DP4354 Can Private Giving Promote Economic Segregation?
|Author(s):||Ignatius J Horstmann, Kimberley Scharf, Al Slivinski|
|Publication Date:||April 2004|
|Keyword(s):||jurisdiction formation, private provision of public goods|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4354|
This Paper explores the theoretical relationship between tax relief for private giving and locational equilibria. Tax relief for giving may receive political support at the local level because of its distributional effects; however, through its effects on public provision choices, such relief may affect individual location decisions and, in so doing, may promote economic segregation rather than integration. In such a scenario, a ban on local tax incentives for giving would be Pareto-improving and would thus be sanctioned by a majority-supported federal tax constitution.