DP13898 How Effective Are Monetary Incentives to Vote? Evidence from a Nationwide Policy
| Author(s): | Mariella Gonzales, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta, Luis Martinez |
| Publication Date: | July 2019 |
| Keyword(s): | compulsory voting, External Validity, Informational frictions, Peru, voter registration, Voter turnout |
| JEL(s): | D72, D78, D83, K42 |
| Programme Areas: | Public Economics, Development Economics |
| Link to this Page: | cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13898 |
We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fine leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full fine reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger fine are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run effects following an adjustment to the value of the fine point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes.