted to <u>ex-servicemen and soldiers</u> on leave who have been caught by the disturbances. Men on horseback, armed with spears or swords, provide guards in front, behind, and on the flanks. There is a regular system of bugle calls. At night a halt is called near some village where water is available, watch fires are lit, and pickets are posted."

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
<u>Bottom line: the ethnic cleansing in the Partition was worst in districts when veteran-organized ethnic majorities faced large ethnic minorities that lacked veteran leadership.</u>

REVOLUTIONARY CONTAGION (Stanford GSB working paper)


The Siege of the Bastille, by Claude Cholat, an eyewitness

web.stanford.edu/~saumitra/papers/RevolutionaryContagion.pdf

NATURAL EXPERIMENT 2: THE COASTS OF BRITTANY 1779-1780

Routes of Washington and Rochambeau in 1781

From NPS "American Revolution at a Glance" unigrid

- 6,500+ troops in Rochambeau's force, 2.5% of French army officers, 3.5% of army's enlisted men (Scott, 1998)

- The soldiers did not select themselves for service in America (Scott, 1998)-- some transports did not arrive, leaving behind Neustrie and Anhalt regiments. The second division was ultimately blockaded at Brest.

- Rochambeau's force fought 1780-1783, campaigned with American revolutionary forces from Newport, RI, to VA, with a major engagement at Yorktown. French artillery and infantry were critical in that victory.

- Compare subsequent support for democratic ideas and political mobilization in the birth locations (bailliages) of those who happened to go versus those left behind, and those deployed elsewhere.

BAILLIAGES & GENERALITES VS DEPARTMENTS (1790+)

ROCHAMBEAU'S VETERANS

ROCHAMBEAU'S VETERANS VS NEUSTRIE/ ANHALT

ROCHAMBEAU'S VETERANS VS NEUSTRIE/ ANHALT

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log Neustrie + Anhalt Soldiers	0.342***	0.268***	0.260***	0.298***	0.290***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Log. Non-American Combat Veterans	0.419***	0.347***	0.339***	0.300***	0.292***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Log. Distance to Holy Rom. Emp. (m)	-0.113***	-0.107***	-0.104***	-0.056	-0.057
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Log. Distance to Spain (m)	-0.094	-0.087	-0.085	-0.044	-0.044
	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Log. Distance to Switz/ Savoy (m)	-0.076*	-0.074*	-0.072*	0.015	0.015
	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Log. Distance to Land Frontier	0.080*	0.079*	0.077*	0.025	0.025
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Log. Urban Population	0.055***	0.027**	0.025*	0.035**	0.034**
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Log. Population Density	0.104	0.094	0.092	0.029	0.035
	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Grosse Fermes	-0.045	-0.045	-0.035		
	(0.220)	(0.197)	(0.196)		
Gabelle (livres per quintal)	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Log. Distance to Paris (m)	0.068	0.093*	0.160**	0.030	0.004
	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.076)	(0.096)	(0.194)
Log. Distance to Provincial Capital (m)	-0.019	0.001	0.001	-0.028*	-0.028*
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Log. Distance to Coast (m)	-0.009	-0.002	-0.001	-0.008	-0.009
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Altitude SD	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Log. High School Professors		0.139	0.150	0.003	0.013
		(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Log. Secular High Schools		0.170	0.167	0.251	0.251
		(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.158)	(0.158)
Log. Catholic High Schools		0.022	0.018	0.045	0.044
		(0.151)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.150)
Log. STN Books Sold		0.067	0.072	0.072	0.075
		(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Log. Banned Books Sold		-0.002	-0.002	-0.041	-0.042
		(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.114)	(0.113)
Log. Encyclopedie Subscriptions		0.042	0.042	0.040	0.041
		(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Hyslop Bailliage		0.095	0.095	0.118	0.112
		(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.096)	(0.096)
Generalite Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Dropping Paris Intra- and Extra-Muros	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	436	436	434	436	434
R-squared	0.627	0.650	0.643	0.709	0.702
Mean DV	1.771	1.771	1.757	1.771	1.757

An observation is a bailliage. The outcome is the logarithm of the number of veterans serving in Rochambeau's force. All regressions are OLS and include linear and quadratic controls for Easting and Northing and Easting x Northing. Columns 3 and 5 drop Paris intra-muros and extra-muros. Columns 4 and 5 include separate intercepts for each pre-Revolutionary generalite. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the pre-Revolutionary generalite level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

WE FIND:

- *No evidence that regiments were selected for military service* in America based upon soldier heights, regiment prestige, age or other factors (+ qualitative accounts of arbitrary deployment).

