DP4297 Political Influence in a New Anti-Dumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico

Author(s): Joseph Francois, Gunnar Niels
Publication Date: March 2004
Keyword(s): anti-dumping, endogenous import protection, endogenous tariffs, mexico, political economy of trade policy
JEL(s): F10, F13
Programme Areas: International Trade and Regional Economics
Link to this Page: cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4297

We examine the role of political factors in Mexico?s anti-dumping regime, considering both the characteristics of target countries subject to anti-dumping duties and industry-specific factors for sectors receiving protection. Our results are broadly consistent with the recent theoretical literature on endogenous protection, in terms of both the political costs and the political benefits of providing protection. They are also in line with the existing empirical literature on anti-dumping, which is focused primarily on the experience of the US and the EU. Our results also suggest that WTO Membership of trading partners increases the political costs of supplying administered protection.