DP16543 Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective

Author(s): Laura Doval, Alex Smolin
Publication Date: September 2021
Keyword(s): Bayesian persuasion, information design, interim payoffs, reputation
Programme Areas: Organizational Economics
Link to this Page: cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=16543

We study the payoffs that can arise under some information structure from an interim perspective. There is a set of types distributed according to some prior distribution and a payoff function that assigns a value to each pair of a type and a belief over the types. Any information structure induces an interim payoff profile which describes, for each type, the expected payoff under the information structure conditional on the type. We characterize the set of all interim payoff profiles consistent with some information structure. We illustrate our results through applications.