- However, among (ex-)army officers, American veterans more likely to support the constitutional phase of the Revolution.

- Bailliages with greater share American vets (of all ranks) among recruits
  - Were more likely to submit (Third Estate) Cahiers des doleances that were``strongly democratic" (Hyslop)
  - more likely to organize political clubs (and Jacobin clubs) from 1790 onwards.
  - had more peasant rebellions in 1789-90 (but not before).

- Neustrie/ Anhalt recruits and home bailliages of combat soldiers deployed to other fronts in 1781-83 also organize, but later, (somewhat) less and not for democratic values and ideas.

Jha & Wilkinson, "Revolutionary Contagion", working paper

LOYALTY TO THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY: THE MEN

- e.g. America- returned *Bourbonnais* regiment was the only one of 8 garrisoned at Metz in 1790 that remained loyal to the revolution and `has sworn to live and die with it'.

- ``Unlike most of the forces, however, the ``American'' units maintained perfect order not only during the immediate crisis but also in the following weeks and months. Rochambeau's old regiments generally remained among the best disciplined in the French Army until 1792.''

(Scott, From Yorktown to Valmy, 1998)

LOYALTY TO THE REVOLUTION: THE OFFICERS

- The most distinguished … young officers, who might under other circumstances have warmly welcomed the reforms…, soon had their loyalty affected by their service in America…. After service side by side with the American colonists, who were fighting to overthrow the authority of a king, they lost respect for their own monarch, and brought home to France very advanced ideas as to the obedience they owed him. This feeling may be seen, not only in the behavior … of Lafayette, but in that of Rochambeau, the Vicomte de Noailles, the Lameths, the Prince de Broglie, Custines, and all the officers who had served in America, except the Vicomte de Mirabeau."

  - Stephens, 1886

A "CERTAIN SET OF SKILLS"

American Veterans Played Important Roles in 1789- 1991

5/20 Members of Military Committee of Revolution (Stephens 1886).

3 future Marshals of France (incl. Jourdan)

Other key generals, (incl. Jean-Charles Pichegru, and Elie).

Commissioning of 20 American NCO veterans in 1791 (Scott, 1998).

Alexandre de Beauharnais (1760-94), Member of Military Council, President of National Assembly 1791

LOYALTY TO THE REVOLUTION

Kaplan-Meier survival estimates: remained in Rev. Army

Data include all officers in Royal Army, with surnames A-O (*Bodinier Dictionnaire des Officiers Generaux de la Armee Royale 1763-1792*),
 cross-checked with biographies on all military emigres (Pinasseau *L'Emigration militaire* 1974) & lists of American veterans (US Congress)

LOYALTY TO THE REVOLUTION

	(1) 1789 Outset	(2) Outset to 1791 Flight to Varennes	(3) Varennes to 1792 Decl. of War	(4) After 1792 Decl. of War	(5) 1789 Outset	(6) Outset to 1791 Flight to Varennes	(7) Varennes to 1792 Decl. of War	(8) After 1792 Decl. of War
American veteran	0.964**** (0.032)	0.859**** (0.030)	0.579**** (0.035)	0.501**** (0.042)				
Rochambeau veteran					0.636**** (0.140)	0.578**** (0.120)	0.413**** (0.086)	0.324**** (0.071)
D'Estaing veteran					0.575**** (0.133)	0.551**** (0.120)	0.395**** (0.093)	0.313**** (0.099)
American army volunteer					0.535**** (0.140)	0.522**** (0.125)	0.396**** (0.105)	0.423**** (0.103)
Age in 1789 (yrs)	-0.022**** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.015* (0.008)	0.017**** (0.006)	-0.032** (0.015)	-0.015 (0.014)	0.009 (0.011)	0.011 (0.009)
Age-Squared	0.000**** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Noble Family Origin	0.035 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.034)	-0.194**** (0.037)	-0.241**** (0.049)	0.232**** (0.067)	0.169**** (0.061)	-0.082 (0.055)	-0.134** (0.059)
Mean DV	0.0804	0.0132	-0.115	-0.206	0.0804	0.0132	-0.115	-0.206
Observations	2,090	2,040	2,023	2,011	2,090	2,040	2,023	2,011
R-squared	0.397	0.257	0.085	0.077	0.297	0.184	0.053	0.050

