DP6240 Legislative Process with Open Rules
|Author(s):||Theresa Fahrenberger, Hans Gersbach|
|Publication Date:||April 2007|
|Keyword(s):||bargaining in legislatures, Baron/Ferejohn model, open rules, three-group and four-group equilibria|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6240|
We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs.