DP7240 Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion
|Author(s):||Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta, Thomas Rønde|
|Publication Date:||March 2009|
|Keyword(s):||Monopolization practices, Vertical agreements|
|JEL(s):||L12, L40, L42|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7240|
This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.