An observation is a military officer alive in the relevant time period listed in each column. The outcome is a score defined as evidence for active support (+1), neutrality (0), or active opposition (-1) to the French Revolution in each time period listed in each column. American veteran is a dummy variable for any American revolutionary service. Rochambeau, D'Estaing veterans are dummy variables for service under either commander. American army volunteer includes soldiers in direct service to the American continental army or colonial militias. Noble family origin is a dummy for whether an individual's family has noble origins. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the military unit the soldier belonged to during the American revolution: **** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Data include all officers in Royal Army, with surnames A-O (*Bodinier Dictionnaire des Officiers Generaux de la Armee Royale 1763-1792*), cross-checked with biographies on all military emigres (Pinasseau *L'Emigration militaire* 1974) & lists of American veterans (US Congress)

WHAT ABOUT OUTSIDE THE ARMY? DATA ON INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Rochambeau Regt	1.855	2.186	4.241
	(6.053)	(5.919)	(5.369)
D'Estaing Regt	-2.779	-3.375	-0.528
	(6.739)	(6.777)	(6.073)
Neustrie / Anhalt Regt	7.000*	7.106*	4.617
	(3.978)	(3.960)	(4.675)
Regiment Deployed in Combat Role- 1780-83	7.257	7.341	3.129
	(5.649)	(5.617)	(4.686)
Grenadier			51.331***
			(2.987)
Age (yrs)	5.782***	32.016**	31.843**
	(0.418)	(12.506)	(12.223)
Age-Squared	-0.081***	-1.178*	-1.202**
	(0.006)	(0.587)	(0.574)
Age-Cubed		0.018	0.019*
		(0.012)	(0.011)
Age-Quartic		-0.000	-0.000
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Year of Enrollment/ Ledger FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV (mm)	1701	1701	1701
p(F(Rochambeau = Neustrie/Anhalt))	0.404	0.414	0.952
p(F(Rochambeau= Deployed Elsewhere))	0.614	0.626	0.900
Observations	51,189	51,189	51,189
R-squared	0.174	0.183	0.258

An observation is an individual soldier-ledger entry. The outcome is soldier height (in mm). The estimation is by OLS. All regressions contain a separate fixed effect for the ledger year or year of enrollment, as well as a dummy variable for whether the age was inferred from birth-year listed in the ledger (relative to directly reported). *Grenadier* is a dummy variable indicating that a soldier served in a grenadier company or was listed as a grenadier in the ledger. Source: Hand-collected from the *Service Historique de la Defense-Vincennes*, supplemented by records from the Marquis de Buffon/Komlos 2003; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the regiment level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

source: Archives de la Defense, Chateau de Vincennes, Bourbonnais regiment, ledger for 1761-1785

e.g.: Link here

REBELLIONS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Forrest McDonald's 1951 analysis of Agrarian Radicalism and American Revolutionary War Veterans in France

ROCHAMBEAU VETERANS AND RIOTS 1785-88

ROCHAMBEAU VETERANS AND RIOTS 1789

With full controls, generalite fixed effects, and dropping Paris.

