DP12474 Heterogeneous Effects of Performance Pay with Market Competition: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
|Author(s):||Guido Friebel, Matthias Heinz, Pooyan Khashabi, Tobias Kretschmer, Nick Zubanov|
|Publication Date:||November 2017|
|Keyword(s):||business stealing, competitor response, Management Practices, market competition, pay for performance (PfP)|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12474|
It is well established that the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (PfP) schemes depends on employee- and firm-specific factors. Much less is known about the role of factors outside the firm. We investigate the role of market competition on the effectiveness of PfP. Our theory posits that there are two counteracting effects, a business stealing and a competitor response effect, that jointly generate an inverted U-shape relationship between PfP effectiveness and competition. Weak competition creates low incentives to exert effort because there is little extra market to gain, while strong competition creates low incentives as competitors respond more. PfP hence has the strongest effect for moderate competition. We test this prediction with a field experiment on a retail chain which confirms our theory and refutes alternative explanations.