DP4670 Political Institutions, Environmental Policy and Growth

Author(s): Laura Marsiliani, Thomas I Renström
Publication Date: October 2004
Keyword(s): bargaining, comparative politics, endogenous growth, environmental policy, overlapping generations, taxation, voting
JEL(s): D62, D72, E20, E62, H20, H55, O41, Q58
Programme Areas: Public Economics
Link to this Page: cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4670

We analyse the impact of micro-founded political institutions on environmental policy and economic growth. We model an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals differ in preferences over the environment (as well as in age). Labour taxation and capital taxation is used to finance a public good and a public production factor, period by period. The underlying political institution is a parliament. Party entry, parliamentary composition, coalition formation, and bargaining are endogenous. The benchmark is when all decisions are taken in parliament. We compare this constitution with an independent regulator, elected in parliament. The regulatory regime causes lower pollution, but production inefficiency.