ROCHAMBEAU VETERANS, RIOTS AND REBELLIONS 1789

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log. Rochambeau Veterans	0.060***	0.044**	0.047**	0.052**	0.053**
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Log Neustrie + Anhalt Soldiers	0.054**	0.044	0.047	0.054*	0.056*
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Log. Non-American Combat Veterans	-0.002	-0.014	-0.012	0.004	0.004
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Log. Distance to Holy Rom. Emp. (m)	-0.002	-0.004	-0.005	0.017	0.016
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Log. Distance to Spain (m)	-0.000	0.002	0.001	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Log. Distance to Switz/ Savoy (m)	0.000	-0.002	-0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Log. Distance to Land Frontier	-0.007	-0.005	-0.005	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Log. Urban Population	0.006*	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Log. Population Density	0.070**	0.060*	0.063*	0.064	0.068*
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Grosse Fermes	-0.088	-0.086	-0.093		
	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.076)		
Gabelle (livres per quintal)	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Log. Secular High Schools		0.029	0.031	0.013	0.014
		(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.093)	(0.092)
Log. Catholic High Schools		-0.081	-0.080	-0.013	-0.012
		(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.112)	(0.111)
Log. STN Books Sold		0.003	0.000	0.002	0.001
		(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.049)
Log. Banned Books Sold		0.001	0.002	0.017	0.018
		(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Log. Encyclopedie Subscriptions		0.046**	0.046**	0.036*	0.035*
		(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Generalite Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Dropping Paris Intra- and Extra-Muros	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	436	436	434	436	434
R-squared	0.206	0.230	0.228	0.347	0.345
Mean DV	0.202	0.202	0.200	0.202	0.200
p-value: Roch. = Neustrie/Anhalt	0.882	0.996	0.992	0.970	0.946
p-value: Roch. = Other Combat Veteran	0.0920	0.103	0.100	0.171	0.167

An observation is a bailliage. The outcome is an indicator for whether the bailliage experienced a riot or a revolt in 1789. All regressions are OLS and include linear and quadratic controls for Easting and Northing and Easting x Northing, and an indicator for presence in Hyslop's dataset. Columns 3 and 5 drop Paris intra-muros and extra-muros. Columns 4 and 5 include separate intercepts for each pre-Revolutionary generalite. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the pre-Revolutionary generalite level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

# ROCHAMBEAU VETERANS AND POLITICAL CLUBS 1789

ROCHAMBEAU VETERANS AND POLITICAL CLUBS 1791

# ROCHAMBEAU VETERANS AND POLITICAL CLUBS 1792

ROCHAMBEAU VETERANS AND POLITICAL CLUBS 1793

ROCHAMBEAU VETERANS AND POLITICAL CLUBS 1794

ROCHAMBEAU VETERANS AND POLITICAL CLUBS

	Political Club Founded in Bailliage in Year					
	1789	1790	1791	1792	1793	1794
Log. Rochambeau Veterans	0.013	0.086***	0.064**	0.080***	0.094***	0.096***
	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.023)
Log Neustrie + Anhalt	-0.038**	0.027	0.075***	-0.011	0.014	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.018)
Log. Non-American Combat Veterans	0.018	0.002	0.014	0.023	0.098**	-0.008
	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.037)
R-squared	0.339	0.480	0.401	0.370	0.458	0.418
p-value: Am. Vets = Neustrie/Anhalt	0.0231	0.209	0.787	0.0282	0.136	0.00809
p-value: Am. Vets = Other Combat Veteran	0.843	0.0508	0.402	0.369	0.951	0.0477
Log. American Vets (Rochambeau+d'Estaing)	0.005	0.093***	0.069**	0.105***	0.095***	0.124***
	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Log Neustrie + Anhalt	-0.036**	0.021	0.071**	-0.023	0.009	-0.012
	(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.018)
Log. Non-American Combat Veterans	0.021	0.003	0.015	0.020	0.101***	-0.011
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.033)
R-squared	0.337	0.482	0.401	0.378	0.457	0.433
p-value: Am. Vets = Neustrie/Anhalt	0.0791	0.122	0.968	0.00408	0.129	0.000696
p-value: Am. Vets = Other Combat Veteran	0.552	0.0367	0.353	0.148	0.907	0.00338
Recruitment, Geog, Admin. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enlightenment & Education Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Generalite Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dropping Paris Intra- and Extra-Muros	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.0369	0.373	0.615	0.311	0.403	0.806
Observations	434	434	434	434	434	434

