DP4576 Interregional Redistribution and Mobility in Federations: A Positive Approach
|Author(s):||Nico Hansen, Anke Kessler|
|Publication Date:||August 2004|
|Keyword(s):||fiscal federalism, interregional transfers, migration, redistribution|
|Programme Areas:||Public Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4576|
The Paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice. We find that paradoxical consequences of interjurisdictional transfers can arise if people are mobile: while self-sufficient regions are necessarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model, interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes. Thus, interregional redistribution prevents interregional equality. As we show, however, it at the same time allows for more interpersonal equality among the inhabitants of each region. For this reason, the voting population may in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence.