Author(s):	Hélène Benghalem, Pierre Cahuc, Olivier Charlot, Emeline Limon, Franck Malherbet
Publication Date:	November 2016
Keyword(s):	Employment protection legislation, taxation, Temporary jobs
JEL(s):	J63, J64, J68
Programme Areas:	Labour Economics
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11628

This paper analyzes the consequences of the taxation of temporary jobs recently introduced in several European countries to induce firms to create more open-ended contracts and to increase the duration of jobs. The estimation of a job search and matching model on French data shows that the taxation of temporary jobs does not reach its objectives: it reduces the mean duration of jobs and decreases job creation, employment and welfare of unemployed workers. We find that a reform introducing an open-ended contract without layoff costs for separations occurring at short tenure would have opposite effects.