An observation is a bailliage. The outcome is an indicator for the founding of political clubs (left) and Jacobin political clubs in the bailliage in each year. All regressions are estimated using OLS and include the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 2, dropping Paris intra-muros and extra-muros, and include separate intercepts for each pre-Revolutionary generalite. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the pre-Revolutionary generalite level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

ROCHAMBEAU VETERANS AND POLITICAL CLUBS

|	Political Club Founded in Bailliage in Year						Jacobin Club Founded in Bailliage in Year					
	1789	1790	1791	1792	1793	1794	1789	1790	1791	1792	1793	1794
Log. Rochambeau Veterans	0.013	0.086***	0.064**	0.080***	0.094***	0.096***	0.004	0.082***	0.074**	0.043*	0.020	0.056***
	(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Log Neustrie + Anhalt	-0.038**	0.027	0.075***	-0.011	0.014	0.002	-0.027*	0.024	0.032	-0.048**	-0.001	-0.004
	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Log. Non-American Combat Veterans	0.018	0.002	0.014	0.023	0.098**	-0.008	0.015	0.007	-0.006	0.015	0.040	-0.014
	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.033)
R-squared	0.339	0.480	0.401	0.370	0.458	0.418	0.318	0.482	0.389	0.243	0.263	0.245
p-value: Am. Vets = Neustrie/Anhalt	0.0231	0.209	0.787	0.0282	0.136	0.00809	0.130	0.215	0.486	0.0224	0.555	0.163
p-value: Am. Vets = Other Combat Veteran	0.843	0.0508	0.402	0.369	0.951	0.0477	0.663	0.0646	0.201	0.493	0.657	0.102
Log. American Vets (Rochambeau+d'Estaing)	0.005	0.093***	0.069**	0.105***	0.095***	0.124***	-0.003	0.091***	0.074**	0.063***	0.021	0.077***
	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Log Neustrie + Anhalt	-0.036**	0.021	0.071**	-0.023	0.009	-0.012	-0.025	0.017	0.029	-0.056**	-0.002	-0.014
	(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Log. Non-American Combat Veterans	0.021	0.003	0.015	0.020	0.101***	-0.011	0.017	0.008	-0.003	0.012	0.040	-0.017
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.032)
R-squared	0.337	0.482	0.401	0.378	0.457	0.433	0.318	0.485	0.389	0.252	0.263	0.254
p-value: Am. Vets = Neustrie/Anhalt	0.0791	0.122	0.968	0.00408	0.129	0.000696	0.279	0.0971	0.481	0.00207	0.508	0.0433
p-value: Am. Vets = Other Combat Veteran	0.552	0.0367	0.353	0.148	0.907	0.00338	0.404	0.0453	0.225	0.197	0.640	0.0214
Recruitment, Geog, Admin. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enlightenment & Education Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Generalite Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dropping Paris Intra- and Extra-Muros	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.0369	0.373	0.615	0.311	0.403	0.806	0.0323	0.359	0.484	0.101	0.0922	0.134
Observations	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434	434

An observation is a bailliage. The outcome is an indicator for the founding of political clubs (left) and Jacobin political clubs in the bailliage in each year. All regressions are estimated using OLS and include the full set of controls as Column 5 of Table 2, dropping Paris intra-muros and extra-muros, and include separate intercepts for each pre-Revolutionary generalite. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the pre-Revolutionary generalite level. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

