DP2156 The Politics of Cooptation
|Author(s):||Graziella Bertocchi, Michael Spagat|
|Publication Date:||May 1999|
|Keyword(s):||Cooptation, Privatization, Upheaval, Welfare State|
|JEL(s):||D3, D74, H3, P26|
|Programme Areas:||International Macroeconomics, Transition Economics|
|Link to this Page:||cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2156|
Group 1 holds political power. Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the upheaval probability by co-opting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign Group 3. Improvements in upheaval technology lead to less co-optation. Increasing the relative size of Group 1 implies larger co-optation payments to a smaller group, decreasing the total resources committed to co-optation. In an extension in which Group 3 also threatens Group 1, although less destructively than does Group 2, co-optation transfers are reduced. Growth causes political stabilization. The theory applies to the origin of the welfare state, post-communist privatization and other situations.