Discussion paper

DP18466 Fraud-proof non-market allocation mechanisms

We study the optimal design of fraud-proof allocation mechanisms with- out transfers. An agent’s eligibility relies on a score reflecting social value, but gaming generates misallocations, mistrust, unfairness and other nega- tive externalities. We characterize optimal allocation rules that are immune to gaming under two classes of gaming technologies. We examine the im- pact of demographic changes on allocations within and across identifiable groups, while accounting for resource and quota constraints. Fraud-proof allocation rules enhance fairness and trust in allocation systems at the cost of some allocative efficiency.


Perez-Richet, E and V Skreta (2023), ‘DP18466 Fraud-proof non-market allocation mechanisms‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 18466. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp18466