BUT DID THIS REFLECT DEMOCRATIC VALUES? THE CAHIERS DES DOLEANCES

BUT DID THIS REFLECT DEMOCRATIC VALUES? THE CAHIERS DES DOLEANCES


|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log. Rochambeau Veterans	0.133***	0.131***	0.130***	0.128***	0.129***
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Log Neustrie + Anhalt Soldiers	-0.022	-0.018	-0.020	0.003	0.004
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Log. Non-American Combat Veterans	-0.042	-0.047	-0.051	-0.045	-0.044
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Log. High School Professors		-0.036	-0.040	-0.027	-0.032
		(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.089)	(0.085)
Log. Secular High Schools		0.009	0.016	-0.015	-0.009
		(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Log. Catholic High Schools		-0.122	-0.118	-0.154	-0.151
		(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.121)	(0.118)
Log. STN Books Sold		0.110*	0.114*	0.108*	0.106
		(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Log. Banned Books Sold		-0.155*	-0.158*	-0.144	-0.143
		(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)
Log. Encyclopedie Subscriptions		0.031	0.033	0.040	0.041
		(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Generalite Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Dropping Paris Intra- and Extra-Muros	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	239	239	237	239	237
R-squared	0.206	0.247	0.228	0.395	0.372
Mean DV	0.180	0.180	0.173	0.180	0.173
p-value: Roch. = Neustrie/Anhalt	0.00281	0.00522	0.00692	0.0481	0.0474
p-value: Roch. = Other Combat Veteran	0.0189	0.0221	0.0207	0.0552	0.0511

An observation is a bailliage. The outcome is an indicator for a "*Most Strongly Democratic* " Third Estate Cahier in 1789, as classified by Beatrice Hyslop. All regressions include linear and quadratic controls for Easting and Northing and Easting x Northing. Columns 3 and 5 drop Paris intra-muros and extra-muros. Columns 4 and 5 include separate intercepts for each pre-Revolutionary generalite. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the pre-Revolutionary generalite level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

AND WHEN THEY GOT TO PARIS…

Serment du Jeu de Paume, by Jacques-Louis David

MODERATE CONSTITUTIONALISTS

ALEXANDRE LAMETH.
Député de Peronne
à l'Assemblée Nationale en 1789
Elu Président le 20 9bre 1790.

A Paris chez l'Auteur Quay des Augustins N° 71. an 3.

- Colonel of Royal Lorraine Regt in Rochambeau's force.
- Order of Cincinnatus, friend of Jefferson
- Moderate `Triumvir'; Believed outsize influence over ~40 deputies
- Left Jacobin club, 1791, joined Feuillants
- Marechal de camp under La Fayette.
- Accused of treason by protesting attack on Tuileries, fled 1792.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN THE ESTATES- GENERAL

	Anti-Revolution Indicators				Pro-Revolution Indicators			
	Right Wing	Against Abolition Nobility	Against New Constitution	Émigré/ Fled	Left Wing	Member Club of 1789	Member Jacobin Club	Member Feuillant Club
Year	1789	1789	1791	1791-	1789	1790	1789-	1791
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
American Rev. Veteran	-0.222***	-0.153	-0.202**	-0.070	0.230*	0.023	0.281**	0.274**
	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.090)	(0.118)	(0.124)	(0.072)	(0.117)	(0.103)
Combat Veteran	0.066	0.065	0.110*	0.116**	-0.074	-0.017	-0.037	-0.138***
	(0.073)	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.038)
Army Career	-0.042	0.014	0.024	0.117*	0.012	0.037	-0.016	0.068
	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.046)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.046)
Landed Seigneurial Estate	0.073**	0.001	0.057	0.064**	-0.075***	-0.023	0.004	-0.008
	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.031)
Held Royal Office	-0.009	-0.028	-0.031	-0.017	-0.022	0.006	-0.019	0.026
	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.016)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Noble before 1400	0.019	0.069	0.057	0.077	0.156*	0.037	0.093	0.033
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.077)	(0.084)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.053)
Third Estate	-0.438***	-0.003	-0.343***	-0.379***	0.399***	0.027**	0.202***	0.298***
	(0.031)	(0.005)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Second Estate (Nobles)	-0.033	0.414***	-0.152**	-0.121*	0.010	0.041**	0.041	-0.001
	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.019)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Generalite Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean DV	0.346	0.110	0.212	0.344	0.412	0.0317	0.157	0.249
P-value (American Vet= Combat Vet)	0.0399	0.0963	0.0246	0.169	0.0334	0.620	0.0198	0.000310
Observations	1,295	1,295	1,295	1,295	1,295	1,295	1,295	1,295
R-squared	0.284	0.402	0.209	0.223	0.239	0.082	0.118	0.167

An observation is an individual member of the Estates-General. All regressions are OLS, and include generalite of representation fixed effects as well as dummy for the different estates (the excluded category is the clergy). The designation "Right Wing" and "Left Wing" originate in the Estates-General for

WE FIND:

- *No evidence that regiments were selected for military service* in America based upon soldier heights, regiment prestige, age or other factors (+ qualitative accounts of arbitrary deployment).

