Discussion paper

DP13424 Fighting Mobile Crime

Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having committed a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, instead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome.


Crinò, R, G Immordino and S Piccolo (2019), ‘DP13424 Fighting Mobile Crime‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 13424. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp13424