DP16091 Equilibrium Securitization with Diverse Beliefs
|Author(s):||Andrew Ellis, Michele Piccione, Shengxing Zhang|
|Publication Date:||April 2021|
|Keyword(s):||Collateral, heterogeneous beliefs, pooling, Securitization, tranching|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=16091|
We study the effects of diverse beliefs on equilibrium securitization under risk neutrality. We provide a simple characterization of the optimal securities. Pooling and tranching of assets emerges in equilibrium as a consequence of the traders' diverse beliefs about asset returns. The issuer of securities tranches the asset pool, and traders sort among the tranches according to their beliefs. We show how the traders' disagreement about the correlation of asset returns is a key factor in determining which assets are pooled.