Discussion paper

DP7482 Delegating Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia

This paper shows that absent a commitment technology, central banks can nevertheless achieve the (timeless-)optimal commitment equilibrium if they are delegated with an objective function that is different from the societal one. In a prototypical forward-looking New Keynesian model, I develop a general linear-quadratic method to solve for the optimal delegation parameters that generate the optimal amount of inertia in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. I study the optimal design of some policy regimes that are nested within this framework: inflation, output-gap growth and nominal income growth targeting; and inflation and output-gap contracts. Notably, since the timeless-optimal equilibrium is time-consistent, so is any delegation scheme that implements it.


Bilbiie, F (2009), ‘DP7482 Delegating Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7482. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp7482