- However, among (ex-)army officers, American veterans more likely to support the constitutional phase of the Revolution.

- Bailliages with greater share American vets (of all ranks) among recruits
    - Were more likely to submit (Third Estate) Cahiers des doleances that were``strongly democratic" (Hyslop)
    - more likely to organize political clubs (and Jacobin clubs) from 1790 onwards.
    - had more peasant rebellions in 1789-90 (but not before).

- Neustrie/ Anhalt recruits and home bailliages of combat soldiers deployed to other fronts in 1781-83 also organize, but later, (somewhat) less and not for democratic values and ideas.

Jha & Wilkinson, "Revolutionary Contagion", working paper

EVIDENCE?

	LIMITED WAR	**EXISTENTIAL WAR**
	CASTE	**CLASS**

DECISIVE WAR — CRISIS

THE PATH OF LEADERSHIP:

FEW NON-ELITES GAIN THE CAPACITY TO ORGANIZE.
BUT THIS ORG. CAPACITY PROVIDES THESE LEADERS CHOICE

SOUTH ASIAN VETERANS IN PARTITION OF S. ASIA (Jha & Wilkinson *American Pol. Sci Rev.* 2012)

FRENCH VETERANS OF AMERICAN REV IN FRENCH REVOLUTION

(Jha & Wilkinson "Revolutionary Contagion" WP)

THE PATH OF REVOLUTION:

MANY GAIN THE CAPACITY TO ORGANIZE.
AGENCY COMES FROM COORDINATION OF THESE GROUPS, INCLUDING THROUGH HEROISM.

UK NAPOLEONIC WAR VETERANS IN PUSHING FOR SUFFRAGE RIGHTS

FRENCH VETERANS OF VERDUN UNDER PETAIN IN SPREADING HIS AUTOCRATIC VALUES. (Cage, Dagorret, Grosjean & Jha

American Econ. Rev. 2023)

'FOREVER' WAR — COOPT

THE PATH CLOSED

ELITES CAN ENTRENCH A MILITARIZED SUBGROUP

THE PATH OF STATEBUILDING:

WITH FORESIGHT: ADOPT REPRESENTATION/ FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION REFORMS WITHOUT NEED FOR EXTERNAL THREAT.

"SWORDS INTO BANK SHARES": 17C UK, 18C US, 19C JAPAN, ISRAEL

(Jha *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 2015, Jha WP, Jha, Mitchener & Takashima, WP,

Jha & Shayo *Econometrica* 2019)

# A DIFFERENT RESPONSE: THE UK 1815

- 300,000 Napoleonic war veterans demobilized 1816, 32,000 in 1817.

- Ex-soldiers active in Luddite insurrections, East Anglian riots of 1816, Pentridge rising 1817, `Peterloo' Massacre

- Govt. banned military training in 1819. (Gash, 1977)

- Temporary threats of revolution leads to democratisation (Great Reform Act 1832)?

IN HEROES AND VILLAINS (*AER*, 2023): WE MEASURE THE EFFECTS OF A NETWORK OF POLITICALLY INFLUENTIAL INDIVIDUALS ON AUTOCRATIC VALUES.

Exploits incidental assignment of `Le Marechal' Philippe Petain + exogenous rotation of troops at Verdun, the `Stalingrad' of WWI, to estimate effects of exposure to heroic networks in WWI on potentially repugnant, autocratic values after the war in home communes.

Exploits secret (1945) French intelligence file listing ~97K individual collabos and their orgs:

economic collaboration

political parties (eg RNF),

militia (eg SOL, LVF, Milice),

Nazi (Gestapo, SS etc).

