DP6379 On the Design of Global Refunding and Climate Change

Author(s): Hans Gersbach, Ralph Winkler
Publication Date: July 2007
Keyword(s): climate change mitigation, global refunding scheme, international agreements, self-enforcing mechanisms
JEL(s): H23, H41, Q54
Programme Areas: Public Economics
Link to this Page: cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=6379

We design a global refunding scheme as a new international approach to address climate change. A global refunding system allows each country to set its carbon emission tax, while aggregate tax revenues are partially refunded to member countries in proportion to the relative emission reductions they achieve within a given period, compared to some given baseline emissions. In a simple model we show that a suitably designed global refunding scheme is self-enforcing and achieves the social global optimum.