Discussion paper

DP17730 Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: theories of harm for abuse cases

This paper is based on my EARIE (European Association of Researchers in Industrial Economics) Presidential Address, delivered at the EARIE Annual Conference in Vienna (August 2022). I am grateful to participants in the EARIE conference, as well as to those in the Bergen Competition Law and Economics Conference (June 2022) in which I had given a keynote address on the same topic; and to Natalia Fabra, Chiara Fumagalli, David Kovo, Miquel Tebar, and Sandro Shelegia for comments and discussions. This paper also builds on many years of work and discussions with Chiara Fumagalli, to whom I am deeply indebted. I have benefited from the BBVA Foundation for a grant within the programme ``Ayudas Fundacion BBVA a Equipos de Investigacion Cientifica 2019''. I also acknowledge financial aid from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (AEI) and FEDER (project ECO2016-76998-P) and from the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (AEI), through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S).

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Citation

Motta, M (2022), ‘DP17730 Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: theories of harm for abuse cases‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 17730. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp17730