Compares communes whose regiments happened to be sent to Verdun under Petain to others sent (just) after.

V-u-P raises share of Nazi collabos by 7-10%,

Effects all forms of collaboration

Diffuses beyond the veterans themselves

Effects on right wing vote choice starting in 1924 and particularly in 1930s, mimicking Petain's views.

Prove persistent after the war, accentuated in times of social crisis (1956/58, 1968, 1981)

EVIDENCE?

DECISIVE WAR **CRISIS**

'FOREVER' WAR **COOPT**

LIMITED WAR

CASTE

EXISTENTIAL WAR

CLASS

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American Econ. Rev. accepted subject to data rep.).

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Jha & Shayo *Econometrica* 2019)

"SWORDS INTO BANK SHARES": FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE THREAT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE


Theory + empirics to document how financial innovations which allow the risks and returns of human capital/ ethnic differences have aligned incentives in favor of peace + broader reforms. Historically directed towards revolutionary veterans.

1. Britain (C17): merchants and non-merchants => Joint Stock Companies=> representative government, peace *(Jha Quarterly Journal of Economics 2015)*

2. US (1790s): veterans, bank speculators and politicians => lowered political risk *(Jha, in progress)*

3. Japan (1876-77): 1.8M samurai (veterans) and non-samurai => 80% Bonds/ National Banks=> peace

(Jha, Mitchener and Takashima, in progress)

Masayoshi.

Alexander.

Anatoly.

Promising results with field experiments in Israel (Jha and Shayo *Econometrica* 2019, Jha and Shayo, *Economic Journal* (cond accept), Jha, Shayo and Weiss WP 2023), and around the Brexit referendum in the UK (Jha, Margalit, Shayo in progress)

WARS AND FREEDOMS

STRUCTURE

- The ability of non-elites to organize and credibly threaten violence has long been seen as an important driver of radical political change, including democratization and revolution (eg Marx, Boix 2003, Acemoglu Robinson 2000, 2006)

TO

- WE ARGUE: A common setting through history where this happens is in times of **war**, when external threats leave elites little choice but mobilize non-elites.

AGENCY

- **War** provides non-elites an opportunity to learn to fight, to organize and build networks as well as to demonstrate `heroism': signal willingness for (extreme) sacrifice for the nation.
- Once non-elite individuals have these skills and heroic credentials, they often play leadership roles when they return home that shape history.

WHO HAS AGENCY?

LIMITED WAR
$$\frac{B_t(K_A,\Pi_t)}{\underline{M}((\alpha V+N)\underline{R},K_M)} \gg 1$$
"CASTE"

EXISTENTIAL WAR
$$\frac{B_t(K_A,\Pi_t)}{\underline{M}((\alpha V+N)\underline{R},K_M)} \simeq 1$$
CLASS

LEADERS ORGANIZE:

THE PEOPLE MOBILIZE:

DECISIVE WAR

CRISIS

FEW **(NON-ELITE) VETERANS**

MANY **NON-ELITE VETERANS + HEROES**

CONDUCIVE TO **CIVIL** CONFLICT

CONDUCIVE TO **CLASS** CONFLICT

Elie/Marneur etc(French Rev), Garibaldi, GK Singh (Partition)

Petain+(win), Mussolini +, Hindenberg (loss) / Russian Rev

Itote/ "General China"(Mau Mau/UK col after WWII)

THE DECISIVENESS OF WAR

LESSENING EXISTING ELITE CONTROL

'FOREVER'

COOPT

EXISTING ELITES

TECHNOCRATIC REFORMERS

Relax Vanguard Non-Elite IR

↑ K_A: Fiscal Reforms (Colbert/ Neckar)

(French Colonial Armies after WWII:

↑ K_M: Military / Coercive Reforms (if substitutes)

Harkis -`bulwarks of empire'

↓ $\underline{R}$: Relax Non-Elite IR: Participation / Financial

Martial races- UK col. armies before WWII)

Reforms. (Hamilton, Matsukata)

THE SCALE OF WAR $\frac{B_t}{\underline{M}}$