DP6240 Legislative Process with Open Rules

Author(s):	Theresa Fahrenberger, Hans Gersbach
Publication Date:	April 2007
Keyword(s):	bargaining in legislatures, Baron/Ferejohn model, open rules, three-group and four-group equilibria
JEL(s):	D7
Programme Areas:	Public Economics
Link to this Page:	cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6240

We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such equilibria are either of the three-group or four-group type. The latter type tends to occur when the size of the legislature becomes larger. Moreover, four-group equilibria imply large delay costs.